Daniel Clyde Dove v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-KA-00226-COA
DANIEL CLYDE DOVE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
1/24/2003
HON. JERRY O. TERRY, SR.
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ROBERT CHARLES STEWART
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
CONO CARANNA
CRIMINAL - FELONY
FELONY DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCESENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF 5 YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF MDOC TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE HE IS
PRESENTLY SERVING.
AFFIRMED 10/18/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Daniel Dove was convicted by a jury in the Harrison County Circuit Court for felony DUI. Dove
appeals, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DOVE’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE
II. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DOVE’S MOTION IN
LIMINE TO PREVENT EVIDENCE OF DOVE’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On November 26, 2000, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Larry Isaiah and Larry Hartfield were
involved in a car accident with Daniel Dove at the parking lot of the Studio Apartments in Gulfport. Officer
James Vaughan responded to the accident. He instructed Dove to turn his car off, but instead he drove
another three feet. Dove complied with the request after Officer Vaughan repeated the command.
¶4.
Officer Vaughan noticed that Dove had a beer in his hand and was trying to hide it. He also noticed
that Dove’s “words were slurry, his eyes were bloodshot, and he really didn’t know where he was.” He
also noticed that Dove’s car smelled of alcohol.
¶5.
Officer Vaughan decided to obtain the assistance of Officer Jerry Birmingham, who has received
training in detecting drunk driving. Officer Birmingham approached Dove and observed him stagger and
stumble. He then asked Dove to recite the alphabet, but Dove failed after reaching the letter G. At 11:37
a.m., Officer Birmingham was of the opinion that Dove was under the influence of alcohol and arrested him.
Dove refused to submit to an intoxilyzer test, so Officer Birmingham obtained a warrant from a municipal
court judge to draw Dove’s blood. The test was administered at 1:24 p.m. and showed a blood alcohol
concentration of .39 percent. At the time of the arrest, the legal limit for driving under the influence was
.10 percent. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(c) (Rev. 2000).
¶6.
While Dove was in custody, the police learned that Dove had been found guilty of a DUI on
January 13, 1997, and pleaded guilty to a second DUI on March 11, 1999. Dove was arrested and later
indicted for felony driving under the influence of alcohol. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1)(a)(2)(c) (Rev.
2004). The case went to trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.
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I. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DOVE’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE
¶7.
On the day of Dove’s trial, his attorney made a motion to suppress evidence of Dove’s blood
alcohol results, claiming that the warrant authorizing the blood alcohol test was invalid. The court denied
the motion. Dove contends that the municipal court violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
when it issued a warrant authorizing a blood alcohol test without Dove’s consent.
¶8.
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966), Schmerber was being treated at a
hospital for injuries he suffered in an automobile accident. A police officer directed a physician to take a
blood sample from Schmerber’s body. The blood sample showed that Schmerber was intoxicated at the
time of the accident. Schmerber was indicted for driving under the influence of alcohol, and the blood
sample was introduced at trial. Schmerber claimed that the blood test was given without his consent, was
the product of an unlawful search and seizure, and violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that
taking blood alcohol samples from a defendant who had been lawfully arrested did not violate a person’s
constitutional rights. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized the urgency of administering alcohol
tests quickly, noting that “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking
stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.” Id. at 770.
¶9.
A police officer desiring an arrest warrant must obtain a judicial determination that probable cause
exists. Conerly v. State, 760 So. 2d 737, 740 (¶7) (Miss. 2000). The issuing judge’s determination of
the existence of probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Haddox v. State, 636
So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Miss. 1994). On review of a judge's issuance of an arrest warrant, this Court
determines whether the facts and circumstances before the judge provided a “ ‘substantial basis . . . for
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conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.’” Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 860 (¶ 65) (Miss. 2003)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)). In the present case, Officer Birmingham
observed Dove’s slurred speech and staggered walk, and he noted that Dove’s breath smelled of alcohol.
He also noted that Dove actually admitted to having drunk four beers that morning and was unable to recite
the alphabet. The municipal court judge was within his discretion in issuing a warrant.
II. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DOVE’S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PREVENT EVIDENCE OF DOVE’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS
¶10.
On the day of trial, Dove’s attorney made a motion in limine to suppress evidence of Dove’s prior
DUI convictions. The court heard the motion and denied it. Dove asserts that the State presented
evidence of four prior DUI convictions, over Dove’s attorney’s objection. This assertion is factually
incorrect. In reality, the State presented into evidence four documents representing two prior DUI
offenses.
¶11.
Dove also contends that Dove’s prior DUI convictions unfairly prejudiced the jury and claims that
the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value. M.R.E. 403. However, the Mississippi Supreme
Court has specifically addressed this very issue. In Weaver v. State, 713 So. 2d 860 (Miss. 1997), the
defendant was convicted of a felony third offense DUI. Weaver claimed that the felony DUI trials should
have been bifurcated due to the prejudicial nature of the underlying misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 865
(¶29). The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected this claim and noted that the evidence of the defendant’s
prior DUI convictions was necessary to meet the State’s burden of proof and obtain conviction for a felony
DUI. Id. at 865 (¶31). Likewise, in the present case, it was necessary for the State to produce evidence
of Dove’s prior DUI convictions in order to secure a felony DUI conviction, because the prior arrests were
elements of the crime with which he was charged. Moreover, in the case sub judice, the circuit court took
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steps to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of Dove’s prior convictions. The jury was given a
cautionary instruction mandating that Dove’s prior DUI convictions were not to be considered as evidence
against Dove. This issue is without merit.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF FELONY DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND SENTENCE OF
FIVE YEARS, SENTENCE TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH SENTENCE APPELLANT IS
CURRENTLY SERVING, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, GRIFFIS, AND BARNES,
JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J NOT PARTICIPATING.
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