Steven Lamont Crosby v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-KA-00422-COA
STEVEN LAMONT CROSBY a/k/a STEVE SALTER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
2/8/2002
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DAN W. DUGGAN
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
RICHARD D. MITCHELL
CRIMINAL - FELONY
APPELLANT FOUND GUILTY OF
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, KIDNAPING, AND
POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A
CONVICTED FELON ALL AS AN HABITUAL
OFFENDER; SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE ON EACH OF
THE THREE COUNTS, TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY.
AFFIRMED: 05/06/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
The Grand Jury of Rankin County indicted Steven Crosby for the offenses of aggravated assault,
kidnaping and convicted felon in possession of a firearm, all as a habitual offender. A jury trial followed
in which the jury returned a verdict of "guilty." Crosby was then sentenced to serve a term of three
consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections. Following the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict, motion for a new trial
and JNOV, he now appeals to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL ERRED IN DENYING CROSBY'S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT, A NEW TRIAL AND A JNOV FOR EACH OF THE THREE OFFENSES.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING THE
STATE TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT PRIOR TO TRIAL.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A SHERIFF'S INVESTIGATOR TO
TESTIFY AS A FIREARMS EXPERT.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A CONTINUANCE AT THE
TIME OF A DISCOVERY VIOLATION ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT.
V. WHETHER IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO ALLOW LEADING
QUESTIONS.
FACTS
¶2.
On the evening of May 5, 2001, James Kevin Gibson traveled to Otis Singleton's trailer, located
in Rankin County, Mississippi. Two men, Marcus Craft and Brandon Young, were already inside the trailer
when Gibson arrived. Sometime after Gibson's arrival, another car pulled up to the trailer and the two men
inside the trailer heard a fight break out outside between Gibson and another person, who was later
identified as the Appellant, Crosby. Crosby's girlfriend, Joyce Anne Kemp, arrived and tried to break up
the fight between Gibson and Crosby, but was told to go inside. During the commotion, Craft and Young
witnessed, and later testified to, a "red beam" displayed across their chests through the window of the
2
bedroom. However, neither Craft nor Young ever saw Crosby. After Joyce went into the trailer, she soon
heard a car leave and, after looking out of the window, noticed both Crosby and Gibson were gone.
¶3.
Sometime later, Crosby was seen in Magee, twenty three miles from the scene, at a Shell service
station. It was at that Shell station where Crosby was captured on a video surveillance camera. While
there, he asked to use a pay phone and handed the cashier a "bloody" dollar bill for change. Crosby was
also witnessed wearing muddy clothing and shoes. It was also at this gas station where police found a
green Ford, belonging to Gibson. What police described as "blood smears" were found on the trunk lid,
sides of the door frames, inside the trunk and within the car itself. Police eventually found Gibson, still alive,
on the side of the road between Magee and Mendenhall. Later Crosby arrived at Kemp's mother's home,
located five minutes from Singleton's trailer. No evidence was ever presented to indicate how Crosby got
from the Shell station in Magee to the mother's house. A unique gun with a laser sighting apparatus was
later found by police in the trunk of Kemp's car and the clip or magazine for the weapon was found under
the passenger seat where Crosby was seated.
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL ERRED IN DENYING CROSBY'S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT, A NEW TRIAL AND A JNOV.
¶4.
With regards to Crosby's first issue, he argues that the trial court committed reversible error when
it failed to grant his motions for a directed verdict, or in the alternative, JNOV on each of his three offenses.
He states that the evidence was simply insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty in his case and requires a
reversal. Specifically, Crosby claims there was insufficient evidence of a gun being used in the aggravated
assault as charged in the indictment. As for the kidnaping, he claims only that there is insufficient evidence.
Lastly, Crosby claims that there was no connection made between him and the gun.
3
¶5.
Our standard of review regarding motions for a directed verdict and also a JNOV is:
Sufficiency questions are raised in motions for directed verdict and also in JNOV motions.
McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). Where a defendant moves for a
JNOV or a directed verdict, the trial court considers all of the credible evidence consistent
with the defendant's guilt, giving the prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that
may be reasonably drawn from this evidence. Id. This Court is authorized to reverse only
where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence
is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could not find the accused guilty. Wetz v.
State, 503 So. 2d 803, 808 (Miss 1987.)
Holmes v. State, 798 So. 2d 533, 538 (¶18) (Miss. 2001).
¶6.
Motions for directed verdicts and motions for JNOV are both for the purpose of challenging the
legal sufficiency of the evidence. Noe v. State, 616 So. 2d 298, 302 (Miss. 1993); McClain, 625 So.
2d at 778. See also Strong v. State, 600 So. 2d 199, 201 (Miss. 1992). Our standard of review
regarding the legal sufficiency of the evidence is as follows:
[W]e must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidence -- not
just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecution -- in the light most favorable
to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted
as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to
be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where,
with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so
considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not
guilty.
