Billy Wayne Kelly v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-00210-COA
BILLY WAYNE KELLY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
11/15/2000
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF JONES COUNTY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
C. GRANT HEDGEPETH
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED
TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH
CREDIT GIVEN FOR TIME PREVIOUSLY SERVED.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 09/10/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 10/3/2002
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., LEE, AND MYERS, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1. Billy Wayne Kelly was indicted in January 1997 on three counts of depraved heart murder involving the
deaths of his wife, Tina, and their two children, two year old Erica and four month old Christopher. A Jones
County Circuit Court jury convicted Kelly of manslaughter on all three counts, and Kelly was sentenced to
serve twenty years in prison for each count, each sentence to run consecutively to all other counts. Kelly
appealed to this Court, and in Kelly v. State, 735 So. 2d 1071 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), we reversed and
remanded for a new trial, finding that the State had violated discovery rules, that improper testimony was
allowed without a mistrial, that evidence of prior bad acts was improperly allowed, and that the jury was
given improper instructions concerning self-defense.
¶2. After remand for a new trial, Kelly was found guilty of manslaughter with regard to the death of his wife,
but he was found not guilty with regard to the deaths of his two children. Kelly was sentenced to serve
twenty years in prison, with credit given for time already served. He filed a motion for new trial arguing that
the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, that evidence was improperly presented
over his objection, that certain instructions were erroneously given, that the indictment was void, and that his
confession was improperly admitted into evidence. The motion was overruled, and he now appeals to this
Court, raising the following issues: (1) did the court err in allowing the State to strike a black juror for cause
over defense counsel's Batson objection; (2) did the court err in allowing Kelly's confession to be admitted
into evidence; (3) did the court err in allowing certain expert testimony; and (4) was the verdict against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, and Kelly's right to protection against double jeopardy violated? We
find no merit to these issues and affirm.
FACTS
¶3. We thoroughly described the facts in this case in our previous opinion on this matter. See Kelly, 735
So. 2d at (¶¶3-8). To briefly recap, on or about November 7, 1996, the Kelly family car flooded during a
rainstorm in Laurel. After attempts to start the car, Tina and the kids started walking towards her mother's
home. Kelly ran after the others and a fight ensued, resulting in Kelly pushing his wife along with his two
small children into a flooded drainage ditch. The three ultimately drowned after a current washed them
away. Kelly was later questioned and confessed to pushing the three into the ditch. He recalled his
confession a few days later for the district attorney, but later recanted at the trial, claiming he had no part in
the deaths of his family and that his confession was the result of threats and promises.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO STRIKE A BLACK JUROR
FOR CAUSE OVER DEFENSE COUNSEL'S BATSON OBJECTION?
¶4. With this first issue, Kelly argues that the court violated the rule from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.79
(1986), in allowing the State to strike a black juror for cause. Our standard of review concerning Batson
decisions is this:
Batson clearly places upon the trial court the duty to determine whether purposeful discrimination has
been shown . . . Batson states that "ordinarily," a reviewing court should give the trial court "great
deference" . . . . [which] has been defined in the Batson context as insulating from appellate reversal
any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous.
White v. State, 761 So. 2d 221 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). Kelly specifically cites to the following
exchange between the trial judge, the prosecutor, Mr. Hedgepeth, and defense attorneys Buckley and
Parrish:
MR. HEDGEPETH: Constance McCann, she was related to one of the witnesses. Which one of the
witnesses? On our notes we just put related to witness and didn't put the name of the witness.
MR. RATCLIFF: My notes reflect that she knows Frank Woods. She's not related to him.
MR. HEDGEPETH: I didn't think anybody knew aso [sic] to jurors?
MR. RATCLIFF: I wrote it down as to Constance McCann.
--THE COURT: Just make your statement as to what it was so I can rule on it.
MR. HEDGEPETH: We had in our notes that she had responded that she was related to one of the
witnesses by marriage. And because of that, we didn't want her in there.
MR. PARRISH: Your Honor, that's really pushing it. I don't know what she said and I don't know
what witness it was, or even if it is actually going to be somebody that will be testifying. Everybody is
reading off of a big list here. Unless we -- it may be something entirely irrelevant. I noticed that they
haven't exercised challenges on other people, for every white person that said they knew a witness.
MR. HEDGEPETH: Well, also on her questionnaire, it shows that she has only been employed for -I think that's two weeks. It could be two or seven weeks with Howard Industries as a coil winder. It
shows a less stable type of juror than we would want. She's young with a number of children with no
spouse. That doesn't fit the type of profile of the type juror we would like to have on this panel.
MR. PARRISH: We introduced a copy of that juror questionnaire, and I think it will show other
jurors, including white jurors, are in the same category; like Michelle Manning who is a young white
woman MR. BUCKLEY: With a baby in court today.
MR. PARRISH: -- that brought a child into court with her today. They accepted her. And they are
wanting to excuse this black woman in addition because they say she has young children. I think we
are grasping at things.
