Craig L. Booker v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-00268-COA
CRAIG L. BOOKER
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
1/8/2002
HON. TOMIE T. GREEN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
CHARLES E. MILLER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
POST-CONVICTION HEREBY DENIED.
AFFIRMED: 03/18/2003
BEFORE MCMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Following indictments by the grand jury of Hinds County, Craig L. Booker pled guilty to four
counts of armed robbery and one count of strong armed robbery. Booker was sentenced to thirty years
on each count of armed robbery, and sentenced to five years on the strong armed robbery conviction, all
to run concurrently. Booker had a pending federal court charge of which he advised the court and the
court ordered the state sentences to run consecutively with the anticipated sentence on the charge pending
in the United States District Court.
¶2.
Booker timely filed his motion for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, Booker's
petition was denied. He now files his appeal therefrom.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE
SENTENCE ON THE DEFENDANT.
III. WHETHER DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY, FREELY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY MADE.
ANALYSIS
I. WHETHER THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
¶3.
Booker argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel since he was not satisfied with his
pleas and his sentence was disproportionate to the sentence given to an accomplice. Booker asserts that
he stated in his sentencing hearing that he was dissatisfied with the representation provided by counsel, that
counsel knew little about the charges facing him, and that counsel never discussed with him anything
regarding defense strategies or the prospect of going to trial. Booker further claims that defense counsel's
main purpose was only to steer him into pleading guilty to the charges.
¶4.
First and foremost, the State argues that all claims introduced by the petitioner were refuted by the
hearing and the findings of the trial judge. The State, in defending this first allegation, mentions the
Strickland standard for determination of ineffective assistance of counsel though they citeBrooks v. State,
573 So. 2d 1350, 1353 (Miss. 1990), which also outlines the standard. The State's final argument is that
there is no indication in the record other than the allegations of Booker that the performance of defense
2
counsel fell below these standards. In fact, the record supports the exact opposite of Booker's allegations.
Booker was well aware of both the maximum and minimum sentences for the crimes charged and that there
was a potential for him to receive four consecutive life sentences plus an additional fifteen years. Booker's
attorney negotiated an agreement with the prosecution limiting Booker's sentence to only thirty years for
each armed robbery and five years for the strong armed robbery, both to run concurrently; a good deal
compared to what he could have received. Booker complained that his attorney did not file any motions,
did not discuss any defense strategies, and did not review any discovery information, however, Booker
failed to provide affidavits of record attesting to the necessity of any motions, the existence of any defenses,
or the availability of any worthwhile discovery left undiscovered. As for the coerced confession, Booker
freely admitted he never told his lawyer that his interrogators allegedly told Booker that if he signed the
confession, "they would go easy on him." This amounts to client nonfeasance, which has nothing to do with
defense counsel. Lastly, even during his plea-qualification hearing, Booker told the circuit judge, under
oath, that his lawyer did a "good job" on the sentencing aspect of his case and that he was satisfied with
the services provided by his attorney.
¶5.
In Burnett v. State, 831 So. 2d 1216, 1220 ¶17 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), the Court states that the
judge's findings concluding the plea was validly made and that counsel was effective will not be set aside
unless the findings are clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), clearly set the guidelines for judicial determination of cases involving
effective or ineffective assistance of counsel. There are two components that Booker must prove in order
for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to prevail and require reversal of his conviction. First,
Booker must show that his "counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second,
Booker must show the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. This requires a showing that
3
"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Id. In regards to this second prong, Booker must show that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; see Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964, 968 (Miss. 1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.
2d 468, (Miss. 1984). Booker must prove both of these elements in order to succeed on his claim. Id.
Each case should be decided based on the totality of the circumstances, that is, by looking to the evidence
in the entire record. McQuarter v. State, 574 So. 2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1990); Stringer, 454 So. 2d at
476. The standard of performance used is whether counsel provided "reasonably effective assistance."
Leatherwood, 473 So. 2d at 968. "There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide
range of reasonable professional conduct." Id. at 969. Should we find that Booker's counsel was
ineffective, the appropriate remedy is remand for a new trail. Moody v. State, 644 So. 2d 451, 456 (Miss.
1994).
¶6.
While the record shows that defense counsel was present at the time of the plea acceptance hearing
and the circuit judge's interrogation, there is no evidence which would tend to advance Booker's theory that
his attorney was deficient or that he forced Booker to plead guilty. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that Booker's attorney did anything more than be available to his client and advise him on the ramifications
of pleading guilty versus pleading not guilty and taking his chances at trial. There is no evidence of any such
injustice. Lastly, there is nothing in the record that even hints that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Therefore, Booker has failed to
prove at least the second element of the Strickland test, a test in which he must prove both elements in
order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
4
¶7.
