Willie Edward Williams, Jr. v. State of Mississippi
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THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-00442-COA
WILLIE EDWARD WILLIAMS, JR. A/K/A JUNEBUG
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
1/15/2003
HON. LARRY EUGENE ROBERTS
LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM F. VICK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CHARLES W. MARIS
BILBO MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
THE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND GUILTY OF
POSSESSION OF CRACK COCAINE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND SENTENCED
TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS.
AFFIRMED - 10/26/2004
EN BANC.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Willie Edward Williams, Jr. was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County of the crime
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was thereafter sentenced to serve, as a habitual
offender, a term of life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Williams appeals,
raising the following issues:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE?
II.
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE GRANTED A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT?
III.
WAS THE SEARCH OF THE AREA SURROUNDING WILLIAMS AND THE SEARCH
OF HIS VEHICLE CONSTITUTIONAL?
IV.
HAS WILLIAMS MADE A SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL?
¶2.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
Willie Edward Williams was driving his car in Meridian while drinking gin, when he ran off the road
and crashed into two parked cars. Williams asked the owners of the two cars, Katrina Dove and Trudie
Stubbs, not to call the police. However, Ms. Dove ignored Williams's request and immediately began to
call the police, and as she did so, she saw Williams go back into his car, reach under a speaker box, and
retrieve an unidentified object into his pocket. He also retrieved his cell phone, then fled on foot before
the police arrived.
¶4.
Meridian Police Officer Michael Phillips and Detective Andy Havard arrived at the accident. After
Ms. Dove and Ms. Stubbs gave the officers a description of Williams, Officer Phillips proceeded in the
direction that Williams fled and spotted him approximately two and a half blocks away. Williams stopped
when he saw Officer Phillips’ car, and Officer Phillips got out to question Williams about the accident. As
they talked, Officer Phillips noticed that Williams “was making a lot of eye movement” towards a particular
area four or five feet away. Officer Phillips called the police dispatcher for a patrol unit. When Officer
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Powell of the Meridian Police arrived, the two officers placed Williams in the back seat of Officer Powell’s
vehicle.
¶5.
The officers searched the area to which their attention had been drawn by Williams's eye
movements and found a large ball of aluminum foil. Inside the foil was a substance that appeared to be
crack cocaine. They found a “cookie” of crack cocaine, about 89.42 grams, with a value of approximately
$20,000 when broken off and sold on the street. Williams also had $4,383.06 in cash in his possession.
The officers went back to the scene of the accident with Williams, and Ms. Dove and Ms. Stubbs identified
Williams as the driver of the car that crashed into their vehicles.
¶6.
There is no indication when or whether Williams was read his rights, but Officer Phillips called
Ricky Roberts, a K-9 officer with the Meridian Police Department, to let his dog sniff Williams's car.
Williams was not near his car at the time. The dog alerted strongly to the speaker box.
¶7.
Williams was indicted on the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute,
as well as with the lesser charge of possession of cocaine. On December 3, 2002, the jury found Williams
guilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.
ANALYSIS
I.
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE?
¶8.
The State was unable to prove that Williams at any time physically possessed the crack cocaine
that resulted in his conviction. No drugs or drug paraphernalia were found in Williams's vehicle at the
accident scene, no drugs were found on his person, and neither police officer was able to produce
Williams's fingerprints on the aluminum foil in which the narcotics in question were packaged. No witnesses
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could testify that they saw Williams possess or otherwise control the narcotics, and Williams maintained
his innocence throughout these proceedings. For these reasons, and as both parties agree, the case against
Williams is based on circumstantial evidence, and the State’s case hinges on the sufficiency of the proof that
Williams constructively possessed the crack cocaine found near where he was standing. “An item is within
one’s constructive possession when it is subject to his dominion or control. Constructive possession may
be established by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Keys v. State, 478 So. 2d 266, 268 (Miss.
1985).
¶9.
In Powell v. State, 355 So. 2d 1378, 1379 (Miss. 1978), the Mississippi Supreme Court
explained:
The correct rule in this jurisdiction is that one in possession of premises upon which
contraband is found is presumed to be in constructive possession of the articles, but the
presumption is rebuttable. We have held that where contraband is found upon premises
not in the exclusive control and possession of the accused, additional incriminating facts
must connect the accused with the contraband. Where the premises upon which
contraband is found is not in the exclusive possession of the accused, the accused is
entitled to acquittal, absent some competent evidence connecting him with the contraband.
