Curtis Gatewood v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2004-CP-00348-COA
CURTIS GATEWOOD
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
5/20/2004
HON. W. ASHLEY HINES
SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CURTIS GATEWOOD (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED.
AFFIRMED - 08/23/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
BRIDGES, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Charged with taking 49.3 grams of marijuana into the Mississippi State Penitentiary, Curtis
Gatewood pled guilty before the Sunflower County Circuit Court. The circuit court sentenced Gatewood
to a three year term in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) followed by four
years of post-release supervision.
¶2.
On March 17, 2004, Gatewood filed a petition for post-conviction collateral relief. According to
Gatewood’s petition, Gatewood requested relief because (1) he did not plead guilty voluntarily; (2) his
sentence had expired; (3) he was unlawfully in the MDOC’s custody; (4) his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance; (5) the circuit court violated his right against double jeopardy; (6) the indictment leading to his
guilty plea was a defective indictment, and; (7) the circuit court violated his right to due process of law.
The circuit court concluded that Gatewood’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit. As for
Gatewood’s remaining claims, the circuit court determined that those claims either lacked merit or were
waived when Gatewood pled guilty. Accordingly, the circuit court denied Gatewood’s motion for postconviction relief. Aggrieved, Gatewood appeals the circuit court’s decision. Gatewood appears to raise
numerous claims for our review. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
“When reviewing a lower court’s decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief this Court
will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.” Brown v.
State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999). “However, where questions of law are raised the
applicable standard of review is de novo.” Id.
ANALYSIS
¶4.
Gatewood’s petition for post-conviction reliefwas inartfully drafted, as is his appellate brief. Under
such circumstances, this Court takes that fact into account so that any meritorious claim is not lost simply
due to the inartful drafting of Gatewood’s assertions. Ford v. State, 708 So.2d 73 (¶12) (Miss. 1998).
Though Gatewood’s allegations are sometimes veritably impossible to decipher, we have done our best
to derive Gatewood’s meaning.
I.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
¶5.
First, Gatewood seems to claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gatewood bears the burden of demonstrating (1) a deficiency
2
of his counsel’s performance that is (2) sufficient to constitute prejudice to his defense. Swington v. State,
742 So.2d 1106, 1114 (¶22) (Miss. 1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984);
Walker v. State, 703 So.2d 266, 268 (Miss. 1997)). In deciding whether Gatewood’s counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, this Court examines the totalityof the circumstances surrounding the case. Swington,
742 So.2d at (¶22). Gatewood faces a “strong but rebuttable presumption that his counsel’s conduct falls
within a broad range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. To overcome this presumption, Gatewood
must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citations omitted).
¶6.
Gatewood claims that his attorney misrepresented the duration of the sentence Gatewood would
receive for his guilty plea. According to Gatewood, his attorney informed him that he would serve only
three years under the plea agreement. Gatewood argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel because Gatewood later learned that not only would he have to serve three years in the custody
of the MDOC, but he would also have to spend four years in post-release supervision. Gatewood opines
that the addition of four years of post-release supervision to his three year sentence “was a violation of the
federal laws and state laws.”
¶7.
In Rush v. State, 811 So.2d 431 (¶5) (Miss.Ct.App. 2001) this Court held that a party's claim
that is based only on the party's individual affidavit is without merit. Gatewood’s claim is only supported
by his lone affidavit. As such, Gatewood’s claim is meritless.
¶8.
Lack of affidavits notwithstanding, our review as to this claim has been rendered impossible by the
fact that Gatewood provided neither his petition on which he entered his plea of guilty nor the guilty plea
transcript in the record now before us. However, the record does contain the circuit court’s order on
3
Gatewood’s motion for post-conviction relief. In that order, the circuit court stated that Gatewood entered
an open plea and the court specifically asked him if anyone made any representation to him about the
sentence he would receive, and Gatewood replied, “no sir.” Gatewood’s response convinced the circuit
court that Gatewood understood that the court alone would determine what sentence he would receive.
II.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
¶9.
Gatewood claims that his double jeopardy rights have been violated because he pled guilty to only
one count, yet the indictment listed two counts. He concludes that he has been subjected to multiple
prosecutions for the same offense.
¶10.
“Double jeopardy protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same
offense.” Greenwood v. State, 744 So.2d 767 (¶ 14) (Miss. 1999) (citing White v. State, 702 So.2d
107, 109 (Miss.1997)). Just because his indictment listed two counts does not mean that Gatewood was
subjected to double jeopardy when he pled guilty to one count. This allegation is meritless.
III.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
¶11.
It appears that Gatewood alleges prosecutorial misconduct. Gatewood gives us very little to work
with, as his entire argument suggesting prosecutorial misconduct consists of the following:
“At paragraph 20, Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1321. Found plain error due to prosecutorial
misconduct. Griffin v. State 557 So.2d 542 the error Here is fundamental. the state caused the error by
improper purpose in excluding evidences.”
4
¶12.
We have been extremely lenient towards Gatewood regarding our requirements of an argument
on appeal. However, no amount of lenience on our part can inform us of what Gatewood means by this
sentence.
¶13.
Gatewood pled guilty to the charge that he took marijuana into Parchman. Both Gray and Griffin
involve claims of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks made during closing arguments. There were
no closing arguments involved with Gatewood’s guilty plea. This issue lacks merit.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING
POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SUNFLOWER COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
