Kristian Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-02501-COA
KRISTIAN JONES A/K/A KRISTEN JONES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/7/2003
HON. C. E. MORGAN, III
ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
RAYMOND M. BAUM
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CRIMINAL - FELONY
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - SENTENCED TO
SERVE A TERM OF (20) YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF MDOC.
AFFIRMED: 05/03/2005
BEFORE KING, C.J., CHANDLER AND BARNES, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Kristian Jones a/k/a Kristen Jones was convicted in the Circuit Court of Attala County of
aggravated assault against Shameka Luckett. Jones was sentenced to serve a term of twenty years
in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by her conviction, she
has appealed and asserts the following issues, which we quote verbatim.
I.
Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed evidence of another
crime with which the defendant has been charged?
II.
Whether the verdict was legally insufficient because, accepting all of the State’s evidence
as true, the defendant, Kristian Jones, was merely present at the scene of the shooting
and there is no evidence of her participation in the crime of Aggravated Assault.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
According to Luckett, while at the Bingo Parlor at approximately 8:30 p.m., she received a call
fromKristian Jones requesting her to meet with Jones concerning an upcoming armed robbery trial. Luckett
had participated in an armed robbery scheme with Marvin Parks, Jeremy Myricks and Kristian Jones. The
four were charged with committing armed robbery against Jones’ grandmother. Luckett contends the
reason for Jones’ desire to speak with her on February 28, 2003, was Luckett’s decision to testify and
implicate Jones and the others at their upcoming armed robbery trial.
¶3.
At 9:00 p.m., Luckett departed the Bingo Parlor with Jones. Luckett and Jones traveled to the
home of Marvin Parks, where they all departed in one car. Between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., the three
traveled to an Exxon gas station. There, Luckett entered the store and purchased gum, while Jones and
Parks remained outside. Later the three traveled to the home of Demond Howard. Upon discovering that
Howard was unavailable, they drove around the neighborhood to “the projects” and on dirt roads
throughout the county.
¶4.
Jones and Parks stated they were having car trouble. During this time period, Luckett repeatedly
informed Jones and Parks that she wanted to go home. Finally, Luckett requested that Parks and Jones
take her to the home of her uncle. Jones and Parks stated they were having car trouble and would have
to walk, but they would walk with her. As the three were getting out of the car, Jones reminded Parks to
get his gun. The three began walking down a dirt road to the uncle’s home, with Jones and Parks lagging
behind Luckett. During their walk, Parks and Jones were walking together “like a couple.” Luckett testified
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that neither Jones nor Parks threatened her. Then after walking only a short distance, Luckett was
suddenly shot twice in the back. Luckett explained that, after Parks shot her in the back, he attempted
to shoot her in the head but the gun jammed. Parks and Jones returned to their vehicle and left Luckett
for dead. The wounded Luckett sought the aid of persons nearby. She received first aid and was taken
to the emergency room. Prior to going to the hospital, in the hospital and thereafter, Luckett consistently
identified Parks and Jones as her attackers.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
ISSUE I.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ALLOWED EVIDENCE OF ANOTHER CRIME WITH WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS
BEEN CHARGED?
¶5.
"Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court, and
reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused." White v. State, 742 So.2d 1126 (¶ 29)
(Miss.1999). When examining issues of the admissibility of evidence, the Court must examine the purpose
for admitting such information. Hill v. State, 797 So.2d 914, 917 (¶15) (Miss. 2001). "Furthermore, the
trialcourt's discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and reversal
will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs." Id.
¶6.
Jones contends that in order for evidence of other crimes to be admissible, there must be an
apparent relation or connection between the prior crime of armed robbery and the present charge of
aggravated assault. She contends that there was not “an apparent relation or connection between the act
proposed to be proved and that charged.” According to the facts, Luckett, Jones, Parks and Myricks
were charged and awaiting trial for committing an armed robbery against Jones’ grandmother. Luckett
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contends that she was shot by Parks and Jones because she posed a threat in confessing their involvement
in the crime. The trial court ruled that the armed robbery was relevant to the motive of the shooting.
¶7.
Under M.R.E. 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive . . . .” “One of the accepted exceptions to the
general disallowance of evidence of other crimes is where that evidence tends to prove motive.” Neal v.
State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss. 1984). According to Rule 404 (b), the motive exception requires an
apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proven and that charged. The State
suggested that the motive for the assault on Luckett was to prevent Luckett from testifying that Parks and
Jones had committed an armed robbery. This clearly was a plausible motive for the assault, which the State
was entitled to place before the jury.
¶8.
