Jessie Johnson v. Patricia Miller
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-02771-COA
JESSIE JOHNSON
APPELLANT
v.
PATRICIA KATHRYN MILLER, MARILYN MARIE
STARKS, KAREEM WEST, FRED D. JOHNSON AND
MORRIS LEE SCOTT
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
12/1/2003
HON. MARGARET CAREY-MCCRAY
SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JESSIE JOHNSON (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JANE L. MAPP
CIVIL-STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
DENIED PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO COMPEL
PAROLE BOARD TO CONDUCT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
AFFIRMED - 06/28/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., CHANDLER AND ISHEE, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Jessie Johnson is serving a sentence of life in the Mississippi Department of Corrections for a
homicide conviction. During his incarceration, he was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to
an additional five years. Johnson has made several requests for parole, which the Mississippi Parole Board
denied each time. In denying Johnson’s requests for parole, the parole board relied on the same reasons
each time, without conducting a hearing. The Sunflower County Circuit Court affirmed the parole board’s
decisions to deny parole without first conducting a hearing. Johnson appeals to this Court, raising the
following issues:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
STATUTE IN DENYING JOHNSON’S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE DECISION TO DENY PAROLE WAS REASONABLE
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A HEARING PRIOR
TO DISMISSING JOHNSON’S PETITION
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE WHETHER
JOHNSON’S ASSERTION OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IN GRANTING PAROLE
WARRANTED A HEARING
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE PAROLE BOARD
TO STATE A SPECIFIC REASON WHY JOHNSON’S PAROLE APPLICATION WAS
REJECTED
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On February 22, 1983, Jessie Johnson was convicted of homicide and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Two co-defendants were also convicted of homicide in the same case. Both of Johnson’s
co-defendants have been granted parole. While he was serving his life sentence, he committed the crime
of aggravated assault. On February 13, 1996, he was given a concurrent five year sentence. Johnson has
since maintained good behavior.
¶4.
Johnson argues that he should be granted parole because he had maintained good behavior for the
past seven years of his incarceration and has “demonstrated his rehabilitative efforts and desire to be
release[d] into society and become a productive citizen.”
Johnson has received numerous
recommendations fromprominent members of his communityrecommending parole, including two ministers
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and the mayor of his hometown. Approximately 250 citizens in Johnson’s hometown signed a petition
supporting his parole. Johnson has made several requests for parole to the parole board, which denied his
request for the same reasons each time, without conducting a hearing.
¶5.
On July 22, 2003, Johnson filed a complaint in the Sunflower County Circuit Court styled “Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus or for Order to Show Cause.” In this petition, he requested that the parole
board conduct an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court affirmed the parole board’s decision to deny parole
without conducting a hearing on the basis that prisoners have no constitutionally recognized interest in
parole sufficient to trigger a due process entitlement.
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
STATUTE IN DENYING JOHNSON’S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
¶6.
Johnson argues that the circuit judge was in error for citing a post-conviction relief statute in
dismissing Johnson’s petition. The trial judge applied Mississippi Code Section 99-39-11 (2) (Rev. 2000),
which states, “If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior
proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its
dismissal and cause the prisoner to be notified.” Johnson argues that it was error for the circuit court judge
to rely on this statute because Johnson does not contest the validity of his conviction or sentence.
¶7.
The circuit judge did not dismiss Johnson’s petition pursuant to the post-conviction relief act, but
merely cited a post-conviction relief statute as justification for dismissing Johnson’s petition. If the judgment
of a trial court can be sustained for any reason, it must be affirmed. Patel v. Telerent Leasing Corp., 574
So. 2d 3, 6 (Miss. 1990) (citations omitted). In McBride v. Sparkman, 860 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (¶10)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2003), this Court held that denying a habeas corpus petition without a hearing is proper
if the petitioner is unable to cite any issues of fact requiring a hearing. See also Tubwell v. Anderson, 776
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So. 2d 654, 661-62 (¶23) (Miss. 2000). Johnson does not claim that the parole board has misconstrued
any facts but is seeking judicial review because he believes the parole board did not give sufficient weight
to the factors he believes favor parole. Because the parole board has complete discretion to grant or deny
parole, Johnson has failed to state a claim that would require an evidentiary hearing. See Scales v.
Mississippi State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir. 1987). This issue is without merit.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE DECISION TO DENY PAROLE WAS REASONABLE
¶8.
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing as to whether the decision to deny
him parole was reasonable. Each time the parole board denies Johnson’s request, the board uses a
standardized form circling reasons it finds weigh against parole on a parole action sheet. Johnson maintains
that the parole board should have provided a reasonable explanation as to why those factors apply to him.
¶9.
