Dwight Smith v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-01959-COA
DWIGHT SMITH A/K/A SMOKEY
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
8/24/2004
HON. MICHAEL R. EUBANKS
MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DWIGHT SMITH (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CLAIBORNE MCDONALD
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 11/01/2005
EN BANC.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1.
On July 11, 2003, in the Marion County Circuit Court, Dwight Smith entered a plea of guilty to
burglary of a building as an habitual offender. Smith was sentenced to serve seven years in the custody of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On August 10, 2004, Smith filed a motion for post-conviction
relief. The trial court denied Smith’s motion for relief on August 24, 2004. Smith now appeals to this
Court, asserting the following: (1) his due process rights were violated; (2) his right to a speedy trial was
violated; (3) the indictment was insufficient; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding
no merit to any of Smith’s issues, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶2.
The standard of review in post-conviction relief cases is well-stated: The findings of the trial court
must be clearly erroneous in order to overturn a lower court's denial of a post-conviction relief motion.
McClinton v. State, 799 So. 2d 123, 126 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
DISCUSSION
I. WERE SMITH’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED?
II. WAS SMITH’S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATED?
III. WAS THE INDICTMENT INSUFFICIENT?
¶3.
As Smith’s first three issues relate to his guilty plea, we will address them together. During his plea
hearing, Smith testified that it was his decision to plead guilty, that no one pressured him into pleading guilty,
that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty rather than going to trial, and that he was satisfied
with his attorney’s advice.
¶4.
According to Anderson v. State, 577 So. 2d 390, 391 (Miss. 1991), “a valid guilty plea operates
as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional rights or defects which are incident to trial.” Other rights waived by
entering a guilty plea are the right to a speedy trial (see Anderson, 577 So. 2d at 391), any defenses to the
charge (see Taylor v. State, 766 So. 2d 830 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)), and the right that the
prosecution must prove each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt (see Jefferson v. State,
556 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Miss. 1989)).
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¶5.
In his order, the trial court determined that Smith’s guilty plea was entered into knowingly and
voluntarily and, as a result, his arguments were waived. We can find no error in the lower court’s finding;
thus, we find these issues to be without merit.
IV. WAS SMITH’S COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE?
¶6.
In his last issue on appeal, Smith argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. Smith claims that his
attorney failed to object to a defective indictment; failed to request discovery; failed to assert his right to
a speedy trial; failed to investigate his defense to the charge; and failed to object to his sentencing as an
habitual offender. Smith must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and the
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
¶7.
During the plea colloquy Smith stated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation and
his counsel had not pressured him into pleading guilty. The trial court also found that Smith’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims were waived by his guilty plea. Furthermore, the trial court also noted that,
“Thanks to the work of Smith’s counsel, he pled guilty to the crime of burglary of a building as a habitual
offender under the ‘Little Habitual Offender Statute’, and thus received a seven year sentence instead of
the aforementioned life sentence.” Smith was originally indicted as an habitual offender, which carried a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Smith has failed to meet the requirements of
Strickland; thus, we find no merit to this issue.
¶8.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO MARION COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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