Sisk v. State, 290 So.2d 608 (Miss.1974).
Williams submits that he did not have the dominion or control of the crack cocaine because he did not have
exclusive possession of the property upon which the narcotics was found. When the police stopped
Williams, he was on a city street, and the aluminum foil that contained the crack cocaine was likewise on
the ground of a city street. Williams submits that no one could be in exclusive control of a city street. As
Powell demonstrates, however, it is not necessary to prove that the premises were in the exclusive
possession of the defendant in order to convict under a constructive possession theory. In this case, the
State has demonstrated that the arrest occurred early in the morning, when few people would be present
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on a public street, and the length of time between Williams fleeing the scene of the accident and the police
locating the aluminum foil was very short, with little opportunity for anyone to alter the contents of the
aluminum foil that had been located. This closeness in time and proximity is an important factor in
concluding that Williams was aware of the nature and character of the drugs and exercised dominion and
control over the drugs.
¶10.
The State submits that the following circumstances, all of which the jury considered, show that
Williams had constructive possession of the crack cocaine. First, the two women saw Williams go back
into his car and retrieve something. Second, Williams fled the scene. Third, the cocaine was within four
to five feet of where Officer Phillips saw Williams. Fourth, Williams made eye movements toward the area
where the drugs were found. Fifth, Williams had an immediate need to get rid of the cocaine before he got
caught with it in his pocket. Sixth, Williams had more than $4,000 in his pocket. Seventh, the drug dog
alerted to the area of Williams's car where he was seen removing something a short while earlier. The jury
decided that these elements were sufficient to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams constructively
possessed the narcotics. “If there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty, this Court will not
reverse.” Meshell v. State,506 So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1987). We find it especially important to
emphasize that two eyewitnesses saw Williams go into his car and retrieve something. This fact shows to
us that there was evidence that Williams exercised dominion and control over the drugs. While no single
factor standing alone establishes that Williams had constructive possession of the cocaine, the evidence
produced by the State, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.
¶11.
On appeal, Williams presents several fact scenarios that might show that he did not possess the
crack cocaine in question. For example, he submits that the narcotics could have been disposed of by
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some other person, perhaps someone running from the police, or that he could have won the large amount
of cash he was carrying at a casino. The reasonable doubt standard the jury was held to does not require
the jury to consider every conceivable scenario that might exonerate the defendant. In Pegues v. State,
840 So. 2d 721, 726 (¶ 16)(Miss. Ct. App. 2002), we explained, “[t]here is sufficient evidence to support
a verdict of guilty when there is competent and credible evidence as to each element of the offense which,
when taken together with all inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, and considered
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, permits a hypothetical reasonable juror to find the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting Beard v. State, 812 So. 2d 250, 253 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.
2002). We went on to explain that a jury’s finding of reasonable doubt should stand, even if another
reasonable hypothetical jury could find differently. Id.
¶12.
Finally, Williams argues that the K-9 dog that identified the narcotics on the speaker box could not
differentiate among the narcotics to which he alerts, as Officer Roberts testified that the smell could be
marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, heroine, or crystal methamphetamines. We are unpersuaded by this
argument, as the facts of this case show that the narcotics identified by the K-9 dog could not have been
anything other than the crack cocaine for which he was charged. Although the alert from the K-9 drug
dog by itself does not establish constructive possession of the cocaine, it is a piece of evidence that the jury
was allowed to consider in deciding that Williams was in constructive possession of the drugs. The
eyewitnesses saw Williams remove an object from the speaker box of the car; the K-9 dog alerted to the
speaker box when he sniffed for drugs. We decline to rule that the alert of a drug dog is irrelevant simply
because the alert is unable to conclusively establish that a defendant constructively possessed drugs.
II.
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE GRANTED A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
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NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT?
