John Griffin Bowie v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-02023-COA
JOHN GRIFFIN BOWIE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
6/10/2003
HON. KOSTA N. VLAHOS
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHN GRIFFIN BOWIE (PRO SE)
G. ERIC GEISS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CONO A. CARANNA, II
CRIMINAL - FELONY
BURGLARY- SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM
OF SEVEN YEARS, DAY FOR DAY, IN THE
CUSTODY OF MDOC, SAID SENTENCE BEING
WITHOUT PAROLE OR PROBATION.
AFFIRMED: 08/23/2005
EN BANC.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
John Bowie was convicted of burglary in the Circuit Court of Harrison County. Bowie was
sentenced as an habitual offender to a term of seven years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections without the possibility of parole. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, Bowie raises the
following issues as error, which we quote verbatim:
I. The trial court committed error when it denied the appellant’s motion for directed verdict as the State
failed to prove an essential element of the indicted charge.
II. The trial court committed error when it denied the appellant’s request for peremptory instruction and
his motion for jnov.
III. The trial court erred in not granting the appellant’s motion for a new trial.
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On the morning of February 7, 2002, Addr Larosa Caves was sitting on the porch of her residence
in Gulfport. According to Caves, she saw a truck with three occupants inside, two males and one female.
The truck’s driver pulled into the driveway across the street from Caves, at the house owned by Amelia
Baker. After seeing the individuals across the street, Caves went behind the house of a nearby relative and
went through a broken fence behind the house of Amelia Baker to observe the individuals.
¶4.
Caves stated that she recognized one of the individuals as Bowie, whom she had known for a long
time. Caves stated that she saw Bowie coming out of the shed located behind Baker’s house with furniture
that he loaded onto the truck. Caves went back to her porch, called Baker, and subsequently called the
police. Caves stated that the furniture on the truck was not on the outside of Baker’s house.
¶5.
Amelia Baker testified that she owned the property located at 2102 33rd Street. She visited the
property frequently to observe its condition. A few days prior to the incident (she could not remember the
exact date), Baker checked the storage shed behind the house and it was locked.
¶6.
Baker stated that when she arrived at the property, the door had been kicked in on the storage
shed. She indicated that several items (mattresses, a table, chairs, dressers, lamps) were missing. Baker
testified that she did not give anyone, including Bowie, permission to remove the property from the area,
nor did she give anyone permission to go into the storage shed.
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¶7.
Officer Wendall Johnson of the Gulfport Police Department testified that on February 7, 2002, he
received a call regarding a complaint of a burglary in progress. Johnson received a description indicating
that the suspects were “two black males and a black female” in a blue pickup truck. As Johnson
proceeded in the direction of the area of the complaint, he observed a vehicle fitting the description of the
vehicle driven by the suspects. Johnson indicated that the vehicle appeared to have been coming from the
residence itself because when he stopped the vehicle, it was “about a house length from the house, the
residence.”
¶8.
Once Johnson stopped the vehicle and exited his patrol vehicle, one of the males, later identified
as Bowie, jumped from the passenger side of the vehicle and ran into a wooded area nearby. Johnson
stated that Bowie turned and looked at him as he proceeded to run. Johnson indicated that he had known
Bowie prior to the incident in question because the house located at the address in question “used to be
their lot.”
¶9.
Johnson stated that when Baker arrived at the scene, she identified some of the items on the back
of the vehicle as belonging to her and coming from her storage shed. Johnson stated that the lock to the
storage shed had been broken off and two doors to the shed had been forced open.
¶10.
B.C. Pervish testified on behalf of Bowie. He stated that his niece, Shannon Jordan, called and
asked him to meet her and Bowie (her boyfriend) at his mother’s house on 3225 20th Street in Gulfport.
Pervish picked up Jordan and Bowie and proceeded to the house in question. According to Pervish, there
was furniture located in the back of the house covered with a blue cover. The individuals picked up the
furniture and loaded it onto the truck. Pervish stated that he could not remember the date that they
removed the furniture. Pervish indicated that he did not see Bowie enter the shed. He testified that once
his vehicle was stopped by the police, Bowie jumped out of the truck and ran into the woods.