In applying Rule 404(b), this Court has held that even though it may reveal other crimes, evidence
or testimony may be given in order to tell a rational and coherent story of what happened and where it is
substantially necessary to present a complete story. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 27-28 (Miss.1990)
(citing Brown v. State, 483 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss.1986)). Such evidence of the other crime is also
admissible if it sheds light upon the motive or if it forms a part of a chain of facts intimately connected so
that in order to interpret its general parts, the whole must be heard. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 69798 (Miss.1988). The trial court ruled that the evidence of Jones’ prior arrest was not introduced for the
purpose of establishing that Jones acted in conformity therewith, but, to establish a possible motive for the
shooting of Luckett. Further the court ruled that the admittance of the prior arrest would allow the jury
to understand “why it happened.” Luckett’s proffered testimony revealed that Jones approached her and
asked what she was going to do, and she replied that she was going to tell the truth. These questions
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transpired while the three were parked on a hill, almost one hour after Jones and Luckett left the bingo
parlor and one hour before Luckett was shot. The trial court noted that these were not contemporaneous
events but occurred within “a couple of hours.” After additional testimony by Luckett, the trial court ruled
that its failure to admit such evidence would have left the issue of motive open to conjecture and
speculation.
¶9.
Where proof of other crimes or acts of the defendant is offered into evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b), it is still subject to the requirement that its probative value substantially outweigh the danger of
unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Adams v. State, 794 So.2d 1049, 1055 (¶ 14)(Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
The trial court determined that the evidence would be admitted because its probative value in determining
motive outweighed any unfair prejudice. In an effort to avoid any undue prejudicial effect, the trial court
instructed the jury as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith.
It is admissible for the purpose of proof or motive, and in this case the jury
can only consider it for this purpose.
Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. Ragin v. State, 724 So.2d 901, 904 (¶ 13)
(Miss.1998). Therefore, this issue is without merit.
ISSUE II.
WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE, ACCEPTING ALL
OF THE STATE’S EVIDENCE AS TRUE, THE DEFENDANT, KRISTIAN JONES, WAS
MERELY PRESENT AT THE SCENE OF THE SHOOTING AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
OF HER PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
¶10.
It is Jones’ contention that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support the
verdict. This Court's standard of review on challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence requires that it
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consider all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Collier v. State, 711 So.2d 458, 461(¶
11) (Miss.1998). However, matters regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence are to be resolved
by the jury and this Court may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the
offense charged, the evidence is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused
not guilty. Id.
¶11.
Jones contends that even if this Court accepts the evidence that she was present at the scene of the
shooting, her mere presence at the shooting is insufficient to establish participation in the crime. Mississippi
Code Annotated 97-3-7(2) (Rev.2000) defines aggravated assault as knowingly causing bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon. The trial court gave an accomplice instruction, that stated the jury could
not convict Jones by her mere presence, but must determine that there was an overt act in relation to the
furtherance of the aggravated assault. Our law is clear that one who aids and abets another in the
commission of an offense is guilty as a principal. Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 821 (Miss.1991);
Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 363-64 (Miss. 1986); Shedd v. State, 228 Miss. 381, 386-87, 87
So.2d 898, 900 (1956).
¶12.
Luckett testified that Parks was the shooter in the crime, but Jones had initiated the contact with
Luckett and had forced her into the vehicle. Luckett testified that she entered the car with Jones because
she was frightened. Jones had reportedly pulled a gun on Luckett before. Jones drove to pick up Parks
and Jones refused to take Luckett home. Before the three began walking along the dirt road, Jones asked
Parks to get his gun out of the car. Shortly thereafter Luckett was shot. Luckett repeatedly stated that
Parks and Jones shot her. These facts provided a basis upon which the jury might reasonably conclude that
the parties acted in concert. Jones contends that Luckett’s testimony was “contradictory and sometimes
bizarre.” It is true that Luckett’s testimony contains several inconsistent facts. However, issues of the
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credibility of witnesses are to be resolved by the jury. Collier, 711 So.2d at 461. In Miller v. State, we
affirmed that the victim’s identification of her assailants at trial, at the time of the shooting and in court was
sufficient for a juror to determine that the defendant was guilty. Miller v. State, 801 So.2d 799, 803 (¶
15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). In the case sub judice, Luckett (1) identified Parks and Jones as her attackers,
(2) informed her rescuers, Kelsey and Vickie Harmon that Parks and Jones shot her (3) was shot at close
range thereby giving her an opportunity to view her attacker and (4) identified Jones and Parks in the
courtroom as the attackers. In Miller, this Court determined that based on this information “we cannot say
that reasonable and fairminded jurors could only find Miller not guilty of the shooting.” Id.
¶13.
Having considered the record in the light most favorable to the verdict, we are not per-
suaded that with respect to any of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence is such that
that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find Jones not guilty.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ATTALA COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS IN
THE CUSTODYOF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO ATTALA COUNTY.
BRIDGES AND LEE, PJJ., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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