Donald Jones v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CP-02003-COA
DONALD JONES A/K/A DONALD MCARTHUR
JONES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
11/13/2002
HON. BOBBY BURT DeLAUGHTER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DONALD JONES (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: CHARLES W. MARIS
ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED - 5/25/2004
BEFORE KING, C.J., THOMAS AND MYERS, JJ.
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Donald Jones entered a guilty plea to manslaughter in the Hinds County Circuit Court on June 6,
2000. In October of 2002, Jones filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was dismissed by the
circuit court. Jones timely perfected his appeal from the dismissal and raises the following four issues.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Was Jones improperly induced through a misrepresentation by defense counsel that the prosecuting
attorney would make no sentence recommendation on an open plea?
II. Was Jones’ guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily entered?
III. Was the sentence imposed on Jones disproportionate to other terms of confinement ordered in similar
circumstances by the trial court?
IV. Was Jones denied effective assistance of counsel?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
On April 6, 1999, Jones was indicted by a Hinds County grand jury for killing Arthur Johnson on
New Year’s Day 1999, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-19(1) (Rev. 2000). On
June 6, 2000, Jones pled guilty to the lesser offense of manslaughter. The plea was accepted. The trial
judge continued the case until June 23, 2000, to allow the preparation of a pre-sentence report. On June
29, 2000, the trial court reviewed the pre-sentence report which included a sentence recommendation by
the State. In the report, the State recommended the “maximum penalty according to the law” which was
twenty years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-25 (Rev. 2000). The trial judge sentenced Jones to twenty
years with two years suspended and eighteen years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department
of Corrections.
¶3.
On October 14, 2002, Jones filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Mississippi
Code Annotated Section 99-39-5 (Rev. 2000). Jones argued four points of error: his guilty plea was
improperly induced by misrepresentations of defense counsel; his guilty plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made; his sentence was disproportionate to other sentences by the same trial court; and he was
denied effective assistance of counsel. The circuit court dismissed the motion for post-conviction relief.
Jones now appeals to this Court arguing the same four issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
¶4.
"When reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief, this Court
will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. However,
where questions of law are raised, the applicable standard of review is de novo." Brister v. State, 858 So.
2d 181, 182 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Graves v. State, 822 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (¶4) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2002)).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. WAS JONES IMPROPERLY INDUCED THROUGH A MISREPRESENTATION BY
DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT THE PROSECUTION WOULD MAKE NO SENTENCE
RECOMMENDATION ON AN OPEN PLEA?
¶5.
Jones asserts that his guilty plea was induced through an unfulfilled promise that the prosecutor
would not make a sentencing recommendation on his open plea of guilty. Jones argues that he relied on
his counsel’s representation that no sentence recommendation would be made. Jones relies on a letter
written by his trial counsel, Andre` de Gruy, as the basis of his argument. Apparently, after the plea and
sentencing Jones wrote to Mr. de Gruy for advice on his case. That letter is not contained in the record
for our review. However, the record does contain a letter from Mr. de Gruy to Jones. In that letter, de
Gruy explained to Jones that he, as a public defender, could not represent Jones on the motion for postconviction relief. Attorney de Gruy did give Jones some guidance on his legal claims.
¶6.
Jones relies on a portion of that letter which states:
The issue as I see it is: You plead guilty only because the prosecutor reduced the charge
to manslaughter and said she would make no recommendation. She had offered 15 years
to serve but you said no to that. It was only after she agreed to make no recommendation
did you agree to plea. That was the deal and she violated the agreement when she put in
that Pre-Sentence Investigation Report that she wanted the maximum of 20 years and then
argued to the court to give you 20 years. As your attorney I did not object to the PSI
report or the argument. The reason I did not object, for your information, is that I was
arguing for the 1 year alternative sentence and did not think it would be helpful for the
judge to know the 15 year offer.
3
Jones provides this Court nothing but the unsworn letter from his former counsel to support his claim of
misrepresentation. Jones failed to support his motion with affidavits from his counsel or other persons with
knowledge of this matter. As such, Jones has failed to meet his burden for establishing his case for postconviction relief on this issue. Bohreer v. State, 812 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (¶ 9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
¶7.
