Jessie Frank Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2003-KA-00083-COA
JESSIE FRANK JONES
APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT
12/17/2002
HON. ANDREW C. BAKER
TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
TOMMY WAYNE DEFER
DAVID L. WALKER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CHARLES W. MARIS
JOHN W. CHAMPION
CRIMINAL - FELONY
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY OF A DWELLING:
SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF TWENTY
FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND THE DEFENDANT SHALL
NOT BENEFIT FROM GOOD TIME,
ADMINISTRATIVE REDUCTION OF
SENTENCE.
REVERSED AND REMANDED ON DIRECT
APPEAL, REVERSED AND RENDERED ON
CROSS-APPEAL - 05/25/2004
¶1.
Jesse Frank Jones was convicted of attempted burglary of a dwelling and sentenced to serve
twenty-five years as a habitual offender. He appeals this conviction and asserts the following issues as
error: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding his past felony convictions; (2)
whether the trial court erred in its rulings on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence; and (3) whether the
trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenges to the State's use of its peremptory strikes. The State,
in its cross-appeal, asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining Jones' motion for bail pending appeal.
¶2.
On direct appeal, we find that the court erred in admitting testimony regarding Jones' past felony
convictions, and we reverse and remand for a new trial. On the State’s cross-appeal, we find that the court
erred in sustaining Jones' motion for bail pending appeal, and we reverse and render denying Jones bail
pending appeal.
FACTS
¶3.
On November 28, 2001, Jessie Frank Jones approached the home of Kevin Voyles and knocked
on the door. Voyles testified that it was his belief that Jones was attempting to break into his house. Jones
admitted he may have knocked too hard, but denied kicking, or in any other way, attempting to force entry.
Voyles, on the other hand, testified that Jones banged and kicked on his door to the point that it scared him.
Voyles called 911 and then retrieved a gun. Voyles also testified that he peered through the window and
saw Jones with a knife in his hand.
¶4.
The investigating officer testified that the door had dents and scratches on it, particularly around
the peephole. Items were knocked off the interior wall of the house and were found laying on the floor near
the door. The peephole of the door was also found lying on the floor inside the house.
¶5.
When first questioned, Jones claimed that he knew nothing about the incident. Later, Jones
admitted that he was at the residence, but said he was there in an attempt to retrieve water for his over2
heated car. While there was evidence to support Jones’ claim that he had radiator problems around the
time of the incident, there was no corroborating evidence that supported Jones’ claim that he had radiator
problems on the specific day of the incident.
¶6.
Jones was convicted of attempted burglary of a dwelling.
ANALYSIS
I.
¶7.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding Jones' past
felony convictions
Prior to trial, Jones filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from eliciting testimony regarding
his past felony convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, and grand larceny connected with burglary.
Relying on Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), the circuit judge admitted testimony regarding the prior
convictions to show intent. The trial court noted that evidence of the prior convictions was more probative
than prejudicial and held that the evidence passed the Rule 403 balancing test.
¶8.
Evidentiary issues are decided under an abuse of discretion standard. Lindsey v. State, 754 So.
2d 506, 511 (¶23) (Miss. 1999). A case may be reversed based on the admission of evidence only if the
admission results in prejudice and harm or the admission affects a substantial right of a party. Smith v.
State, 839 So. 2d 489, 495 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2003).
¶9.
Character evidence is not admissible to prove that one acted in conformity therewith. M.R.E.
404(a). Evidence of another crime or prior bad act is not usually admissible. Ballenger v. State, 667 So.
2d 1242, 1256 (Miss. 1995). However, according to Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes or bad acts
may be admissible to prove identity, knowledge, intent, motive or to prove scienter. Simmons v. State,
813 So. 2d 710, 716 (¶ 30) (Miss. 2002); Wheeler v. State, 536 So. 2d 1347, 1352 (Miss. 1988);
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Robinson v. State, 497 So. 2d 440, 442 (Miss. 1986); Carter v. State, 450 So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1984).
¶10.
Upon finding that the evidence is admissible under M.R.E. 404(b), the court must still consider
whether the evidence passes the Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 filter. Simmons, 813 So. 2d at 716 (¶
33) (Miss. 2002); Stallworth v. State, 797 So. 2d 905, 910 (Miss. 2001); Ballenger, 667 So. 2d at
1257 (Miss. 1995). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 provides that otherwise admissible evidence may
be excluded where the risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
¶11.
Here, the State did not offer evidence of Jones' prior convictions of burglary and burglary related
crimes to show Jones' character. Instead, the State claimed that this evidence was presented to show
Jones' intent to commit the crime of burglary.
¶12.
The trial court relied on Leedom v. State, 796 So. 2d 1010 (Miss. 2001), to rule that the evidence
of Jones' prior convictions was admissible. Leedom was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and
capital murder of Lula Young. Trial testimony revealed that Leedom paid her co-conspirator $5,000 to
kill Young and that she had taken out three life insurance policies on Young, with either her or her husband
named as the beneficiary. The trial court also allowed evidence that Leedom had taken out life insurance
policies on Robert Stovall and that she offered her co-conspirator $10,000 to kill Stovall. On appeal,
Leedom challenged the trial court's admission of evidence of the second conspiracy. Id. at 1014 (¶ 14).
¶13.
The supreme court ruled that the evidence regarding the second conspiracy was admissible other
crimes evidence. Id. at 1016 (¶ 19). The court held, “[a]s there exists an inherent danger of prejudicial
effect in the use of other acts evidence, the 404(b) exception for which the crime is introduced must be a
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material issue in the case. Moreover, its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial effect, Miss. R. Evid. 403.” Leedom, 796 So. 2d at 1015 (¶ 15).
¶14.