Wetz, 503 So. 2d at 808. "The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, and the jury's decision
based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial and believable evidence
supporting the verdict." Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 463 (Miss. 1984). This Court may not make
an assessment on the credibility of the trial witnesses as this task is one for the jury presiding over the
matter. Kinzey v. State, 498 So. 2d 814, 818 (Miss. 1986).
¶7.
When this Court analyzes a jury's verdict to determine whether it goes against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence, we must keep in mind that the jury is the ultimate finder of fact. This Court does
4
not have the task of re-weighing the facts in each case to, in effect, go behind the jury to detect whether
the testimony and evidence they chose to believe was or was not the most credible. The law provides:
Jurors are permitted, indeed have the duty, to resolve the conflicts in the testimony they
hear. They may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject the utterances of any witness. No
formula dictates the manner in which jurors resolve conflicting testimony into finding of fact
sufficient to support their verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and
observing the witnesses as they testify, augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve
individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A reviewing court cannot and need not
determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved
in arriving at its verdict. It is enough that the conflicting evidence presented a factual
dispute for jury resolution.
Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983).
¶8.
According to the above standard of review, this Court is supposed to look at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict. We do not have the responsibility of re-weighing the evidence to
determine which witnesses we believe had the most credibility.
¶9.
In light of the standard of review, we must disregard this issue of the verdict being against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Crosby cites Cooley v. State, 803 So. 2d 485 (¶¶6-7) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2001), where this Court reversed and remanded where the following facts were observed: (1) Clark
testified that he saw Cooley with a gun in his right hand; (2) Cooley then hit Clark with something, but it
was not a gun, he just could not identify what he was hit with; and (3) he never did identify to the jury with
what he was beaten. That case was reversed in spite of the fact that Cooley apparently had a gun in his
hand. The problem was the indictment alleged that the beating was done with a hatchet and no one found
or identified a hatchet during testimony.
¶10.
First and foremost, this Court must distinguish the Cooley case from the present case. In Cooley,
while there was blood found on the hatchet, laboratory analysis established that the blood was not that of
5
the victim. In the case sub judice, while there was testimony that blood was found on the weapon, it was
never analyzed to determine if it was the victim's blood.
¶11.
In addition, there was expert testimony given by Dr. Yablon that the injuries to Gibson were
consistent with the history received, that Gibson had been assaulted with a gun.
¶12.
Also, there was testimony that blood was found on the end of the magazine found underneath the
seat where Crosby was seated. Blood was also found on the victim, in the car, in the trunk, on the ground,
and even on the currency presented to the cashier at the Shell station. Craft and Young both testified that
they noticed a laser light on their chests. A gun with a laser apparatus was found in a car where Crosby
disavowed any knowledge of the gun.
¶13.
It is clear from the record, there was an abundance of evidence to support the jury finding Crosby
guilty of aggravated assault. It is the job of the jury to determine which witnesses are credible and which
are not. All of the conflicting evidence involve jury questions and it was the responsibility of the jury to
decide whether a weapon was actually used.
¶14.
In regards to the kidnaping charge, there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of "guilty."
In his brief, Crosby cites caselaw that states mere speculation, guesswork, and conjecture have no place
in the courtroom. Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 69 (Miss. 1985). However, jury instructions were
given in regards to reasonable inferences. In regards to the evidence itself, blood was found everywhere.
There was blood found in Gibson's car, in the trunk of the car, and miles away the victim was found lying
in a ditch, a ditch that happens to be on the way to Magee where Crosby was also seen. Crosby was
caught on tape coming into a convenience store and handing the cashier a dollar bill stained with blood.
The evidence is clear, Crosby thrashed Gibson, put him in his car and dumped him in a ditch.
6
¶15.
Last, but not least, we consider the convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge. Again, there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding on this charge as well. Crosby had been convicted of
at least two other felonies which were charged separately and arose out of separate incidents. One
involved manslaughter, and the other involved aggravated assault. Also Craft saw a red beam of light that
he claims had to belong to a gun. Crosby went in search of his laser gun which he misplaced. The gun was
found and returned to Crosby. That same gun was later found in the trunk of a car in which Crosby was
riding as a passenger, and the owner of the car told police that the gun did not belong to her. A clip or
magazine for the laser sighted weapon was found underneath the seat where Crosby was seated.
¶16.
Therefore this Court finds these claims are without merit.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING THE
STATE TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT PRIOR TO TRIAL.
¶17.
The next issue argued by Crosby is that the trial court erred in allowing the indictment to be
amended, therefore, allowing him to be prejudiced. The law regarding pre-trial amendments of an
indictment to charge habitual offender status is stated clearly in Rambus v. State, 804 So. 2d 1052, 106061(¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). It states:
Getting to the amendment itself, an indictment can be amended when the amendment goes
to form and not to substance. Burson, 756 So.2d (¶ 14). When deciding whether an
amendment goes to form or substance, this Court looks to see if the defenses the defendant
had originally are equally available to the defendant after the amendment is made. Eakes,
665 So.2d at 859-60. After looking at the record in this case it becomes clear the same
defenses were available to Rambus after the indictment was amended as were available
before the amendment. Rambus would have the same defenses available to him in this case
whether he was a repeat offender or not. For this reason, the amendment in this case goes
to form and not to substance, and thus would be allowed under Mississippi law. Also, the
Uniform Circuit and County Rules allows an indictment to be amended so a defendant may
be charged with habitual offender status. U.C.C.C.R. Rule 7.09. Therefore, the trial court
was not in error in allowing Rambus's indictment to be amended to reflect his repeat
offender status. We affirm as to this issue.
