Sarah Ratcliff v. Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, L.P.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-01211-COA
SARAH RATCLIFF
APPELLANT
v.
RAINBOW CASINO-VICKSBURG PARTNERSHIP,
L.P. (THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP), UNITED
GAMING RAINBOW AND ALLIANCE GAMING
CORPORATION
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
5/18/2004
HON. GRAY EVANS
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
STANLEY FRANK STATER
JASON HOOD STRONG
CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
RAINBOW CASINO.
AFFIRMED: 11/01/2005
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Sarah Ratcliff sustained injuries when she fell at the Rainbow Casino in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and
consequently sued Rainbow for her injuries. At the completion of discovery, the court below granted
Rainbow’s motion for summary judgment. Feeling aggrieved, Ratcliff appeals, arguing that (1) Mississippi
should hold casinos to a higher standard of care than other businesses, (2) the stool she tripped over was
inherently dangerous or, (3) in the alternative, Mississippi should adopt a requirement that all premises
liability claims must go to a jury.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
Ratcliff was gambling at the Rainbow Casino in Vicksburg on March 13, 2001, when she tripped
over a stool1 and fell, breaking her hip. Ratcliff was seventy years old at the time of the accident and had
been sitting on the same stool for five or six hours, taking breaks only to cash in her tickets or to use the
restroom. Ratcliff consequently sued Rainbow Casino for damages, alleging that Rainbow was negligent
in not providing a reasonably safe premises. After discovery, the court below granted Rainbow’s motion
for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
We employ a de novo standard when reviewing a lower court’s grant of summary judgment.
McMillan v. Rodriguez, 823 So. 2d 1173, 1176-77 (¶9) (Miss. 2002). All evidence in the record will
be viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment has been entered. Id.
Summary judgment will only be affirmed where the non-moving party fails to present any genuine issue of
material fact. Id. The burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving
party. Id.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
(1) The standard of care owed by casinos
¶5.
Ratcliff urges this Court to find that casinos should be held to a higher standard of care than other
businesses. The current standard of care owed by casinos is “to keep the premises reasonably safe, and
when not reasonably safe to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril that is not in plain and open
1
Neither Ratcliff nor Rainbow is sure which stool Ratcliff tripped over, but Ratcliff concedes that
it was either her own stool or her friend’s stool (whom she had been sitting next to the entire evening).
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view.” McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Miss. 1990). This standard applies not only
to casinos, but to all business owners. Although numerous Mississippi cases have applied this standard to
casinos,2 Ratcliff urges this Court to adopt a new strict liability standard for casinos. Under this standard,
a casino would be liable for any injury suffered by its patrons, regardless of fault.3 Ratcliff believes casinos
should be held to this higher standard because of the “physical and psychological manipulation of the casino
environment.”
¶6.
We decline to apply a new standard of strict liability to casinos. Ratcliff has provided no authority
to support her argument that strict liability should be applied to casinos. No Mississippi case has ever
applied strict liability to a casino. Ratcliff cites a passage from the Restatement Second of Torts that is not
directly on point, two dissenting opinions, and other cases that state only the current standard of care owed
by casinos. None of these sources provide support for this Court to apply a standard of strict liability to
casinos. Under Mississippi law, “failure to cite case law in support of an argument precludes this Court
from considering the assignment of error on appeal.” Farm Services, Inc. v. Oktibbeha County Bd. of
Supervisors, 860 So. 2d 804, 810 (¶24) (Miss. 2003) (citing Hewlett v. State, 607 So. 2d 1097, 1107
(Miss. 1992)). Therefore, Ratcliff has not presented a valid argument for this Court to review.
¶7.
We do note, however, that even if the authorities cited by Ratcliff were assumed to be sufficient
to overcome the aforementioned procedural bar, we would still decline to impose a standard of strict
2
E.g., Tucker v. Riverboat Corp., 905 So. 2d 741, 744 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Breaux
v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., 854 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); Breland
v. Gulfside Casino Partnership, 736 So. 2d 446, 448-49 (¶¶18-22) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
3
Ratcliff also makes the argument that the mere presence of a patron in a casino is inherently
dangerous. Although Ratcliff treats this as a separate argument from her contention that casinos should be
held to a standard of strict liability, we see no real distinction between the two. Therefore, our discussion
of Ratcliff’s strict liability theory also responds to her argument that the mere presence of a patron in a
casino is inherently dangerous.
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liability on casinos. Ratcliff argues that casinos are inherently different from other businesses, such as
grocery stores, because it is the purpose of a casino to “seduce the invitee to get lost in time and space and
to create the [sic] ‘magical effects’ and ‘dream-like state’.” However, Ratcliff fails to point out the
examples that are more on point: bars, movie theaters, museums, musicals, nightclubs, amusement parks,
state fairs, etc. All these businesses rely on being able to attract and keep customers entertained for hours.
All these businesses employ flashy attractions designed to keep customers riveted. All do so for profit.
According to Ratcliff’s reasoning, all these businesses should therefore have a standard of strict liability
imposed upon them. We see no reason to ignore established Mississippi premises liability law and impose
a standard of strict liability on casinos and other similar businesses.
(2) Summary judgment and inherent danger of stools
¶8.
Ratcliff also argues that summary judgment was improperly granted in her case because she
presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the inherent safety of the stools employed by Rainbow.