The only detail in the record regarding Jones’ plea with the State is contained in the Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report. In the report, Jones’ plea is described by the State as an “open plea.” This Court
has held that an open plea does not “designate any specific recommendation that the State [will] offer.”
Brasington v. State, 760 So. 2d 18, 27 (¶ 43) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). We held that in a situation where
the defendant agrees to an open plea, the State is not bound by any agreement to offer a specific
recommendation. Id. Similarly to Brasington, Jones provides this Court with no proof that a plea
agreement existed, or that the State violated such an agreement other than his own assertions. According
to Brasington, Jones could enter an open plea and the State could properly recommend a sentence to the
trial court. This issue is without merit.
II. WAS JONES’ GUILTY PLEA KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED?
¶8.
Jones argues that his guilty plea to manslaughter was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because
the trial judge failed to advise him of the critical elements of manslaughter. Rule 8.04 (A) (3) & (4) of the
Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules addresses the issue of the voluntariness of guilty pleas and outlines
the measures the trial judge must take upon the accused entering a plea of guilty. The rule states:
3. Voluntariness. Before the trial judge may accept a plea of guilty, the court must
determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis
for the plea. A plea of guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or
improper inducements. A showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently
made must appear in the record.
4
4. Advice to the Defendant. When the defendant is arraigned and wishes to plead guilty
to the offense charged, it is the duty of the trial court to address the defendant personally
and to inquire and determine:
a. That the accused is competent to understand the nature of the charge;
b. That the accused understands the nature and consequences of the plea, and the
maximum and minimum penalties provided by law;
c. That the accused understands that by pleading guilty (s)he waives his/her constitutional
rights of trial by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the
right against self-incrimination; if the accused is not represented by an attorney, that (s)he
is aware of his/her right to an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and that one will
be appointed to represent him/her if (s)he is indigent.
A plea is deemed voluntary and intelligent if the defendant is advised regarding the nature of the charge
against him and the consequences of his plea. Rankins v. State, 839 So. 2d 581, 584 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2003). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plea
was involuntarily entered. Id. Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of
verity. Fairley v. State, 812 So. 2d 259, 263 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
¶9.
In order to ensure that Jones had been properly advised and adequately understood the
consequences of his plea, the trial judge questioned Jones on the record regarding the requirements of Rule
8.04 (A) (4). Jones responded (1) that he had fully discussed the facts and circumstances of the offense
with his attorney, including a discussion of possible defenses and elements of the crime of manslaughter,
(2) that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation, (3) that he understood certain constitutional
rights were available to him and that by pleading guilty he was waiving those rights, (4) that he committed
the offense for which he was charged, (5) that he was not on drugs or other medications or being treated
for a mental illness and (6) that he was not induced to plead guilty by threats or intimidation or by promises
of leniency.
¶10.
The judge made a finding on the record that Jones’ guilty plea was freely, knowingly and voluntarily
made. In response to Jones’s specific claim that the trial judge failed to advise him of the critical elements
5
of manslaughter, the record indicates that the judge specifically asked Jones if he discussed the elements
with his attorney. Jones replied that he had. Furthermore, the trial judge followed the guidelines of Rule
8.04 (A) (3) & (4). Jones’ guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
III. WAS THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON JONES DISPROPORTIONATE TO OTHER TERMS
OF CONFINEMENT ORDERED IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES BY THE TRIAL COURT?
¶11.
Jones contends that the sentence imposed on him by the trial court is disproportionate to the
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants within the same circuit court district. In his appellate
brief, Jones cites several cases from the Hinds County Circuit Court where other defendants pled guilty to
manslaughter and received shorter sentences than he received.
¶12.
The State correctly argues that the imposition of a sentence is within the discretion of the trial court.
Holt v. State, 757 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983)). The sentence imposed is not subject to appellate review if it is within the statutory limits.