Again, the plea hearing transcript negates Booker's assertions against his attorney. After stating
that he was not satisfied with his attorney, Booker was asked by the circuit judge to explain why he was
dissatisfied . Booker responded that his attorney knew nothing of the case. After explaining that Booker's
attorney negotiated for a lesser sentence, the circuit judge again asked if Booker was satisfied and this time
he responded that he was satisfied with his attorney. As such, we accept the truth to be the version told
by Booker in open court under oath rather than the version in Booker's brief.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE
SENTENCE ON THE DEFENDANT?
¶8.
Another argument presented by Booker was that his sentence was excessive. However, in her
opinion and order, Judge Green specifically noted that "all sentences were within the allowable statutory
maximums." Booker was involved in five robberies, and he received less time for all five than he would
have received for just one.
¶9.
The court, in Johnson v. State, 461 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 1984), addresses the issue of an
excessive or disproportionate sentence by stating "that a trial court will not be held in error or held to have
abused its judicial discretion if the sentence imposed is within the limits fixed by statute." Again, Judge
Green specifically noted, in her opinion/order that "all sentences were within the allowable statutory
maximums." Booker received a sentence of thirty years when there was a potential for the imposition of
four consecutive life sentences, plus an additional fifteen years. There is also nothing in the record that
would indicate that the sentencing judge unlawfully enhanced the sentence of Booker over Smith.
¶10.
Additionally, Booker complains that his sentence was disproportionate to the sentence imposed
on an accomplice, Jawara Smith. There are no statutes or case law stating that a defendant must receive
a sentence proportionate to a sentence imposed on an accomplice. As stated in her memorandum opinion
5
and order, Judge Green explained that sentences between co-defendants are, often times, different. Also,
the recommendations in regards to sentencing come from the district attorney's office, and each judge
makes an independent determination as to what the sentence should be. The duty of this Court is not to
determine the working mind of the sentencing judge or to determine the reasons why the judge gave that
sentence to Booker.
¶11.
This Court is also aware of the gravity of the offenses with which Booker was charged. Armed
robbery as well as strong armed robbery are both serious offenses. Booker was not only involved in one,
he was in fact involved in no fewer than five robberies.
¶12.
In conclusion, the sentences imposed on Booker were neither disproportionate nor excessive.
There are a number of factors stated in the record that were taken into consideration by the sentencing
judge, primarily; (1) the number of charges; (2) Booker's prior criminal record; (3) the seriousness of the
offenses; (4) the role of Jawara Smith; (5) Booker's alleged role; and (5) the recommendations given by
the prosecution. After considering these factors, coupled with the fact that the sentences were indeed
within the allowable statutory maximums, Booker's claim that his sentences were disproportionate and
excessive are totally without merit.
III. WHETHER DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY, FREELY, INTELLIGENTLY AND
VOLUNTARILY MADE?
¶13.
Lastly, Booker argues that, but for the ill-informed advice of counsel, he may have taken advantage
of the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury and could have been found guilty of a lesser-included
charge. Therefore, he was prejudiced.
¶14.
In defending this claim the State argues that Booker never raised the issue of voluntariness in his
petition for post-conviction relief.
6
¶15.
In Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the court stated that a guilty plea can only be entered by
"one fully aware of the direct consequences." However, the Court stated in Ballenger v. State, 667 So.
2d 1242, 1256 (Miss. 1995) that an "assertion on appeal of grounds for an objection which was not the
assertion at trial is not an issue properly preserved on appeal." In his petition for post-conviction relief,
Booker never raised the issue of voluntariness nor was it presented during the evidentiary hearing. The
circuit judge, while finding the pleas were both knowing and intelligent, never specifically addressed the
issue of traditional voluntariness. Therefore, as a reviewing tribunal, we should not address it here.
¶16.
In conclusion, Booker has given this Court no plausible evidence on which we may rely to overturn
the decision of the trial judge to accept Booker's plea. The credible evidence before us, including the
transcript of the plea hearing, points to the inescapable fact that Booker made his decision to plead guilty
on his own, without coercion and without misrepresentation. We do not believe that Booker has met his
very heavy burden of proof to show that he did not understand what he was agreeing to or that he was
pressured or intimidated into executing the petitions for guilty pleas.
¶17.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING,
MYERS, CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
