Curtis L. Jennings v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-CP-02047-COA
CURTIS L. JENNINGS
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/26/2003
HON. LEE J. HOWARD
LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CURTIS JENNINGS (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
FORREST ALLGOOD
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 11/09/2004
BEFORE LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Curtis Jennings pled guilty to the offense of the sale of a controlled substance and was
sentenced to serve a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections.
¶2.
Jennings filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which was denied by the trial court. On
appeal, Jennings asserts the following errors: (1) the trial court failed to inform Jennings of his right
against self-incrimination, (2) the trial court failed to advise Jennings of the elements of the offense,
(3) Jennings was denied effective assistance of counsel, (4) the trial court failed to correctly advise
Jennings of his right to appeal, (5) the trial court erred in refusing an evidentiary hearing on the merits
of the post-conviction relief petition, and finally (6) that there was cumulative error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for post-conviction relief, the standard
of review is clear. The trial court's denial will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court's
decision was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (¶3)(Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
ANALYSIS
I.
¶4.
Involuntary Guilty Plea
Jennings claims that his plea was involuntary. In support of his allegation, Jennings argues
that the trial court did not advise him of his right against self-incrimination, nor did the court fully
advise him of the consequences of his pleading guilty to the crime charged. The record disputes
Jennings' claims.
¶5.
It is clear from the record that Jennings understood the nature of his plea of guilty as well as
the sentence required by law. Jennings testified that he had reviewed the plea detailing his
constitutional rights with his attorney. Jennings also testified that he understood that he was giving
up his protection against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, his right to testify, and finally his
right to appeal the guilty plea. After making these statements to the trial court, Jennings stated that
he did not have any questions about the plea nor had he been promised anything or coerced into
pleading guilty. Statements such as these made in open court at sentencing are viewed as highly
credible. Gable v. State, 748 So. 2d 703, 706 (¶11) (Miss. 1999). The transcript of the guilty plea
hearing disproves Jennings' claim that his guilty plea was involuntarily and unintelligently entered.
Therefore, we find no merit to this issue.
II.
Denial of Due Process
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¶6.
Jennings argues next that he was denied due process of law because the indictment was not
read to him before he pled guilty. The argument continues that by this failure, he was not advised
of the elements of the offense.
¶7.
Again, the transcript of Jennings' plea hearing refutes this argument. Jennings testified that
his attorney had advised him of the elements of the offense. The trial court questioned Jennings
about the facts set out in the indictment, and he affirmed the truth and veracity of those statements,
admitting his guilt to each element of the offense. The record indicates that the trial court went so
far as to question Jennings' attorney to validate the fact that the elements of the offense had been
fully explained to Jennings.
¶8.
Furthermore, in its order dismissing the motion, the trial court properly evaluated this
argument and found it to be groundless. "When reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a petition
for post-conviction relief, this Court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are
found to be clearly erroneous." Graves v. State, 822 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (¶4) (Miss. App. 2002);
quoting Pickett v. State, 751 So. 2d 1031 (¶ 8) (Miss. 1999); Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595 (¶ 6)
(Miss. 1999). Accordingly, we find no merit to this issue.
III.
¶9.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Jennings argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel preventing a fair trial. Here
again, Jennings maintains that his attorney did not inform him of the specific elements of the charged
offense. Jennings further argues that his attorney did not ensure that the trial court advise him of his
rights regarding the possibility of an appeal. The final effort by Jennings to establish the ineffective
nature of his counsel is his blanket statement that his counsel "stood still and did nothing" while
Jennings was sentenced.
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¶10.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Jennings must demonstrate that his attorney's
performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Moore v. State, 676 So. 2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1996). A
presumption exists that the attorney's conduct was adequate. Burns v. State, 813 So. 2d 668, 673
(¶ 14) (Miss. 2001). When evaluating the effectiveness of counsel at trial, the alleged deficiency and
any prejudicial effect are measured by looking at the totality of circumstances. Hiter v. State, 660
So. 2d 961, 965 (Miss. 1995).
¶11.
Jennings signed a guilty plea petition. This petition clearly informed Jennings that by
pleading guilty he waived his right to an appeal and other specified rights. Jennings' allegation that
he was unaware of this consequence is clearly unsupported.
¶12.
Jennings further asserts that his counsel was ineffective on the grounds that he was not
informed of the elements of the crime. Jennings testified himself that the elements of the charge
against him were fully explained. In addition, the guilty plea petition also required Jennings to
indicate whether or not he was dissatisfied with his counsel's representation. Jennings made no such
objection at his plea hearing when given the opportunity.