We find this argument is without merit. The stools used by Rainbow were standard stools used not only
by numerous casinos, but also by any number of other businesses across the country. Ratcliff claimed in
her affidavit that the stools were dangerous in part because they did not have backs and that the other
casinos she visited had backed stools. However, Ratcliff herself contradicted this statement in her
deposition where she testified as follows:
Q. Do you always go to the Rainbow?
A. No. I sometimes go to Harrahs. [sic]
Q. Sometimes Harrahs. [sic] Does Harrahs [sic] use the same type of stools Rainbow
does?
A. I never have looked at the stools down there. I just sat on them. They probably
do.
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Q. They look about the same?
A. Uh-huh. [Affirmative].
Ratcliff also offered no evidence to substantiate her claim that stools with backs are easier to occupy or
have safer legs. No experts were deposed to support Ratcliff’s claim that backed stools are safer than
backless stools. No evidence was presented as to the actual practices of casinos and other businesses and
whether the style of stool that Ratcliff was sitting on is considered to be dangerous.
¶9.
More than once Ratcliff alleges, but offered no proof, that Rainbow later replaced the style of stool
over which she tripped. Ratcliff does not address the fact that even if she had proof of this, it would be
inadmissible at trial under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 407, which bars evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when offered to prove negligence. Such evidence is only admissible to prove other facts, such
as control, ownership, or feasibility (none of which Ratcliff alleges as an issue). Therefore, we accord little
weight to Ratcliff’s bare assertion that Rainbow replaced its stools because the previous stools were
dangerous.
¶10.
Ratcliff also contends that her claim should have gone to a jury because “being carried out of the
casino on a gurney after falling and breaking her right hip is conclusive proof that sufficient facts exist for
a jury to determine that the casino had not met its obligation to keep its premises reasonably safe.” This
statement is simply untrue. The mere presence of an injury is not conclusive proof that there are any facts
from which a jury could conclude that a casino did not meet its obligation to maintain a reasonably safe
premises. People slip and fall for many reasons — including their own negligence. The mere fact that an
injury results from such a fall does not conclusively create evidence of negligence on the part of the business
owner.
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¶11.
Several Mississippi cases are relevant to the issues raised in this case. In one case, a motion for
directed verdict was affirmed where a plaintiff had tripped over a raised threshold in a doorway.
McGovern v. Scarborough, 566 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Miss. 1990). The court held: “it is impossible to
envision this doorway as creating a danger of some kind, in some way different from thousands of like
doorways. . . . If this Court were to hold a jury question was made on whether this doorway was not
reasonably safe, we would have to say a jury question is made as to any doorway from the street which
is not on the same level as the street.” Id. Similarly, in the case now before us, it is equally difficult to see
how the stool in question created a danger different from thousands of similar stools in use across the
country.
¶12.
In another case, a plaintiff tripped and fell over a hand truck that the plaintiff knew was present but
misjudged its actual location. This Court held that the defendant, Wal-Mart, should have been granted a
directed verdict at the end of trial because “[t]he fact that Littleton misjudged the actual location of the. .
. hand truck is lamentable, yet hardly implies a breach of duty by Wal-Mart. . . . The danger was known
to Littleton, and the presence of a hand truck is hardly unusual in a store like Wal-Mart. . . .” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Littleton, 822 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The presence of a stool
is hardly unexpected in a casino; like the plaintiff in Littleton, Ratcliff knew that the stool was there and
merely misjudged its actual location, which caused her to trip over it.
¶13.
The record clearly established that Ratcliff tripped over either her own stool or her friend’s stool,
which she sat next to all night. Ratcliff testified in her deposition that no Rainbow employees tampered with
her stool and that the stool was where Ratcliff had herself placed it. She presented no evidence that the
stool in question was dangerous, or that its location was dangerous, or that the lighting was dangerous, etc.
Ratcliff has only presented evidence that there was a stool, which she tripped over. For all the reasons
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above, Ratcliff has failed to show any genuine issue of material fact regarding the inherent safety of the
stools used by Rainbow.
(3) Requirement that all premises negligence claims go to a jury
¶14.
Ratcliff urges this Court to create a procedural requirement whereby anytime negligence is asserted
against the owner of an establishment (it is not clear whether Ratcliff intends this only for casinos or for all
businesses), summary judgment is not available and the case must go to a jury, regardless of how
preposterous the plaintiff’s claims. There is no binding case law to support Ratcliff’s contention that
Mississippi should adopt this requirement, which is found only in Nevada state law. Ratcliff has presented
no persuasive reason as to why Mississippi should abandon its common law requirements and the vehicle
of summary judgment in premises liability cases. The potential dangers of adopting such a requirement are
obvious. Summary judgment is available to help unclog already overcrowded court dockets by throwing
out cases where a plaintiff is unable to show any genuine issue of material fact. If summary judgment were
to be abolished as a remedy in premises liability cases, how long before it would no longer be available in
products liability cases, contract cases, etc.? Removing such an established and useful procedural remedy
would lead Mississippi courts down a path whose end is even more congested court dockets and frivolous
lawsuits that juries would be forced to endure merely because the plaintiff alleges that his injuries occurred
on business premises. We see no reason to create such a requirement and therefore decline to do so. The
grant of summary judgment against Ratcliff was proper.
¶15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BRIDGES, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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