Benny R. Knight v. Corey Brooks
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-02093-COA
BENNY R. KNIGHT
APPELLANT
v.
COREY BROOKS
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
11/5/2002
HON. DALE HARKEY
JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
BILLY PARLIN
H. BENJAMIN MULLEN
CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
JUDGMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF. DAMAGES
ASSESSED AT $0.00
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 3/16/2004
EN BANC
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Benny R. Knight filed suit against Corey Brooks in the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Mississippi, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred
on May 3, 1994. After Knight presented his case and Brooks presented no evidence, the trial court
entered judgment on the jury verdict that found for Knight but awarded zero dollars in damages.
Knight moved for a new trial on the issue of damages which the trial court denied. From the denial
of that motion, Knight appeals and raises the following two issues.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Knight’s motion for a new trial on damages?
II. Was the verdict supported by the evidence or was it a result of bias, passion or prejudice on the
part of the jury?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
The evidence reflects that on May 3, 1994, Knight and Brooks were involved in a collision
of their motor vehicles. Knight was driving east on U.S. Highway 90 in Pascagoula, Mississippi.
Knight stopped at an intersection when the traffic light turned red. After having been stopped for
a short time, Knight looked in his rear-view mirror and noticed that a truck was coming toward him
at a high rate of speed. Believing the approaching truck was not going to stop, Knight grabbed his
steering wheel tightly and was struck from behind by a truck driven by Brooks. The collision totaled
Knight’s vehicle and Knight was forced to exit his vehicle through the sunroof. Knight called
someone from his place of business to come and pick him up from the scene of the accident.
¶3.
Knight went to visit his family physician, Dr. Kevin Cooper, on May 4, 1994, the day
following the accident. However, the record indicates that Knight went to see Dr. Cooper for a
complete physical, not for pains associated with the automobile accident. Knight admitted on crossexamination that he did not complain to Dr. Cooper about having pain or discomfort at that time and
that he went to see Dr. Cooper about his heart problems. Dr. Cooper’s medical records indicate no
mentioning by Knight to Dr. Cooper about the accident. Dr. Cooper’s report described Knight’s
exam an “essentially unremarkable.”
¶4.
The record reflects that Knight waited six months after the accident before he went to see
Dr. Christopher Wiggins, an orthopedic surgeon, in November 1994. Knight explained that the
reason he waited six months to see Dr. Wiggins was because he had heart surgery in June of 1994.
Given by deposition, Dr. Wiggins’ testimony indicated that Knight complained at that time of pains
in his left elbow. Knight mentioned the May 1994 accident to Dr. Wiggins. Dr. Wiggins testified
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that Knight suffered from an avulsed distal tendon and that given Knight’s medical condition with
heart problems, surgery was probably not an option of treatment. Dr. Wiggins testified that Knight
sustained “fifteen percent permanent partial disability to the left upper extremity because of pain and
loss of strength.” According to Knight’s direct examination, Dr. Wiggins prescribed medicine to
treat his arm pain.
¶5.
In July of 1995, Knight went to see Dr. Harry Danielson, a neurosurgeon, due to recurring
headaches, back and neck pain. Knight had been a patient of Dr. Danielson in 1992 following
another auto accident. In 1993, Dr. Danielson performed surgery on Knight to alleviate pain and
disk injury resulting from the previous accident. Following a neurological exam performed by Dr.
Danielson, an MRI X-ray and a myelogram, Dr. Danielson concluded that Knight suffered from a
“herniated disk at the C5-6 level.” After waiting several months to see if Knight's condition
improved, Dr. Danielson suggested surgery in March of 1996. An anterior cervical disckectomy was
performed by Dr. Danielson on April 5, 1996.
¶6.
Dr. Danielson testified that his medical opinion was that Knight’s accident on May 3, 1994,
with Corey Brooks worsened the pre-existing back condition Knight suffered as a result of the 1992
accident. Dr. Danielson also testified that Knight had a “nine percent general physical impairment
rating of the person as a whole for an anterior cervical disk fusion” but was not so disabled that he
would need to resign from his job as CEO of his company.
¶7.
Knight testified that he had post-accident medical bills totaling $23,000. Dr. Danielson
stated that his charges for Knight’s surgery and consultation were $7,650. Knight also testified that,
because of chronic pain resulting from the auto accident, he could not participate in certain activities
that he once enjoyed. Knight stated that due to pain he no longer could stand or ride in a car for long
periods of time. However, Knight stated that he was still able to fish, go boat riding and work as
owner of his own business.
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¶8.