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¶11.
On June 10, 2003, Bowie was found guilty of burglary.
I. & II.
Whether the trial court erred by denying Bowie’s motion for a directed verdict, JNOV,
and request for a peremptory instruction.
¶12.
Bowie asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict, JNOV, and
his request for a peremptory instruction because the State failed to prove the elements of the crime of
burglary. These three errors concern the sufficiency of the evidence.
¶13.
In McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993), the supreme court held that the
sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law is viewed and tested in a light most favorable to the State.
The credible evidence consistent with Bowie’s guilt must be accepted as true. Id. The prosecution must
be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id. The
Court is authorized to reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense
charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the
accused not guilty. Id.
¶14.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-17-33 (1) (Rev. 2000) provides:
(1) Every person who shall be convicted of breaking and entering, in the day or night, any
shop, store, booth, tent, warehouse, or other building or private room or office therein,
water vessel, commercial or pleasure craft, ship, steamboat, flatboat, railroad car,
automobile, truck or trailer in which any goods, merchandise, equipment or valuable thing
shall be kept for use, sale, deposit, or transportation, with intent to steal therein, or to
commit any felony, or who shall be convicted of breaking and entering in the day or night
time, any building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, not joined to, immediately
connected with or forming a part thereof, shall be guilty of burglary, and imprisoned in the
penitentiary not more than seven (7) years.
¶15.
To prove that the crime of burglary has been committed, the State must show that there was (1)
an unlawful breaking and entering and (2) with the intent to commit some crime upon entry. The State
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presented evidence of the unlawful breaking and entering through the testimony of Caves, an eyewitness,
and Baker, the property owner. Caves testified that she saw Bowie coming out of the shed carrying
furniture which he loaded onto the pickup truck.
¶16.
Baker testified that she checked on her property several times a month. When she last checked
on her property, a few days prior to the incident, the storage shed door was locked. Baker stated that she
did not give anyone permission to take any items from her property or storage shed.
¶17.
Officer Johnson also stated that the individuals were in close proximity to the house in question
when he stopped them and he observed various items of furniture on the back of the pickup truck. Johnson
testified that when Baker arrived at her property, she identified the items as belonging to her. Johnson
stated that upon inspection of the shed door, the lock was broken off and the door had been damaged by
force.
¶18.
The record contains substantial evidence, from which a jury could conclude that Bowie broke the
lock on Baker’s storage shed, entered the shed without permission, and stole Baker’s furniture. Thus, this
issue is without merit.
III.
Whether the trial court erred by denying Bowie’s motion for a new trial.
¶19.
Bowie contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial. A motion for a new
trial challenges the weight of the evidence. Bridges v. State, 790 So. 2d 230 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is discretionary with the trial court. Harried v. State,
773 So. 2d 966 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). This Court “will not order a new trial unless it is convinced
that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would
sanction an unconscionable injustice." Watson v. State, 722 So. 2d 475 (¶23) (Miss. 1998).
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¶20.
Bowie claims the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence because there was
no evidence provided to establish that a reasonable juror could have found that he broke into the shed.
¶21.
The Court notes again that the State presented evidence that Bowie was in possession of the stolen
goods, in close proximity to the house in question, just after the burglary occurred. An eyewitness saw
Bowie coming out of the storage shed carrying furniture. Upon being stopped by police, Bowie jumped
out of the vehicle and ran into the woods. Baker testified that the last time she checked the lock on her
storage shed, it was intact and she did not give anyone permission to enter her storage shed and remove
the items taken. Inconsistencies or contradictions in testimony are clearly in the jury's province, and we
refuse to reverse on such grounds. James v. State, 756 So. 2d 850 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). “It is
the duty of the jurors to resolve conflicts in the testimony presented.” Id. This Court affirms the trial court’s
decision.
¶22. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER AND SENTENCE OF
SEVEN YEARS, DAY FOR DAY, WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR
PROBATION, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
HARRISON COUNTY.
BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS AND BARNES,
JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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