James Saucier v. Susan W. Tatum
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CA-00892-COA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JERRY LEE
SAUCIER, DECEASED: JAMES SAUCIER,
EXECUTOR
APPELLANT
v.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE AND LAST WILL
AND TESTAMENT OF JERRY L. SAUCIER,
DECEASED: SUSAN W. TATUM, EXECUTRIX
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
3/3/2004
HON. JAMES H. C. THOMAS, JR.
FORREST COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
PRENTISS GREENE HARRELL
MATTHEW W. O’QUAIN
MICHAEL D. SIMMONS
FRANK D. MONTAGUE
CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
JANUARY 27, 2003 WILL DETERMINED TO BE
THE LAST WILL OF DECEDENT AND
ADMITTED FOR PROBATE.
AFFIRMED-08/16/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., MYERS AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This will contest was brought before the chancery court of Forrest County on August, 14, 2003,
when the Appellant, James Saucier (“Saucier”), the father of Jerry Saucier, deceased, filed his petition to
probate the will in common form. Appellee Susan W. Tatum (“Tatum”), filed her petition to probate a
will and letters testamentary of another will purported to be the last will and testament of Jerry Saucier on
August 18, 2003. On March 3, 2004, final judgment was entered in favor of Tatum and the will she
supported was entered into probate. Aggrieved by this judgment, Saucier appealed. Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
The testator, Jerry Saucier (“Jerry”), was thirty-seven years of age at the time of his death on
August 9, 2003. His death was the result of congestive heart failure due to alcoholic cardiomyopathy.
During his life, Jerry executed two documents which were later produced and submitted to probate. The
first will, later propounded by the Appellant, was a holographic document dated January 27, 2002. The
second will was a typewritten will dated January 27, 2003, leaving all of Jerry’s property, both real and
personal, to Tatum. There is no dispute as to the authenticity of the two wills presented for probate.
¶3.
Under the holographic will the balance of Jerry’s estate would have passed to his son, from whom
Jerry was estranged at the time of his death. At trial, Saucier challenged the second will put forth by Tatum
on the grounds that the will was the product of Tatum’s undue influence over Jerry at the time it was
executed. The facts presented at trial regarding the close relationship between Tatum and the decedent
established that Tatum provided care and assistance to Jerry as his health declined by, for example,
cleaning his house and by taking him to detoxification programs and psychiatric appointments. Tatum and
Jerry also dated at least one year prior to his death. Testimony at trial illustrated that the pair saw each
other every day of the year prior to his death, that they were physically intimate, and that at some point the
pair had made plans to marry. Tatum was heavily involved in preparing his will. Tatum located and
provided the form used for the second will, and accompanied Jerry to the bank where the instrument was
executed. Upon learning that the will had not been properly executed, Tatum brought Jerry to the bank a
second time in order to affect a valid execution.
2
¶4. After hearing all testimony in the matter, the trial court found that Tatum “played an instrumental part
in seeing that the will was created . . . .” While Jerry admitted to his father that he consumed approximately
one-fifth of whisky a day, there was no testimony that Jerry was intoxicated at the time of the preparation
and execution of his will. Witnesses from the bank where the instrument was executed provided that they
thought Jerry was competent at the time of the execution, and that while present, Tatum did not appear to
be an active or interfering force in the execution of the will. The judgment entered by the chancery court
found that the will propounded by Tatum was not the result of undue influence, and allowed the document
to be entered into probate. Aggrieved by this decision, Saucier asserts the following errors on appeal: (1)
whether the chancery court erred in failing to find that the second will was the product of undue influence
by Tatum; and (2) whether Tatum failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
I.
Whether the chancery court erred in failing to find that the second will was the
product of undue influence by Tatum.
¶5.
Saucier asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find that second will was the product of undue
influence. Saucier asserts specifically that the relationship between Tatum and Jerry was confidential and
that Tatum was instrumental in the formation of the second will, thereby creating a presumption of undue
influence. We begin our analysis of this issue by noting the standard of review. “When reviewing a
chancellor’s legal findings, particularly involving the interpretation or construction of a will, this Court will
apply a de novo standard of review.” In re Last Will and Testament of Carney, 758 So. 2d 1017, 1019
(¶8) (Miss. 2000). With respect to a chancellor’s findings of fact in a will contest, this Court has held that
it “will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless he is manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied
3
an erroneous legal standard.” Goode v. Village of Woodgreen Homeowners Ass’n, 662 So. 2d 1064,
1070 (Miss. 1995).
