Antonio Terrell Anderson v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-01863-COA
ANTONIO TERRELL ANDERSON
A/K/A CRAZY HORSE
v.
APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
8/13/2001
HON. LAMAR PICKARD
JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
WILLIAM B. LOVETT
JAMES LAWTON ROBERTSON
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
ALEXANDER C. MARTIN
CRIMINAL - FELONY
MANSLAUGHTER - SENTENCED TO SERVE A
TERM OF SIXTEEN YEARS WITH THE MDOC;
THREE COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF EIGHT
YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF MDOC FOR
EACH SEPARATE COUNT OF AGGRAVATED
ASSAULT. SAID SENTENCES TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY.
AFFIRMED - 6/24/2003
BEFORE LEE, P.J., MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
MYERS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Antonio Anderson was tried for manslaughter and three counts of aggravated assault on July 2,
2001. A jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The Circuit Court of Jefferson County then sentenced
Anderson to sixteen years for one count of manslaughter and three consecutive eight-year sentences for
the counts of aggravated assault. Aggrieved by the verdict, Anderson asserts the following issues on
appeal:
I.
WAS THE IDENTIFICATION OF ANDERSON AS THE SHOOTER IN
THIS CASE SUPPORTED BY EITHER THE SUFFICIENCY OR THE WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE?
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING CRIME SCENE
PHOTOGRAPHS?
III.
DID ANDERSON SUFFER PREJUDICE WHEN HE WAS REFERRED TO
AS “CRAZY HORSE”?
IV.
DID THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DENY ANDERSON A FAIR TRIAL?
V.
WAS ANDERSON’S VERDICT THE RESULT OF BIAS, PASSION, AND
PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURY?
Facts
¶2.
Antonio Anderson arrived at the In and Out Club, just outside Fayette, Mississippi, in the early
morning hours of August 13, 2000. In the back of the club was a small pool room. This room was packed
with people watching, playing, and betting on games of pool. At one of the tables, Terrence Kelly and
Bevie Bingham were playing a heated game.
¶3.
During the course of this game, some confusion arose, and Christopher Barnes, one of the persons
betting on the game, called off his bet. He retrieved his money, and walked past Anderson. Anderson
shoved Barnes. Barnes then punched Anderson in the face, knocking Anderson to the floor. At this point,
according to several witnesses, Anderson reached into his pants and withdrew a gun. Many of the
spectators, upon seeing the weapon, panicked and began to flee. Shots were heard. Jamaal Odom was
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shot in the head, resulting in his death, and three people suffered less severe gunshot wounds while they
were fleeing.
¶4.
Anderson was later arrested for the manslaughter of Odom and the aggravated assault of the three
other shooting victims.
Legal Analysis
I.
WAS THE IDENTIFICATION OF ANDERSON AS THE SHOOTER IN
THIS CASE SUPPORTED BY EITHER THE SUFFICIENCY OR THE WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE?
V.
WAS ANDERSON’S VERDICT THE RESULT OF BIAS, PASSION, AND
PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURY?
¶5.
The appellant has a high burden to overcome when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. This
standard has been stated as:
[T]he sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law is viewed and tested in a light most
favorable to the State. The credible evidence consistent with [the defendant's] guilt must
be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and
credibility of the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We are authorized to reverse only
where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence
so considered is such that reasonable and fair- minded jurors could only find the accused
not guilty.
Jones v. State, 819 So. 2d 558, 562 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d
774, 778 (Miss. 1998)). We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
¶6.
Testimony was presented that Anderson was seen with a gun. He began to pull the gun out of his
pants either immediately after getting knocked to the floor of the In and Out Club or immediately before.
At least one witness, Bevie Bingham, saw “fire” coming from the muzzle of the gun. The bullet casings were
identified as likely coming from a Glock. A witness identified Anderson’s gun as a Glock. While there was
also testimony that at least one other person drew a gun inside the club that night, that testimony goes to
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the weight which the jury gives the various pieces of evidence. Obviously, by returning a verdict of guilty,
the jury decided to give that testimony less weight than the testimony supporting the guilt of Anderson. We
do not find that evidence of the presence of another gun would cause reasonable doubt and fair minded
jurors to find Anderson not guilty.
There is a similar standard of review when we must review the weight of the
evidence. In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will
reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to
grant a new trial. Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice
will this Court disturb it on appeal. As such, if the verdict is against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence, then a new trial is proper
Baker v. State, 802 So. 2d 77, 81 (¶14) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Dudley v. State, 719 So. 2d 180, 182
(¶8) (Miss.1998)). Our finding concerning the weight of the evidence is the same as to the challenge of the
sufficiency of the evidence. The jury heard evidence that Anderson was the shooter. They also heard
evidence that other persons brandished guns that night. There are many factors that go into the weight a
jury gives the testimony it hears during a trial -- the appearance of a witness, his or her manner of speech,
body language, etc. We are not in a place to judge all of these factors and can only review what is on the
record. Looking at the record, we do not find sufficient reason to declare the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Similarly, there was enough evidence presented for us to say that the verdict was
not the result of any bias, prejudice, or passion.
II.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING CRIME SCENE
PHOTOGRAPHS?
III.
DID ANDERSON SUFFER PREJUDICE WHEN HE WAS REFERRED TO
AS “CRAZY HORSE”?
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¶7.
Anderson asserts that it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to see photographs showing
Odom’s wounds. One of the photographs appears to have been taken at the crime scene, and the other
appears to have been taken as part of the autopsy. These photographs, he argues, have a prejudicial effect
that outweighs any probative value they may have. Again, we will reverse the trial judge’s decision only
when it is shown that he has abused his discretion. Yoste v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 822 So. 2d 935, 936
(¶7) (Miss. 2002).
¶8.
Anderson’s attorney made a pre-trial motion to exclude these photos. The trial judge decided to
withhold his ruling until the State offered the photos into evidence. At that time, the trial judge, outside the
hearing of the jury, stated:
These are two photographs that have previously been objected to because of the
prejudicial nature of the photographs, but it appears to the Court that one of the key
elements of proof in this particular scenario is the angle of the projectile. And I’ve heard
enough evidence to determine that that is, in fact, a very crucial element of the proof, and
I find that the prejudicial value or prejudicial effect is far outweighed by the probative value
of the photograph.
¶9.
The trial judge made a careful decision that the photographs were needed, especially in light of
expected testimony from the coroner and the medical examiner. This decision is not an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion. Therefore, we will not overrule the trial judge’s decision to admit the photographs.
¶10.
The defense also made a pre-trial motion to prevent Anderson being identified by his nickname,
“Crazy Horse.” The record makes it clear that the trial court did consider the prejudicial effect versus the
probative value of this nickname. Some of the witnesses only knew Anderson as "Crazy Horse."
Therefore, the court ruled that it was more probative than prejudicial. We agree. We find the identification
of the shooter was more important than any prejudice that Anderson may have suffered. Admitting the
name “Crazy Horse” was not an abuse of discretion.
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IV. DID THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS DENY ANDERSON A FAIR TRIAL?
¶11.
Since we have not found any errors, we find no merit in this issue.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE OF SIXTEEN YEARS AND
CONVICTION OF THREE COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF
EIGHT YEARS FOR EACH COUNT IN THE CUSTODY OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS WITH ALL SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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