¶13.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has set forth the following standard of review for motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
Our standards of review for a denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
directed verdict are also identical. Under this standard, this Court will consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all
favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so
considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not
have arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the other
hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such
quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial
judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. The above
standards of review, however, are predicated on the fact that the trial judge applied the
correct law.
Jackson v. State, 815 So. 2d 1196, 1202 (¶14)(Miss. 2002) (citing Coleman v. State, 697 So. 2d 777,
787-88 (Miss. 1997)). As we have stated, the State presented ample evidence for the jury to decide,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams was in constructive possession of the crack cocaine. The circuit
court, as well as this Court, is unable to grant motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless the
evidence is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the defendant not guilty. Alexander
v. State, 759 So.2d 411, 421 (¶36) (Miss.2000) (quoting Gossett v. State, 660 So.2d 1285, 1293
(Miss.1995)). Williams’s proposal of scenarios that the jury could have, but did not, consider in rendering
a guilty verdict does not create any reason to overturn the jury’s verdict. This issue is without merit.
III.
WAS THE SEARCH OF THE AREA SURROUNDING WILLIAMS AND THE SEARCH
OF HIS VEHICLE CONSTITUTIONAL?
¶14.
Williams has complained that the search of the area in which he was taken into custody, the opening
of the aluminum foil found by the officers, and the search of his vehicle were unconstitutional. However,
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he did not object at trial to any of this testimony or evidence of which he now seeks to complain. In
McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to decide
McNeal’s complaint that the detectives exceeded the scope of their search warrant because McNeal had
not brought up the issue at trial level. Id. at 1005 (citing Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173, 1177
(Miss. 1990) (refusing to address the issue because appellant failed to raise the specific issue at the trial
level); Brown v. State, 534 So. 2d 1019, 1024 (Miss. 1988).
¶15.
The State submits that Williams's search is not an unreasonable search as contemplated by the
Fourth Amendment because the evidence was not found on Williams's person, and he cannot claim to have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy alongside a public road. We agree. The Mississippi Supreme
Court has stated that “generally one does not reasonably expect to keep private that which can be seen
by the public.” Shook v. State, 552 So. 2d 841, 847 (Miss. 1989). In Shook, the Court upheld a search
around the exterior of the defendant’s truck. On this precedent, certainly there is no expectation of privacy
on a public street. Also pertinent in this case is the principle of abandonment. By discarding the aluminum
foil package, before the police took him into custody, Williams abandoned it and deprived himself of any
right to privacy. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991); Harper v. State, 635 So. 2d
864, 867 (Miss. 1994); Bessent v. State, 808 So. 2d 979, 985-86 (¶20)(Miss. App. 2001). Indeed, the
facts of Hodari, in which the defendant abandoned the cocaine he possessed while fleeing from the police,
uniquely fit the facts of the case before us. Williams abandoned the crack cocaine before the police took
him into custody; it was not the fruit of an illegal seizure.
¶16.
Williams also argues that Officer Phillips seized the aluminum foil unconstitutionally because he had
no reasonable fear that Williams was in a position to destroy evidence. We disagree. Williams had fled
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the scene of an accident, and he had done so after retrieving something from his wrecked car. On these
facts, the police were justified in seizing the aluminum foil without a warrant for fear that the evidence would
be destroyed. Courts have consistently held that no warrant is necessary to search for drugs when exigent
circumstances exist that make police believe the evidence will be destroyed. Moss v. State, 411 So. 2d
90, 95 (Miss. 1982).
¶17.
Finally, we decide Williams's claim that the police should not have been allowed to bring a drug
dog to sniff his car. Before Officer Roberts arrived with the dog, Officer Phillips secured Williams and
found the cocaine. These facts provide probable cause to conduct a search of the car. The State also
submits that Williams, having abandoned his car, wrecked in someone else’s yard, had no reasonable
expectation of privacy. We agree. In United States v. Williams, 569 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1978), a truck
driver who pulled into a truck stop, unhooked his trailer, and drove off without it after learning that he was
being followed by government agents, was held to have abandoned the trailer and its contents. The court
stated that the truck driver's only conceivable purpose in leaving the trailer unguarded and unlocked in the
parking area had been to rid himself of the vehicle with its incriminating contents, possibly with the hope
of recovering it later if no one else took it. Such conduct, the court concluded, was transparently an
abandonment of the tight grip of ownership, relying solely on a feeble hope of reacquisition. Id. at 826.