¶6.
“In an action contesting a will, a presumption of undue influence arises where there is a confidential
or fiduciary relationship.” In re Fankboner v. Pallatin, 638 So. 2d 493, 495 (Miss. 1994) (citing Mullins
v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1192 (Miss. 1987)). “Suspicious circumstances, along with the confidential
relationship, also give rise to a presumption of undue influence.” Id. (Citing Estate of Lawler v. Weston,
451 So. 2d 739, 741 (Miss. 1984)). In Croft v. Adler, 237 Miss. 713, 722-23, 115 So. 2d 683, 686
(1959), the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
[W]here a confidential relation exists between a testator and a beneficiary under his will,
and the beneficiary has been actively concerned in some way with the preparation or
execution of it, the law raises a presumption that the beneficiary has exercised undue
influence over the testator, and casts upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue
influence by clear and convincing evidence.
Saucier argues on appeal that a confidential relationship, as well as suspicious circumstances, created such
a presumption of undue influence in this case, and that as such, Tatum should have been forced to rebut
that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
¶7.
The factors utilized by this court to determine whether a confidential relationship existed are as
follows:
(1) whether one person has been taken care of by others, (2) whether one person
maintains a close relationship with another, (3) whether one person is provided
transportation and has their medical care provided for by another, (4) whether one person
maintains joint accounts with another, (5) whether one is physically or mentally weak, (6)
whether one is of advanced age or poor health, and (7) whether there exists a power of
attorney between one and another.
In re Estate of Dabney, 740 So. 2d 915, 919 (¶12) (Miss. 1999). In examining factor one, Tatum’s own
testimony established that she provided assistance and care to Jerry. However, in many instances, despite
4
his alcoholism, Jerry was capable of caring for himself in a manner common to functional alcoholics.
Because the parties saw each other on a daily basis, were physically intimate, and had made some
generalized plans to marry, these facts clearly indicate that a close relationship was maintained between
Jerry and Tatum in regards to factor two. While Tatum did provide transportation for Jerry, most notably
during the formation of the will, this was mostly due to the fact that Jerry’s license had been suspended.
There is some evidence to suggest that Tatum transported Jerry to a handful of psychiatric appointments,
and provided other more generalized assistance as considered by factor three. As to factor four, there is
no evidence to suggest that Jerry and Tatum held joint accounts, although we note that Jerry entrusted
Tatum with the keys to his safety deposit box. As to factor five, Jerry was physically ravaged by his
alcoholism. However, whether Jerry was mentally weak presents a closer question. Saucier asserts on
appeal that Jerry’s liquor consumption, and a past incident where police were called to his home after a
bout of hallucinations evidences Jerry’s weakened mental state. Saucier also claims that Jerry “badly
mismanaged” some apartments owned by his father. Finally, Saucier cites the statement of Jerry’s
psychiatrist who observed that he was “shaky, tremulous,”and that Jerry “just seemed uncomfortable.”
¶8.
Tatum has put forth ample evidence to indicate that Jerry was fully capable of conducting his own
affairs, was able to manage his own business and employees, and for the most part was competent to
handle his own affairs. In fact, his own psychiatrist, Shannon Johnson, stated that Jerry was “in his right
mind.” Although Jerry evidenced specific instances of mental weakness, the weight of the evidence
mitigates against finding that he functioned within a continually weakened mental state. As to factors six
and seven, we note that Jerry was in a weakened physical state, and that no power of attorney was granted
to Tatum by Jerry.
5
¶9.
Taking all of the Dabney factors as a whole, it is clear that the relationship between Jerry and
Tatum was confidential in nature. Furthermore, the chancellor found that Tatum was “a moving force” in
the creation of the second will. The confidential relationship of the parties and Tatum’s role in the creation
of the will suffice to create a presumption of undue influence. Furthermore, according to Croft, Tatum’s
status as a beneficiary under the will further bolsters this presumption. Croft, 115 So. 2d at 686. Saucier
is correct in stating that the chancellor failed to make any mention of this presumption within his judgment.