After Knight presented his case, Brooks chose to rest and not to put on any evidence. The
trial court instructed the jury to find for Knight. The jury returned a verdict for Knight but assessed
his damages at zero dollars. The judgment on the jury verdict states, “We the jury find for the
plaintiff, and assess his damages at $0.00.” Knight moved for a new trial on the issue of damages.
Knight argued that the jury verdict was inadequate, not supported by the evidence and a result of
bias, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury. The trial judge denied Knight’s motion for a new
trial and Knight appeals this ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶9.
Knight raises two issues on appeal which are intertwined. We will consider the two issues
together in order to better resolve the issues before the Court. Knight contends that the trial court
erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. Motions for new trial challenge the weight of the
evidence. Mitchell v. Glimm, 819 So. 2d 548, 551 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The decision to grant
or to deny a motion for new trial is within the trial judge's discretion. Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Jeff
Anderson Med. Ctr., 792 So.2d 267, 274 (¶ 17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The appellate court, when
reviewing the trial judge's decision to deny a motion for new trial, views all evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. This Court will reverse the trial judge’s denial of a request
for a new trial only when the denial amounts to an abuse of discretion. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So. 2d
1, 13 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2000).
¶10.
Knight asserts two points of error with regard to the jury verdict of zero dollars. First, that
the amount is inadequate and second, that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence and evinces
bias, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury. Based on these assertions, Knight argues that the
trial court should have granted him a new trial on damages. Proper bases for granting a motion for
new trial are “when the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or when the jury
has been confused by faulty jury instructions, or when the jury has departed from its oath and its
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verdict is a result from bias, passion, and prejudice." Gatewood v. Sampson, 812 So. 2d 212, 222 (¶
22) (Miss. 2002) (citing Hamilton v. Hammons, 792 So.2d 956, 965 (Miss. 2001)). Commonly, the
sole proof of bias, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury is “an inference, if any, to be drawn
from contrasting the amount of the verdict with the amount of the damages.” Gatewood, 812 So.
2d at 222 (citing Green v. Grant, 641 So. 2d 1203,1209 (Miss. 1994)).
¶11.
The trial judge gave the following peremptory instructions to the jury:
Instruction No. 4
The Court instructs the jury to return a verdict for the Plaintiff, Benny R. Knight.
Instruction No. 10
Your verdict should be written on a separate sheet of paper, need not be signed by
anyone, and should be in the following form: “We the Jury, find for the Plaintiff
and assess his damages at $_________.”
Essentially, the trial court was directing a verdict for Knight while leaving the issue of damages for
the jury’s determination. When this Court reviews the action of the jury after the trial court has
refused to grant a new trial on the question of damages, the question then becomes whether the
verdict was either so excessive or inadequate as to shock the conscience and to indicate bias, passion
and prejudice on the part of the jury, or, whether the jury failed to respond to reason. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So. 2d 382, 392 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2001).
¶12.
In the case sub judice, there was actually no award of damages since the jury assessed them
at zero dollars. This cannot be viewed as an inadequate award of damages, but instead as no award
at all. Knight presented several expert witnesses at trial by way of their depositions, each stating
that Knight suffered some injury from the accident. Knight testified that his medical bills total
$23,000. Dr. Danielson testified that his bill for services rendered to Knight was $7,560. Dr.
Danielson stated that Knight suffered from an aggravation of a pre-existing back condition due to
the accident which resulted in surgery. Knight stated that he still continued to experience pain and
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discomfort at the time of trial, several years after the accident. Upon viewing the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to Brooks, it is clear that Knight suffered some injury from this
accident. The jury verdict is, therefore, against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and is
reversed. We remand this case to the trial court for a new trial solely on the issue of damages.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY IS
REVERSED AND THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES ONLY. ALL COSTS OF APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. McMILLIN, C.J., CONCURS WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, LEE,
IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER, AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., CONCURRING:
¶14.
I concur. I write separately to express some concern regarding the proper procedure in
submitting contested issues to the jury when other relevant issues are either not contested or are
determined by the trial court to be established as a matter of law. It has been my observation during
my tenure on this Court that this problem arises with some degree of frequency in negligence claims
for personal injury such as the one now before the Court and that, depending on the manner in which
the jury is instructed, the path is left open for confusion on the part of the jury as to the scope of its
authority and for uncertainty at the appellate level in assessing the responsiveness of the jury’s
verdict to the court’s instructions.
¶15.