The issue is without merit.
IV.
HAS WILLIAMS MADE A SHOWING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
¶18.
The substantive issues of law relative to this issue are found in the case of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
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Id. at 688. In addition, it is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test.
Id. at 693. Instead, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694.
¶19.
Williams first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not filing substantive
pre-trial motions. He does not identify which pre-trial motions his trial counsel should have filed, thus failing
to show either deficient performance or prejudice.
¶20.
Williams also claims that the trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in that his trial counsel did
not object to the introduction of several items of evidence that should have been excluded, including the
following: the warrantless search of Williams's vehicle and the resulting positive alert of Officer Roberts’
K-9 dog; the introduction of the aluminum foil; and the introduction of the contents of the foil. As we have
already discussed, these items of evidence were admissible. As such, Williams could not have been
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to such evidence.
¶21.
Williams next claims that his trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction regarding dominion and
control and proximity, despite precedent from the Mississippi Supreme Court that such instructions be
given. Williams is referring to the standard proof articulated in Curry v. State, which held as follows:
What constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and the narcotic
property to complete the concept of ‘possession’ is a question which is not susceptible of
a specific rule. However, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant
was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally
and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive
possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject to his
dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate
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in the absence of other incriminating circumstances.
Curry v. State, 249 So. 2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971), In this case, Williams's trial counsel requested, and
the trial court granted, an instruction stating the law of constructive possession. The jury instruction stated,
“Where the crack cocaine is not in the actual physical possession of Defendant, there must be sufficient
facts to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine was subject to the Defendant’s dominion or
control.” This instruction contains the essence of the standard of proof required by Curry to convict under
a constructive possession theory.
¶22.
Williams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to call any witnesses
on his behalf. Williams apparently informed his trial counsel that the property on which the narcotics were
found was owned by a man Williams knew to be a crack dealer who was in the habit of concealing his
drugs in the backyard. Once again, Williams has not shown how this fact demonstrates prejudice. The
State has already proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was in constructive possession of the
crack cocaine, and the mere fact that the crack cocaine was located in a backyard of someone Williams
contends is a drug dealer does not by itself raise an inference the drugs found belonged to someone else.
Williams provided no facts to support these accusations and no method by which these accusations would
have been admitted at trial. It is highly unlikely that the owner of the property would have confessed to
being a drug dealer possessing 89.42 grams of crack cocaine.
¶23.
Williams next claims that his trial counsel failed to offer as proof any videotape from the Silver Star
Casino which may have given an explanation as to why Williams was in possession of such a large amount
of cash. Whether some evidence “may have benefitted” Williams is not the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. The fact that Williams had a large amount of cash in his possession is only one factor
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that the jury considered, if it had considered this factor at all, in deciding that Williams had constructive
possession of crack cocaine. Even if Williams did have a legitimate reason for carrying a large amount of
cash, there remained ample evidence to show that Williams had constructive possession of the crack
cocaine. Williams has failed to show that this evidence was available at all, and even if it were, Williams
has not proven that the introduction of this evidence would have changed the outcome of the case.
¶24.
Williams next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to ask Ms. Dove
or Ms. Stubbs if Williams could have been putting cash into his pocket when they testified that they thought
he retrieved something from his vehicle in addition to his cell phone. Williams’s efforts to create doubt do
nothing to overcome the overwhelming evidence against him.
¶25.
Williams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in not asking the officers
whether or when Williams was informed of his constitutional rights. Whether Williams received his
Miranda rights is irrelevant in this case because he was never interrogated while in police custody. The
evidence presented in this case was admissible without the police officers’ reading Williams his rights.
There was no reason to ask the police officers whether they advised Williams of his Miranda rights.
¶26.
Finally, Williams claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in that he counseled
Williams not to testify on his own behalf because the State might have questioned him about prior
convictions. Williams did have the option of testifying. After extensive questioning and explaining by the
trial court, Williams chose not to testify. The record is clear. Williams knew he had the right to testify; he
knew the likely risks of not testifying outweighed the possible advantages and opted to forego this option.