However, this failure to state this presumption within the judgment or elsewhere in the record may not, in
and of itself, compel us to hold that the chancellor committed reversible error. “Even where the specific
basis of a decision is not stated in the chancellor’s opinion, the decision will not be disturbed if substantial
evidence can be found in the record.” M.C.M.J. v. C.E.J., 715 So. 2d 774, 777 (¶20) (Miss. 1998). It
is apparent from the chancellor’s opinion that all of the requisite Dabney factors were considered within
his deliberative process. Although the chancellor did not specifically state that a presumption of undue
influence arose, substantial evidence of such can be found to support, at the very least, his consideration
of the matter. We cannot say that the chancellor committed manifest error in his factual findings, and further
hold that any legal error by the chancellor in this regard constitutes harmless error. We therefore must
affirm the chancellor as to this issue.
II.
Whether Tatum failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and
convincing evidence.
¶10.
Saucier asserts in his second assignment of error that Tatum failed to rebut the presumption of
undue influence. In the case sub judice, due to the fact that the circumstances give rise to a presumption
of undue influence, the burden off going forward with the proof shifted to Tatum to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) Tatum acted in good faith in the confidential relationship with Jerry;
6
(2) Jerry acted with full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences when he
executed the second will; and (3) that Jerry exhibited independent consent and action. Murray v. Laird,
446 So. 2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1984) as modified by Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183, 1193 (Miss.
1987).
¶11.
To determine whether Tatum acted in good faith, we must examine the facts surrounding the
procurement of the second will. It is undisputed that Tatum was instrumental in the drafting of the will.
However, she and Jerry worked together in this regard, and her role in drafting the will is not alone
determinative of bad faith. Numerous disinterested persons witnessed the signing of the will. The first
subscribing witness to the will, Teressa Rogers, an assistant manager at the bank, testified that she
questioned Jerry regarding whether the will represented his wishes, and whether he wanted to sign the
document. She further testified that Jerry answered both questions in the affirmative, and that Jerry
appeared to be in his right mind and was not intoxicated. The testimony of the second subscribing witness,
Jacque Forrester, was not heard as the parties stipulated that his testimony was merely corroborative of
the testimony of Rogers. “Secondly, the place of the execution of the will and the persons in whose
presence the will was executed are significant.” In re Will of Fankboner, 638 So. 2d at 496. The second
will of Jerry Saucier was executed in the open at a branch of the Union Planters Bank before two
disinterested subscribing witnesses and a notary public. “The third and fourth factors are the consideration/
fee that was paid and the identity of the person who paid the fee.” Id. In this case, no consideration or fee
was paid in the drafting of the will. The fifth and final factor that should be considered to determine the
“good faith” of Tatum is the secrecy and openness given the execution of the will. Id. The evidence before
us is clear that the execution of the will was open and well observed. We therefore find substantial evidence
that supports a finding that Tatum acted in good faith.
7
¶12.
We now turn to the question of whether Jerry acted with full knowledge and deliberation of his
actions and their consequences when he signed the will. The testimony of the subscribing witnesses is again
pertinent in this regard. All of the testimony provided regarding the signing of the will at the bank indicated
that Jerry was acting in accordance with his own wishes and of his own volition. There is simply scant
evidence to conclude that Tatum abused her relationship with Jerry either by asserting dominance over him
or by substituting her intent for his. See In re Estate of Sandlin v. Sandlin, 790 So. 2d 850, 854 (¶9)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the level of influence that must be exerted over a testator in order for
the court to find undue influence). As to the third factor established in Murray, we must determine whether
Jerry exhibited independent consent and action. The evidence in this case is legion toward establishing that
Jerry exhibited independent consent and action, and that the second will represents his final wishes
independent and free from of any undue influence by Tatum. The evidence sub judice is clear and
convincing in establishing that Tatum did not substitute her will for Jerry’s, and any presumption to the
contrary is clearly rebutted in accordance with the requirements of Murray. This assignment of error is
without merit.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF FORREST COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS AND
BARNES, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.