Rodriquez v. State, 839 So. 2d 561, 564 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Mississippi Code Annotated
Section 97-3-25 (Rev. 2000) states: “Any person convicted of manslaughter shall be fined in a sum not less
than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or both, or in the
penitentiary not less than two years, nor more than twenty years.” The trial judge sentenced Jones to
twenty years with two years suspended and eighteen years to serve. The sentence imposed on Jones was
within the applicable statutory guidelines.
¶13.
A sentence may be attacked under the Eighth Amendment based on the argument that the sentence
is disproportionate to the crime committed. McCoy v. State, 820 So. 2d 25,32 (¶ 18) (Miss. Ct. App.
2002) (citing White v. State, 761 So. 2d 221, 229 (¶ 39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)). The Eighth
Amendment forbids prison sentences that are “disproportionate to the crime committed.” Holt, 757 So.
6
2d at 1089 (¶ 7) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 284). However, the Eighth Amendment does not require that
all sentences be subject to a proportionality analysis. Holt, 757 So. 2d at 1090 (¶ 8). The proportionality
analysis is applicable only when an inference of gross disproportionality appears from the comparison of
the crime to the sentence imposed. Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 537 (Miss. 1996) (citing Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)). Considering Jones’ sentence, we find that a threshold comparison
of the crime to which Jones admitted his guilt in the form of a guilty plea, manslaughter, to the sentence
imposed by the trial court, does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. Therefore, a
proportionality analysis is not needed.
¶14.
Jones’ argument goes to the second prong of the proportionality analysis of Solem: a comparison
of the sentence imposed with sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. The argument
is similar to the one made by the appellant in Womack v. State, 827 So. 2d 55 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
In Womack, this Court held that while other similarly situated defendants in the same circuit court district
as Womack received less severe sentences than he did, “this fact alone does not prove that the sentences
imposed here are grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.” Womack, 827 So. 2d at 59 (¶ 13).
Similarly, the fact that other criminal defendants in Hinds County Circuit Court who pled guilty to
manslaughter received shorter sentences than Jones has no decisive bearing on whether or not his sentence
is disproportionate. The determination of proportionality relates back to the issue of statutory guidelines
in sentencing. According to our prior decisions, we find no disproportionate sentencing since Jones’
sentence was within the statutory limits of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-25.
IV. WAS JONES DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
¶15.
Jones contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by misrepresenting
to him that the State would make no sentence recommendation. Jones argues that based upon his
7
attorney’s misrepresentations about sentencing he was induced into pleading guilty to manslaughter. Jones
argues that he pled guilty because the prosecutor reduced the charge to manslaughter and said that she
would make no recommendation on his sentence.
¶16.
In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Beall
v. State, 768 So. 2d 949, 951 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-96 (1984)). The two-prong test of Strickland “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Beall, 768 So. 2d at 951 (¶ 7). This burden of proof by the petitioner
is met with the strong rebuttable presumption that “counsel’s conduct falls within the broad spectrum of
reasonable professional assistance." Walker v. State, 703 So. 2d 266, 268 (¶ 8) (Miss. 1997).
¶17.
Jones "must specifically allege facts showing that effective assistance of counsel was not in fact
rendered, and he must allege with specificity the fact that but for such purported actions by ineffective
counsel, the results of the trial court decision would have been different." Finley v. State, 739 So. 2d 425,
428 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Ford v. State, 708 So. 2d 73, 75 (¶ 8) (Miss. 1998)). Jones
argues that his attorney was deficient for misrepresenting to him that the prosecution would not make a
sentence recommendation. The only proof Jones provides to this Court regarding the alleged deficiency
by his attorney are his own allegations in his brief and the unsworn letter from Mr. de Gruy. Jones "must
prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, prejudice resulted from a deficiency in [trial] counsel's
performance." Earley v. State, 595 So. 2d 430, 433 (Miss. 1992). In addition, such deficiencies must
be presented with specificity and detail. Perkins v. State, 487 So. 2d 791, 793 (Miss.1986). Jones falls
short of meeting his burden on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim due to his failing to provide this
8
Court with proper proof of misrepresentation and how that alleged misrepresentation prejudiced his case.
This issue is without merit.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY DISMISSING
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS
OF APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HINDS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, CHANDLER
AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