We find Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be without merit.
¶27.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY OF
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CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND
SENTENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., MYERS, GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ., CONCUR. KING,
C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY IRVING, J. ISHEE,
J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
KING, C.J., DISSENTING:
¶28.
With appropriate regard for the majority, I dissent.
¶29.
Williams was found guilty of possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. There was
no evidence of actual possession, so the majority relies on constructive possession. Constructive
possession may be shown by proof that the drugs were subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.
Mere proximity, absent other evidence, is not sufficient to establish constructive possession. Hamm v.
State, 735 So. 2d 1025 (¶11) (Miss. 1999).
¶30.
In this case the proof that relates to constructive possession, can be reduced to the following: (1)
Officer Phillips was looking for Williams, who he saw walking in a northerly direction approximately two
blocks from the accident site; (2) Williams stopped upon seeing Officer Phillips; (3) Officer Phillips
detained Williams to take him to the accident site for identification purposes; (4) Officer Phillips’ vehicle
lacked a security screen, therefore, he called for a second vehicle to transport Williams; (5) as they waited
for the transport vehicle, Williams stood to the north of Officer Phillips; (6) Officer Phillips said that during
that time, Williams was "making a lot of eye movement, you know back and forth, back and forth,"; and
(7) Officer Phillips searched through a pile of debris, on the right shoulder of the public road, approximately
13
four to five feet from where he detained Williams, and found a large quantity of crack cocaine.
¶31.
None of these things placed Williams in possession of the drugs. Likewise, there is no evidence
that Williams was aware of the nature and character of the drugs found in the pile of trash, or that he
exercised any dominion and control over the drugs. While Officer Phillips may have strongly suspected that
the drugs belonged to Williams, mere suspicion was not enough to support a conviction. Stringfield v.
State, 588 So. 2d 438, 440 (Miss. 1991).
¶32.
As a part of its validation of this conviction, the majority notes that a drug dog gave an alert when
brought in to check Williams’ vehicle. However, a look at the essence of the drug dog evidence indicates
that it does not establish any constructive possession by Williams.
¶33.
The K-9 officer responsible for the drug dog indicated that neither actual drugs, nor any physical
evidence of drugs was found in Williams’ vehicle. He therefore concluded that what the dog alerted to was
the odor of drugs in the vehicle. The K-9 officer noted that the dog was trained to sniff for several types
of drugs, so that it was impossible to tell to what drug the dog might have alerted in Williams’ vehicle. He
also noted that it was impossible to determine how long any drug odor might have been present in Williams’
vehicle, saying it might well have been present any where from a few minutes to several weeks.
¶34.
As can be expected, the majority takes exception to the position expressed in the dissenting
opinion.
¶35.
The majority states,"We find it especially important to emphasize that two eyewitnesses saw
Williams go into his car and retrieve something. This fact shows to us that there was evidence that Williams
exercised dominion and control over the drugs." Contrary to the majority’s assertion , this does not provide
evidence that Williams exercised dominion and control over the drugs found in the pile of debris on the
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street. Indeed the witnesses testified that while Williams went back into the car, they never saw what he
retrieved. Such a self-authenticating proposition, as that set forth by the majority, can only be proof of
dominion and control over the drugs if you assume from the outset that Williams was in possession of drugs.
¶36.
Consistent with its use of self-authenticating statements to establish dominion and control, the
majority also states, “Williams had an immediate need to get rid of the cocaine before he got caught with
it in his pocket.” The majority’s presumption that Williams had drugs in his pocket is not proof that he in
fact exercised dominion and control over drugs found in a pile of debris on a public street.
¶37.
The majority notes as proof of Williams’ dominion and control that he had over $4,000 in his
possession. While the possession of that sum of money may raise a question, it in no way ties Williams to
the drugs found on the street. This is particularly true where his explanation as to how it came into his
possession was not implausible, and was not contradicted.
¶38.
The evidence in this record fails to demonstrate that Williams exercised any dominion and control
over the drugs. Under these facts, there was not sufficient proof of constructive possession.
¶39.
I therefore dissent and would reverse and render the conviction.
IRVING, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
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