Deana Martinez v. Ricardo Alfredo Martinez
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2002-CA-01709-COA
DEANA MARTINEZ
APPELLANT
v.
RICARDO ALFREDO MARTINEZ
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
9/30/2002
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN, III
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DAVID M. SESSUMS
WILLIAM CHARLES BELL
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED - 12/09/2003
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Deana Martinez's suit for personal injuries was dismissed because of a contract which the court
found had relinquished the claim on which the suit was based. Ms. Martinez alleges that this was a
misreading of the agreement. We find no error and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2.
Deana and Ricardo Martinez were divorced on February 9, 200l, in Madison County, Mississippi,
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. A property settlement agreement was incorporated into the
final judgment. This agreement addressed several subjects. What concerns us are the following two
paragraphs:
XIII
Wife hereby agrees to drop any charges of any nature filed by her against
Husband, whether criminal or civil, and Husband hereby agrees that he will not file any
charges, whatsoever, against wife.
XV
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, each party releases the other
party from all claims or demands through the date of the execution of this Agreement . . .
.
¶3.
Prior to seeking the divorce, Ms. Martinez had filed a criminal affidavit in the Madison County
Justice Court against Mr. Martinez alleging that he assaulted her on September 1, 2000. This agreement
required her to drop the charges. Ms. Martinez did that.
¶4.
A few months later, Ms. Martinez filed this civil suit against her former husband in the Madison
County Circuit Court. She sought damages for the same September 1, 2000 assault that had been the
basis of the earlier justice court affidavit. Mr. Martinez filed an answer and counterclaim in which he denied
the alleged assault and requested that the court grant sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. A transfer to
chancery court was also requested.
¶5.
The circuit court found that jurisdiction was proper in that court. After a hearing, the court found
that the property settlement agreement created an unambiguous contractual obligation. The court further
concluded that the agreement's reference to criminal and civil charges by the parties also incorporated
personal injury claims. Finally, the court held that this suit violated paragraph XV of the agreement which
released all claims through February 9, 2001. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. The defendant was awarded the attorney's fees incurred in defending the
suit.
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DISCUSSION
¶6.
Ms. Martinez argues that she has not violated the agreement entered at the time of the divorce. She
emphasizes that paragraph XIII of that agreement only required that she "drop any charges of any nature
filed by her against Husband, whether criminal or civil," while her husband was required not to "file any
charges, whatsoever, against Wife." We agree that "drop" suggests the abandoning of pending matters,
with the implicit requirement not then to refile those charges.
¶7.
Of equal importance is paragraph XV, which states that "except as otherwise provided in this
Agreement, each party releases the other party from all claims or demands through the date of the
execution of this Agreement . . . ." It is this paragraph that the trial judge found to prevent the suit.
¶8.
We consider the issues raised on appeal.
Jurisdiction
¶9.
Ms. Martinez argues that the claim that she has now brought for personal injuries was never within
the jurisdiction of the chancery court to resolve at the time of divorce. She relies on a precedent that held
that "a claim for personal injury arising out of an assault and battery properly belongs in the circuit court."
Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So. 2d 1021, 1028 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). However, this Court also
stated that since the parties had submitted the claim as one of the issues for resolution before the chancellor
as part of the divorce that they were seeking on the basis of irreconcilable differences, the claim could be
resolved by the chancellor. Id.
¶10.
Drumright is consistent with what occurred here, but ultimately it is irrelevant. The Martinez
personal injury claim was not litigated before the chancellor as in Drumright. Instead, the divorcing parties
entered a binding agreement later incorporated by reference into the final decree, that they would abandon
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any claims that they had against each other. These claims, these "choses in action," were matters eminently
appropriate for addressing in a property settlement agreement since the relinquishment of the claims
removed the possibility that whatever assets were distributed by agreement would be immediately
threatened with redistribution by the results of litigation.
¶11.
Claims can be the basis for suit by an injured party, can be assigned for others to pursue (Miss.
Code Ann. § 11-7-3 (1972)), or can be voluntarily abandoned. The property settlement agreement was
an appropriate location for a release of claims to appear.
Tort claim as personal property
¶12.
Ms. Martinez argues that a claim for personal injury does not fall within the description of "property
rights." She states that the property settlement agreement was entered explicitly under the authority of a
statute that she alleges only applies to property rights. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Rev. 1994). The
statute also refers to issues regarding custody and maintenance of children. Id.
¶13.
Even if a property settlement agreement would be defective for addressing a matter other than
property distribution and custody and maintenance of children, a point we do not address, this tort claim
was a property right. A "chose in action" is personal property. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-41 (Rev. 1998);
Watson v. Caffery, 236 Miss. 223, 233, 109 So. 2d 862, 866 (1959). The Supreme Court held that the
right to bring a suit for tort damages was a personal property interest. Garrett v. Gay, 394 So. 2d 321,
322-23 (Miss. 1981).
¶14.
The relinquishment of these tort claims was a valid provision in the agreement.
Property settlement agreement as contract
¶15.
Ms. Martinez argues that the lower court erred in interpreting this agreement as a relinquishment
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of all claims against the other spouse for any personal injury.
¶16.
A property settlement agreement has the character of other contracts and also has the nature of
a court order when it is incorporated into the final decree. East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 932 (Miss.
1986). Under paragraph XV, "each party releases the other party from all claims or demands through the
date of the execution of this Agreement," with the exception of anything "otherwise provided in this
Agreement. . . ." Ms. Martinez takes the exception, blends it into paragraph XIII that she agreed to "drop
any charges of any nature filed by her against Husband," and concludes that only claims then pending were
relinquished by paragraph XV.
¶17.
With respect, that is a distorted reading of the agreement. Each party released the other from all
claims according to paragraph XV. In order for paragraph XIII to be an exception to that release, it would
have needed by plain language or reasonable implication to preserve all claims not yet brought despite
requiring that Ms. Martinez drop all claims already filed. We can not read the paragraph as a savings
clause. Its sole language is of abandonment, not preservation. There was no language that only the claims
that had already been brought were affected by the agreement to release claims. We find nothing in the
agreement that excepted the claim now being made.
Ambiguity in agreement
¶18.
Ms. Martinez argues that the language of the property settlement agreement is ambiguous and
therefore requires a trial in order to present other evidence. We find no ambiguity. Parol evidence would
have been inadmissible. Dismissal on the pleadings was appropriate.
¶19. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
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McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
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