¶13.
Finally, we take notice that Jennings had previously pled guilty to felony and misdemeanor
offenses. Therefore, there is more than reasonable evidence to prove that Jennings fully understood
the plea procedure. Accordingly, we find Jennings to have received effective assistance of counsel
and therefore, this argument is without merit.
IV.
¶14.
Right to Appeal
Jennings next asserts that the trial court erred in advising Jennings that he had no right to
appeal. Jennings continues in his argument with the assertion that the trial court misstated the law
and that he does in fact have a right to appeal. It is Jennings who has misinterpreted the law.
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¶15.
Again, Jennings claims that he was unaware of the consequential bar should he plead guilty.
The record speaks for itself. The trial court specifically stated at the plea hearing that "if a jury tried
this case and a jury found you guilty, you could appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, but you
can't appeal when you plead guilty." Jennings testified that he understood.
Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-35-101 (Rev. 2003) provides in part:
Any person convicted of an offense in a circuit court may appeal to the supreme
court, provided, however, an appeal from the circuit court to the supreme court shall
not be allowed in any case where the defendant enters a plea of guilty.
¶16.
Jennings relies on the case of Trotter v. State, 554 So. 2d 313 (Miss. 1989). However, Trotter
provides that while the conviction itself cannot be appealed, an illegal sentence handed down
pursuant to the plea is appealable. Id. at 315; citing Burns v. State, 344 So.2d 1189 (Miss.1977).
"Therefore, it becomes a question of whether the petitioner claims his plea was involuntary or
whether he claims his sentence was illegal." Gunter v. State, 841 So. 2d 195, 201 (¶ 20)(Miss. App.
2003). It is only the argument that the sentence was illegal that is directly appealable. Id.
¶17.
Likewise, as in Gunter, it is apparent that Jennings is contesting his conviction rather than
the sentence imposed. Jennings fails to assert even one allegation that his sentence was illegal. Since
he is challenging his conviction, the trial court was correct, and Jennings only possible relief was a
motion for post-conviction relief. Jennings presented his motion for post-conviction relief and was
denied by the trial court. Therefore, we again find no merit to this issue.
V.
¶18.
Evidentiary Hearing
Jennings maintains that he was denied an opportunity to present evidence supporting his
claims of errors by the trial court. He maintains that, under the provisions of the Mississippi Uniform
Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 99-39-1 to 29 (Rev.
2000), he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
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¶19.
The right to an evidentiary hearing is not guaranteed. Mississippi Code Annotated Section
99-39-19(1) (Rev. 2000) provides that the trial judge has discretion in allowing an evidentiary hearing:
If the motion is not dismissed at a previous stage of the proceeding, the judge, after
the answer is filed and discovery, if any, is completed, shall, upon a review of the
record, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If it appears that an
evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge shall make such disposition of the
motion as justice shall require.
The trial court is simply not required to grant an evidentiary hearing on every petition it entertains.
Rowland v. Britt, 867 So. 2d 260, 262 (¶8 )(Miss. App. 2003); citing McMillian v. State, 774 So.2d
454(¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
¶20.
Trial courts are authorized to dismiss post-conviction relief motions if there are no disputed
or disputable facts. Jennings' petition for post-conviction relief failed to include any affidavits, other
than his, or evidence to support his claims. This Court has consistently held that mere allegations
in the pleadings, otherwise undisputed, are not sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing.
McCuiston v. State, 758 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (¶9)(Miss. App. 2000); citing Cole v. State, 666 So. 2d
767, 777 (Miss. 1995).
¶21.
Jennings was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. No evidence accompanied Jennings'
motion to contradict the trial court’s findings when the guilty plea was entered. The trial court
adequately and thoroughly questioned Jennings at the plea hearing concerning his understanding of
the proceedings and the effect of his pleading guilty. Thomas v. State, 861 So. 2d 371, 375
(¶14)(Miss. App. 2003).
¶22.
Given the lack of contradictory evidence presented, we find that Jennings was fully aware of
the consequences of the waiver of his constitutional rights as well as his waiver of appeal; he knew
the elements of the offense to which he was pleading guilty; and finally, his counsel provided
effective representation. Therefore, we find this argument to be without merit.
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VI.
¶23.
Cumulative Error
Since each of the foregoing assignments of error have been found to be without merit, we
find there was no cumulative error. Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 847 (¶10) (Miss. 2003).
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO LOWNDES COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, BARNES
AND ISHEE, JJ., CONCUR.
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