Curtis D. Glinsey v. John A. Newson, Sr.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-00499-COA
CURTIS D. GLINSEY
APPELLANT
v.
JOHN A. NEWSON, SR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
2/13/2004
HON. ALBERT B. SMITH, III
COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CURTIS D. GLINSEY (PRO SE)
C. KENT HANEY
CIVIL - CONTRACT
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ENTERED.
AFFIRMED - 09/20/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
BRIDGES, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
On December 13, 2002, Curtis Glinsey sued John Newson in the Coahoma County Circuit Court.
Glinsey alleged that Newson committed a breach of contract. Newson answered and finally filed a motion
to dismiss on January 5, 2004. The circuit court considered matters outside the pleadings and, accordingly,
treated Newson’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit
court granted summary judgment in Newson’s favor. Aggrieved, Glinsey appeals and alleges that the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because of the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Glinsey and Newson have the same father, but different mothers. Together, they maintained
construction, plumbing, and real estate businesses under the name Glinsey-Newson, as well as a residential
neighborhood called “Glinsey-Newson Cove” in Clarksdale, Mississippi.
¶3.
Around January of 1998, the United States Attorney charged Glinsey with illegally purchasing food
stamps, among other charges. Glinsey eventually entered a guilty plea, but he attempted to liquidate some
of his assets and arranged for the care of his family and property before he pled guilty. To that end, Glinsey
allegedly entered a contract with Newson. Though Glinsey has never produced a written contract, Glinsey
alleged that the entire contract was made up of a combination of a written contract and at least one oral
contract.1 According to Glinsey, the contract provided that Newson would manage Glinsey’s real and
personal property in exchange for Glinsey’s guilty plea. Additionally, the contract provided that Newson
would return Glinsey’s property when Glinsey was released from federal prison.
¶4.
In June of 1999, Glinsey went before the United States District Court and pled guilty to charges
of conspiracy to commit food stamp fraud, illegal acquisition of food stamps, food stamp fraud, and
attempting to use physical force against a witness to prevent the witness’s testimony. As a result, the U.S.
district court sentenced Glinsey to fifty-one months in the federal penitentiary.
¶5.
On April 29, 2002, Glinseywas released from federal prison. Glinsey eventually filed his complaint
in the circuit court and alleged that Newson breached their contract when he failed to keep the mortgage
payments on Glinsey’s property current and also failed to return Glinsey’s personal property. As
mentioned, the circuit court granted summary judgment in Newson’s favor. Glinsey appeals.
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Glinsey claims Newson took the only copy of the written contract from Glinsey’s safe.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
This Court conducts a de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment. Rush v.
Casino Magic Corp., 744 So.2d 761 (¶5) (Miss. 1999). Accordingly, we are bound by the same
mandate as the circuit court. Id. Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). For summary judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it tends to
resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties. Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 949 (Miss.
1991). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must view the sources listed above
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362
(Miss. 1983). A mere allegation by the non-moving party that a dispute over whether a material fact exists
will not defeat a movant’s otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Reynolds v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 778 So.2d 759, 765 (¶27) (Miss. 2000). A summary judgment motion should be
denied unless a court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plaintiff would be unable to prove any facts
to support his claim. Rush v. Casino Magic Corp., 744 So.2d 761 (¶6) (Miss. 1999). Said another way,
a court should grant a summary judgment motion if the court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
plaintiff would not be able to prove any facts to support his claim. E.g., id.
ANALYSIS
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
NEWSON’S FAVOR?
¶7.
Glinsey claims that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment. Glinsey claims that genuine
issues of material fact exist. Despite his contention, Glinsey’s pro se brief focuses more on the circuit
court’s reasoning in granting summary judgment, rather than detailing the presence of genuine issues of
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material fact. Glinsey’s only argument for the existence of issues of material fact is his statement “[t]he
Complaint by itself put forward genuine issue[s] of material facts.” Further, Glinsey states that a genuine
issue of material fact exists because “[Newson’s counsel] stated . . . that this case was an issue for the jury
[because] ‘Glinsey says one thing and Newson says another.’” As stated, an allegation by the non-moving
party that a dispute over whether a material fact exists will not defeat a movant’s otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment. Reynolds, 778 So.2d at (¶27). As such, Glinsey’s allegation
that a material fact exists is insufficient to reverse the circuit court’s decision.