The co-conspirator testified that Leedom offered him money to kill Stovall, just as she had offered
him money to kill Young. Id. 1014 (¶ 12). Insurance agents testified that Leedom took out life insurance
policies on Stovall and claimed to be related to him, just as she had for Young. Id. at 1016 (¶ 18).
Leedom also listed her address as both Stovall's and Young's places of residence on the policies. Id. The
court concluded that the evidence regarding the Stovall plan was admissible under Mississippi Rule of
Evidence 404(b) and that the trial court did not err in finding that the probative value was not substantially
outweighed the unfair prejudice. Id.
¶15.
Jones admitted that he knocked on the door and testified that he may have knocked too hard.
However, Jones denied intending to break in and steal. He claimed that he knocked on the door to ask
for some water for his overheated car. Therefore, Jones' intent was squarely in issue and indeed was a
material issue, meeting the requirement that “the 404(b) exception for which the crime is introduced must
be a material issue in the case.” Id. at 1015 (¶ 15).
¶16.
However, the facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Leedom and require a different
outcome in relation to the M.R.E. 403 decision. The prosecution presented no underlying facts about
Jones’ prior convictions. Instead, the prosecution called the circuit clerk to testify that Jones had several
prior convictions. The prosecution handed the clerk documents reflecting guilty pleas and judgments from
the previous convictions and asked the clerk what Jones was convicted of in each count. The clerk merely
read the convictions of each case. The clerk provided no information other than the documents which
indicated Jones was a prior convicted felon.
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¶17.
In Leedom, specific evidence of the second conspiracy was presented. Leedom, 796 So. 2d at
1013-14 (¶¶ 9-13). This evidence strongly suggested that Leedom had essentially the same plan and
preparation to kill Stovall. Id. at 1015 (¶ 16). Leedom's co-conspirator and insurance agents testified
regarding the similarities of the two conspiracies. Id. at 1014 and 1016 (¶¶ 12 and 18).
¶18.
Although evidence of Jones' other convictions of burglary and burglary-related crimes can be
admissible to show his intent, simply allowing the circuit clerk to read the convictions was improper.
Evidence of similar facts or plans in the previous convictions that suggested Jones' had a similar intent on
this occasion may pass the Rule 403 balancing test. However, simply allowing testimony that Jones'
committed similar crimes in the past and may have a propensity to commit similar crimes is an abuse of
discretion. The policy behind these rules, and the danger the rules seek to prevent, is that the jury may rely
on this evidence to determine that the defendant should be convicted because he/she has a character trait
or propensity to commit burglary.
¶19.
As it was presented, the probative value of evidence relating to Jones' prior convictions was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court's decision to allow the evidence
of the prior convictions, through the testimony of the clerk, was an abuse of discretion and resulted in
obvious prejudice to Jones. We reverse and remand for a new trial with proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
II.
III.
¶20.
Whether the trial court erred in its rulings on the sufficiency and weight of
the evidence.
Whether the trial court erred in overruling Jones' Batson challenges to the
State's use of its peremptory strikes.
Given our holding to reverse and remand for a new trial on other grounds, these issues are moot.
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IV.
¶21.
Whether the trial court erred in sustaining Jones' motion for bail pending
appeal
On cross-appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the Appellant's motion for
bail pending appeal. This court's review of a trial court's ruling on bail is limited to a review for abuse of
discretion. Veal v. State, 585 So. 2d 693, 697 (Miss. 1991). As long as the trial court applies the correct
legal standard and the record reflects substantial evidence consistent with the trial court's finding, the
decision will be upheld. Id.
¶22.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-35-115(2)(a) (Rev. 2000) provides:
[a] person convicted of any felony. . . shall be entitled to be released from imprisonment
on bail pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, within the discretion of a judicial officer,
if the convict shows by clear and convincing evidence that release of the convict would not
constitute a special danger to any other person or to the community, and that a condition
or a combination of conditions may be placed on release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of the convict as required, and only when the peculiar circumstances of the
case render it proper.
¶23.
This statute establishes three requirements for a person convicted of a felony to be released on bail
pending an appeal. First, one must show by clear and convincing evidence that the release would not
constitute a special danger to any other person. Second, there must exist a condition or combination of
conditions that may be placed on the release that will reasonably assure the appearance. Third, peculiar
circumstances of the case must render the release on bail proper.
¶24.
In reaching its decision to grant Jones bond pending appeal, the trial court did not address the
statutory requirements. Instead, the trial court merely relied on its concern over its prior Rule 404(b) ruling
and the possibility of the decision being overruled as a basis for allowing bond.
¶25.
Although the possibility of spending unnecessary time imprisoned is serious, it is not a circumstance
that warrants an appearance bond in a felony case. In Ex parte Atkinson, 101 Miss. 744, 58 So. 215,
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217 (1912), the court allowed bail upon several doctors' recommendations that "confinement will aggravate
the trouble and imperil the life and health of petitioner." In Ex parte Willette, 219 Miss. 785, 63 So. 2d
52, 54 (Miss. 1953), the court likewise allowed bail pending appeal finding it probable that confinement
is "likely to produce, fatal or serious results."
¶26.
The possibility of an evidentiary ruling being overruled and resulting in a defendant possibly being
imprisoned while the issue was decided is not supported by the similar policy concerns facing the courts
in Atkinson and Willette.
¶27.
Here, the trial judge did not apply the correct legal standard and the record does not reflect
substantial evidence to grant bail pending appeal. For these reasons we find the trial judge erred in granting
Jones bail pending appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and render the trial court's grant of bail pending
appeal.
¶28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TATE COUNTY IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED ON DIRECT APPEAL FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION AND REVERSED AND RENDERED ON CROSS-APPEAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE TAXED TO TATE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS AND
CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
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