A tort claim sounding in negligence has four essential elements. They are (a) a duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that duty, (c) a causal connection between that
breach and an injury to the plaintiff, and (d) some loss or damage to the plaintiff arising out of that
injury. Couch v. City of D’Iberville, 656 So. 2d 146, 150 (Miss. 1995). A directed verdict in favor
of the plaintiff that does not reserve any element of a negligence claim for jury determination,
therefore, contemplates, in the view of the trial court, that the evidence is such that a fair minded
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jury, viewing the evidence as a whole, could only conclude that the plaintiff has satisfactorily proven
each of the elements of the claim. Ishee v. Peoples Bank, 737 So. 2d 1011, 1013 (¶7) (Miss. Ct.
App. 1998). In that situation, the sole issue for resolution by the jury – a matter which necessarily
involves some measure of fact-finding discretion that cannot be usurped by the trial court – is the
measure of the plaintiff’s damage. This matter must be distinguished from the immediately
preceding consideration of whether the fact that damage in some amount has occurred has been
satisfactorily established.
¶16.
There are situations where causation of the incident leading to the damage claim may be an
uncontested matter though the issue of whether the plaintiff suffered any measurable damage as a
result of the incident remains in dispute. In that situation, it would be inappropriate to direct a
verdict for the plaintiff since proof of a compensable injury is an essential element of a plaintiff’s
verdict, and the failure to show such an injury by a preponderance of the evidence would properly
result in a defendant’s verdict just the same as if the proof failed on the threshold issues of the
existence of a duty or a breach of that duty.
¶17.
If the issue of whether a compensable injury has, or has not, been suffered is a matter
unresolved at the conclusion of the proof, though all other essential elements of the claim have either
been confessed or are established as a matter of law, then appropriate instructions can be drafted that
reflect this state of affairs and submit the unresolved issues to the jury for determination. However,
that situation does not call for a directed verdict for the plaintiff.
¶18.
In this case, the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. It may be that
the court meant to inform the jury simply that the issue of “fault” in causing the accident was not
a disputed issue but that the issues of both (a) the fact of injury and (b) the existence of compensable
damages arising from the injury remained in dispute. For reasons I have already discussed, I
conclude that a directed verdict for the plaintiff does not accomplish that purpose.
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¶19.
It is on that basis that I agree that a verdict of zero damages cannot be construed as being in
accord with the trial court’s instruction, given without qualification, to “return a verdict for the
Plaintiff.”
¶20.
One appropriate means of reflecting that the issue of the fact of injury remains unresolved
is to include the term “if any” at appropriate places within the body of the instructions. In McCary
v. Caperton, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered the following instruction:
The court instructs the jury that if you find for the Plaintiff in assessing her damages
you may take into consideration all evidence in reference to lost wages and income
Plaintiff has suffered as a result of injuries if any sustained in the accident; and all
evidence in reference to pain and suffering if any the Plaintiff has suffered or is
reasonably likely to suffer in the future as a result of injuries sustained . . . .
McCary v. Caperton, 601 So. 2d 866, 869-70 (Miss. 1992). In that case, the supreme court found
the inclusion of the phrase “if any” to be reversible error since the court concluded that there was
“unrefuted evidence that McCary was injured in the . . . accident and that the injury resulted in loss.”
Id. at 870. In essence, the supreme court found error in the trial court’s giving the jury the latitude
to determine that no damage was suffered. A zero verdict for the plaintiff accomplishes that result
and must, therefore, be seen as error when the trial court has concluded that the evidence shows
otherwise as a matter of law.
¶21.
It is my view that the state of the instructions in the case now before us puts it in essentially
the same posture as McCary v. Caperton in that the instructions given in this case reflect a
determination by the trial court that, not only was causation satisfactorily shown, but also that the
fact of injury and resulting loss in some amount was established. Whether the trial court was wrong
in reaching that conclusion is a different issue that is not before this Court.
¶22.
There exists a roadmap in existing case law to differentiate between cases where duty, breach
of duty, and a proximately caused injury are undisputed and one where duty and breach of duty are
the only issues that are undisputed. It is important for the parties and the trial court to be mindful
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of this distinction and to carefully frame the instructions given the jury so as to properly instruct as
to which issues are being submitted to them for determination and which ones they must accept as
having been already resolved.
¶23.
In this case, I think the court’s instructions resolved all issues up to and including the fact
that the plaintiff suffered some measure of compensable injury arising from the accident, and, for
that reason, the jury’s verdict of zero damages was not responsive to the instructions it was given.
In that situation, the only appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial on the sole unresolved
issue, which is the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS,
JJ., JOIN THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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