¶8.
Still, the majority of Glinsey’s brief focuses on the circuit court’s basis for granting summary
judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment based on (1) lack of consideration for the alleged
contract, (2) the alleged contract would be void under the statute of frauds, and (3) res judicata. As
Glinsey attacks each basis, we address them in turn.
1. Consideration
¶9.
The circuit court noted that, according to Glinsey, Newson agreed to handle Glinsey’s affairs in
consideration of Glinsey’s guilty plea to the food stamp charges. Glinsey claimed that his guilty plea
benefitted Newson in that it prevented Newson from having to pay Glinsey’s legal expenses and prevented
further embarrassment to the family. However, Newson pointed to Glinsey’s deposition. In Glinsey’s
deposition, Glinsey stated that part of the bargain was that he would not implicate Newson in the food
stamp fraud. Having noted such, the circuit court stated that “an agreement to obstruct justice would be
for an illegal purpose and would not provide the basis for a legally enforceable contract.”
¶10.
Further, the circuit court stated that Newson “was never legally obligated to pay for Glinsey’s legal
expenses, so [Glinsey’s] contention that his pleading guilty would relieve [Newson] from that obligation
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does not provide adequate consideration.” Finally, the circuit court held that “preventing further
embarrassment to a person or a person’s family is likewise not adequate consideration.”
¶11.
Glinsey offers a vague argument. First, Glinsey cites a definition of consideration taken from
Black’s Law Dictionary. That definition states that consideration is “something of value (such as an act,
a forbearance, or a return promise).” Following that statement, Glinsey argues that “[i]t is apparent that
[Newson] did received [sic] something of value, and the only dispute is how much did he received [sic]
[Newson] has attempted to fulfill portions of the contract he made monetary payments and on at leas[t] (4)
occasions he has attempted to return personal property to [Glinsey].”
Then, Glinsey claims “[t]he existence of a contract is a question of fact for the jury, or trial judge when a
trial is conducted without a jury.” Hunt v. Coker, 741 So.2d 1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶12.
That is Glinsey’s entire argument on consideration. However, Glinsey goes on to state that “the
[circuit court’s] argument on this point is vague and indefinite, therefore absent any of confession from
[Newson] declaring that he entered into an illegal contract basic [sic] on illegal acts there is nothing to
support this point. [Newson] has not made any admission therefore there is no basic [sic].”
¶13.
Newson argues that the circuit court was correct in finding a lack of consideration. Newson also
states that the Mississippi Supreme Court will not enforce a contract if the principle purpose of the contract
directly furnishes aid and protection to an illegal enterprise, or if the party seeking to enforce the contract
must base his or her cause of action on his or her own illegal act, or if the contract itself is unlawful. Martin
v. Estate of Martin, 599 So.2d 966 (Miss. 1992). We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s
decision.
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2. Statute of Frauds
¶14.
The circuit court held that the alleged contract between Glinsey and Newson violated Mississippi’s
Statute of Frauds for several reasons. First, Section 15-3-1(c) of the Mississippi Code requires that any
agreement for the sale of land, or for the leasing thereof for a term of longer than one year must be in
writing. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1(c) (Rev. 2003). Noting Glinsey’s claim that he deeded various pieces
of real property in consideration for Newson’s taking care of that property while Glinsey was incarcerated,
the circuit court held that there is no evidence of any writing between the parties evidencing this agreement
for the transfer of the real property.
¶15.
Second, the circuit court quoted Section 15-3-1(d)’s requirement that any agreement that cannot
be performed within fifteen months be evidenced by a writing.
Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1(d).
Accordingly, the circuit court held that Glinsey knew he would be incarcerated more than fifteen months
and that Newson would have to perform for more than fifteen months. Further, the circuit court held that
the contract would have to be in writing. Due to the lack of a writing, the circuit court held that the contract
violated the statute of frauds. We agree. This issue is meritless.
CONCLUSION
¶16.
Glinsey’s brief also contains an allegation that the circuit court improperly applied the doctrines of
res judicata. Having found that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment and properly applied
both the lack of consideration and the statute of frauds, the propriety of the circuit court’s application of
res judicata is irrelevant. Even if we found that the circuit court improperly applied the doctrine of res
judicata, our previous findings demand that we affirm the circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment
in Newson’s favor.
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¶17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.,
CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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