Shirley Darlene Norman v. Magnolia Regional Health Center
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CC-01223-COA
SHIRLEY DARLENE NORMAN
APPELLANT
v.
MAGNOLIA REGIONAL HEALTH CENTER, BY
AND THROUGH ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DIANE BOATMAN, AND ITS BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND THE MISSISSIPPI
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
6/6/2002
HON. PAUL S. FUNDERBURK
ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GERTRUDE A. REID
B. RAY THERRELL, II
CIVIL - OTHER
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS
AFFIRMED - 06/17/03
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., LEE AND IRVING, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1.
Shirley Darlene Norman began working in 1998 as a cook in the food services department at
Magnolia Regional Health Center. On August 15, 2001, Norman was discharged for misconduct in using
profane language towards her supervisor. The next day, Norman filed for unemployment benefits, from
which she was disqualified. On August 31, 2001, Norman filed a notice of appeal.
¶2.
On September 27, 2001, a hearing was held before the appeals referee, who found that Norman
was discharged for misconduct connected with her work, and so disqualified for unemployment benefits
under Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513 A(1)(b) (Supp. 2002). The board of review affirmed the referee's
findings, as did the Alcorn County Circuit Court. Norman now appeals to this Court asserting that the
lower court erred in denying her unemployment benefits under the circumstances surrounding her discharge.
Finding no error, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
¶3.
In reviewing an administrative agency's findings and decisions, the standard of review by this Court
is well settled:
An agency's conclusions must remain undisturbed unless the agency's order 1) is not
supported by substantial evidence, 2) is arbitrary or capricious, 3) is beyond the scope or
power granted to the agency, or 4) violates one's constitutional rights. A rebuttable
presumption exists in favor of the administrative agency, and the challenging party has the
burden of proving otherwise. Lastly, this Court must not reweigh the facts of the case or
insert its judgment for that of the agency.
Lewis v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 767 So. 2d 1029 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
¶4.
The referee found, and the board of review and the Alcorn County Circuit Court affirmed, that
Norman was discharged due to misconduct connected with her work. The referee's opinion cites to
Wheeler v. Arriola, 408 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Miss. 1982), for a definition of the term "misconduct."
[T]he meaning of the term "misconduct," as used in the unemployment compensation
statute, was conduct evincing such willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interest
as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the
employer has the right to expect from his employee. Also, carelessness and negligence of
such degree, or recurrence thereof, as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent or evil design,
and showing an intentional or substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the
employee's duties and obligations to his employer, came within the term. Mere
inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, or inadvertences [sic] and ordinary negligence in isolated incidents, and good
2
faith errors in judgment or discretion were not considered "misconduct" within the meaning
of the statute.
¶5.
The referee's findings of fact refer to a final warning Norman received in October of 1999, after
she used abusive, threatening language towards a co-worker. Norman admits that she was guilty of the
violation for which she received the warning. On August 15, 2001, Norman referred to a supervisor in a
derogatory manner, using profane language. Norman admits to making the derogatory statements about
her supervisor, but only in response to a derogatory racial remark made towards her by her supervisor.
However, Norman never mentioned the racial remark in subsequent meetings with her employer, only
mentioning that her supervisor referred to her as "Ms. Thing." Norman produced no evidence or witnesses
to testify to the use of a derogatory racial remark made by her supervisor. Her employer did testify that
there were witnesses who heard the supervisor call Norman "Ms. Thing" frequently and that she appeared
to like the nickname.
¶6.
As previously noted in our standard of review, a rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the
administrative agency, and Norman, as the challenging party, has the burden of proving otherwise. We are
not permitted to reweigh the facts of the case or insert our judgment for that of the agency and, having
found substantial evidence to support the decision and having found no arbitrary or capricious action to
exist on the part of the MESC, we affirm the lower court.
¶7.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE ALCORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