The parole board denies Johnson of parole for the following reasons: (1) the serious nature of his
offense; (2) the number of offenses Johnson has committed; (3) community opposition; (4) insufficient time
served; and (5) the board believes the ability or willingness to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen
is lacking pursuant to 47-4-17 of the Mississippi Code Annotated as amended. Johnson argues that there
is no basis to deny parole on such grounds. He points out that he has the support of the community in
which he would live, support from his family, a place of employment, a place to live upon being paroled,
a “fairly decent” prison conduct record, and the potential never to commit another crime again. All the
factors relied upon by the parole board in deciding to deny Johnson’s parole are areas in which it has
authority to consider pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-17 (Rev. 2004) and therefore, these categories
cannot be viewed as arbitrary and capricious. Justus v. State, 750 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (¶6) (Miss. Ct.
App. 1999).
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¶10.
Johnson’s complaint filed with the circuit court for a review of the parole board’s determinations
was properly dismissed because the circuit court does not have the jurisdiction to grant or deny parole.
“The Parole Board is the only determiner of parole.” Cotton v. Mississippi Parole Bd., 863 So. 2d 917,
921 (¶21) (Miss. 2003). This issue is without merit.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A HEARING PRIOR
TO DISMISSING JOHNSON’S PETITION
¶11.
Johnson argues that, because his petition is styled as a habeas corpus petition, a hearing is required.
To support his argument, Johnson cites Carson v. Hargett, 689 So. 2d 753, 755 (Miss. 1996). The
supreme court in that case stated, “The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to give a person restrained
of his liberty an immediate hearing so that it can be determined whether that person is being deprived of
his constitutional rights, such as the right to due process of law.”
¶12.
The Mississippi legislature has defined the cases to which the habeas corpus writ extends. “The
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto, except in the cases expressly excepted.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-1 (Rev. 2002). Johnson does
not argue that he is being illegally confined, detained, or deprived of his liberty. He merely argues that the
parole board failed to give him a meaningful parole hearing.
In Mississippi, prisoners have “no
constitutionally recognized liberty interest in parole.” Vice v. State, 679 So. 2d 205, 208 (Miss. 1996).
Because Johnson’s petition is merely a request for parole, his petition is not a writ of habeas corpus. This
issue is without merit.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE WHETHER
JOHNSON’S ASSERTION OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IN GRANTING PAROLE
WARRANTED A HEARING
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¶13.
Johnson argues that he was entitled to a hearing because the two co-defendants who were
convicted of homicide for the same crime were paroled. Johnson alleges that the parole board’s decision
to deny him parole amounts to discriminatory treatment.
¶14.
Johnson does not allege that he is a member of a suspect class or that a fundamental right was
violated. Therefore, the parole board’s actions are subject to a rational basis standard of review. Justus,
750 So. 2d at 1279 (¶5). Under this standard of review, government entities’ acts or policies are required
to follow a rational means of achieving a legitimate government interest. Id. (citing Townsend v. Estate
of Gilbert, 616 So. 2d 333, 337 (Miss. 1993)). “State action will be upheld if there is any ‘conceivable
basis which might support [the action].’” Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
¶15.
In considering whether an inmate should be granted parole, the parole board examines each
individual inmate’s case and should consider:
All pertinent information regarding each offender ... including the circumstances of his
offense, his previous social history, his previous criminal record, including any records of
law enforcement agencies or of a youth court regarding that offender’s juvenile criminal
history, his conduct, employment and attitude while in the custody of the department, and
the reports of such physical and mental examinations as have been made.
Miss. Code Ann. 47-7-15 (Rev. 2004). Clearly, Johnson’s prison conduct record is not identical to the
prison conduct records of the other two co-defendants. Johnson committed a violent felony after having
been convicted of homicide. The parole board has discretion to grant or deny parole for each individual,
and its decision to deny parole to Johnson while granting parole to the co-defendants satisfies the rational
basis standard of review.
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE PAROLE BOARD
TO STATE A SPECIFIC REASON WHY JOHNSON’S PAROLE APPLICATION WAS
REJECTED
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¶16.
Johnson argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the parole board to state specific reasons
why he was denied parole rather than repeat the same reasons each time.
¶17.
In Cotton, 863 So. 2d at 919 (¶¶3-4), the inmates argued that they were subjected to cruel and
inhuman treatment because of the parole board’s repeated denial of parole. The Mississippi Supreme
Court held that the inmates had received all that was constitutionally required. The inmates “ were given
a chance to present their reasons for parole and the Board, using statutory factors, determined all [inmates]
to be unentitled for parole at [that] time.” Id. at 920 (¶6). In the case sub judice, the parole board had
knowledge of Johnson’s behavior as an inmate and had knowledge of the letters of recommendation
submitted on Johnson’s behalf. After weighing the statutory factors, the board determined that Johnson
was not eligible for parole at that time. The parole board was not required to be more specific in its denial
of parole or require an evidentiary hearing.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUNFLOWER COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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