7
¶18.
Crosby was convicted, in Hinds County Circuit Court, for manslaughter, a violent offense and was
also convicted in Rankin County Circuit Court for aggravated assault. In accordance with the following
caselaw, the indictment was allowed to be amended so that Crosby could be charged with habitual offender
status. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing Crosby's indictment to be amended to reflect his
repeat offender status. We affirm as to this issue.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A SHERIFF'S INVESTIGATOR TO
TESTIFY AS A FIREARM EXPERT.
¶19.
During direct examination of the crime lab witness, the State qualified Gregg Eklund, an investigator
with the Rankin County Sheriff's Department, as an expert for the limited purpose of answering questions
concerning the clip found under the seat matching the gun found in the trunk. The defense was given an
opportunity to voir dire the witness and later objected to his qualifications based upon asking him only two
questions, one of which he could not answer. However, that last question concerned the number of twists
and grooves in the barrel of this particular gun, which according to Crosby, is a rather basic question that
any "expert" should have been able to answer. The trial court later allowed him to be qualified.
¶20.
In Edwards v. State, 737 So. 2d 275, 298 (¶45) (Miss. 1999), the Court stated that the question
as to whether a person is qualified to testify as an expert is "left to the discretion of the court, and will not
be overturned, absent an abuse and a showing the witness was clearly not qualified."
¶21.
In accordance with the aforementioned caselaw, and from the evidence that is present in the record,
this Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the witness to be qualified as an
expert. Defense counsel should have asked more than just two questions during voir dire of the witness
in order to show a clearer picture of abuse by the trial court. Considering the limited scope of the
8
questioning, whether the clip matches up with the gun, and the expert's involvement in law enforcement over
twenty years, the Court finds this claim without merit.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A CONTINUANCE AT THE
TIME OF A DISCOVERY VIOLATION ALLEGED BY THE APPELLANT.
¶22.
Crosby also seeks reversal and remand for a new trial based on a claim of a discovery violation,
specifically, that blood was found on the gun. During Eklund's testimony, he mentioned finding blood on
the weapon. Defense counsel, outside the presence of the jury, confirmed that he had no reports in his
discovery that included whether or not blood was found on the weapon, or that the weapon tested positive
for blood, which is required under Rule 9.04 (1) (4) of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules.
¶23.
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Box formulated the guidelines which every trial court must
adhere to concerning newly discovered evidence. Box v. State, 437 So 2d 19, 23 (Miss. 1983). First,
the defendant, after making a timely objection should be permitted to interview the witness. Id. Second,
if suspecting unfair surprise and that the defendant will be prejudiced, a continuance should be requested.
Finally, the court may grant a continuance or set a new trial. Id. Defense counsel explained to the court
this information was new, and not provided in discovery. After the explanation, defense counsel requested
a continuance which was denied and further asked for and was denied a mistrial. Crosby claims he was
entitled under the rules to a copy of any reports from which the State's witness was to testify.
¶24.
However, this evidence had been in the custody of the Rankin County Sheriff since the crime
occurred and was readily available to Crosby and his counsel. While there were no laboratory analysis
done on the blood found on the gun, there was testimony stating that field tests were conducted. Since
the gun was readily available to defense counsel, he had plenty of opportunity to get the blood tested. This
9
witness was also made available to defense counsel and these questions certainly could have been asked
of him. Therefore, this was not a discovery violation, thus Crosby's claim is without merit
V. WHETHER IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO ALLOW LEADING
QUESTIONS.
¶25.
The case of Neal v. State, 805 So. 2d 520 (Miss. 2002), provides the most accurate caselaw on
leading questions; when they are permitted and when they are not. It states:
M.R.E. 611 (c) allows leading questions on direct examination when a
party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with
an adverse party: (c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary
to develop his testimony. The decision to allow leading questions rests
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless there
is a showing of abuse of discretion. McFarland v. State, 707 So. 2d
166, 175 (Miss. 1998).
Id. at 527 (¶25-27).
¶26.
With respect to Marcus Craft, during the examination the trial court did allow limited leading
questions, however, it was only for the purpose of developing his testimony as is permitted in M.R.E.
611(c). In addition, as to Crosby's claims that hearsay was admitted over objection, he failed to mention
any specific hearsay that was allowed to come in outside of an exception. Therefore, these allegations are
without merit.
¶27. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY OF CONVICTION
OF COUNT I AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF LIFE; COUNT II
KIDNAPING AND SENTENCE OF LIFE; AND COUNT III POSSESSION OF A FIREARM
BY A CONVICTED FELON AND SENTENCE OF LIFE, ALL SENTENCES TO RUN
CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO RANKIN COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
10
11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