MR. HEDGEPETH: Although, Michelle Manning has been employed for three and a half years with
the same employer. She's a professional speech pathologist. Just a totally different type of juror all
together.
THE COURT: All right. The Court accepts your reason as being race-neutral.
¶5. Kelly argues that this exchange shows that the trial judge erred in accepting the prosecutor's reason for
excluding juror McCann as race-neutral. In the transcript of voir dire proceedings, we find that Kelly
requested a Batson hearing after the State's first three strikes were all against black female jurors. The State
addressed the three strikes individually, noting that the first was struck because she was young, unmarried,
non-responsive, and failed to adequately fill out her juror questionnaire. The court accepted this as a raceneutral reason. The second juror was struck because she had gone to school with Dennis Bisnette, one of
the district attorneys on the case, and she appeared to be "less than honest in her answers," claiming that
although she attended school with Mr. Bisnette for seven years, she did not remember him. The court
accepted this as a race-neutral reason. The third juror struck was Constance McCann, whom the State first
noted was related by marriage to one of the potential witnesses. Kelly's attorney stated that his notes
reflected that she knew potential witness Frank Woods, but she was not related to him. The prosecutor
also noted that McCann was the single mother of several children and that her work history was not steady,
distinguishing her from a single white mother that the State had declined to strike because she had been
steadily employed in a professional career.
In Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1242 (Miss. 1995), this Court reiterated a list of reasons
accepted as race neutral. "Included among those reasons: age, demeanor, marital status, single with
children, prosecutor distrusted juror, educational background, employment history, criminal record,
young and single, friend charged with crime, unemployed with no roots in community, posture and
demeanor indicated juror was hostile to being in court, juror was late, short term employment." We
have also condoned a peremptory challenge against a juror who was acquainted with the defendant's
family.
Davis v. State, 767 So. 2d 986 (¶22) (Miss. 2000). In the present case, the prosecutor pointed out juror
McCann's status as the single mother of several children, that her work history was not steady, and that she
was possibly related to or acquainted with one of the witnesses. According to Davis, these are acceptable
race-neutral reasons for exclusion of a juror. We find no error with the judge's decision to allow the juror to
be struck due to the reasons given.
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN ALLOWING KELLY'S CONFESSION TO BE
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE?
¶6. With his second issue, Kelly argues his confession was improperly admitted as evidence. "The
admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. Appellate courts will not reverse a trial
court on an admission decision unless the trial court abused its discretion. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible." Walker v. State, 759 So. 2d 422 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
¶7. Upon Kelly's arrest on November 9, 1996, he was taken into custody and was questioned for ten
hours by three different officers. After more than nine hours of interrogation, Kelly signed a statement in
which he admitted that he argued with his wife by the side of the creek, and that after she first pushed him,
he in turn pushed her, causing her to fall into the creek with the kids. Kelly explains that this signed
statement was used in a question and answer session on videotape whereby the officer asked questions
relative to Kelly's statement, and Kelly affirmed the story that he had just given in his statement. However,
Kelly states on the videotape that although he did not understand his Miranda rights when he signed his
statement of confession, he did now, and since the statement closely tied into the subsequent videotaped
statement, the latter was the fruit of the poisonous tree and should not have been admitted. In his brief,
Kelly also points out that on the videotape at the point that Officer Hosey asks Kelly if he waives his rights,
"you can actually see in the picture Officer Hosey's arm and hand motioning up and down for Billy Wayne
Kelly to respond yes to his question!"
¶8. First, concerning whether or not Kelly's initial signed statement was "poison fruit" as would cause the
subsequent videotaped confession to be "poisonous fruit" as well, we note that this written statement was
not admitted into evidence. Thus, the propriety of the statement is not something which we will contend
ourselves. We do look to the video to determine whether or not the judge erred in allowing this to be
admitted into evidence.
¶9. In the transcript of the video, we find that Officer Hosey used the statement as a guideline with which to
direct his questions to Kelly. However, at the beginning of the tape, Hosey clearly explains Kelly's rights to
him, and Kelly affirms that he understands at that time, thereafter making his statement of confession:
HOSEY: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to
remain silent. Anything you say could be used against you in Court. You have the right to talk to a
lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. If
you can't afford one, one will be appointed for you by the court, if you wish. If you decide to answer
questions now without a lawyer, you still have the right to stop answering anytime. You also have the
right to stop answering at anytime until you talk to a lawyer. You do have the right to have one with
you when you're being questioned. Do you understand what I read to you?
KELLY: I understand it now, but I didn't earlier.
HOSEY: I know you advised me earlier that you did (Billy: I didn't) but didn't know, but now, now
you do understand it? You do? Ok.
KELLY: I figured that I'd have to have an attorney present with one in court. I didn't know that I
could have one present here, in here.
HOSEY: Well, do you understand that now?
KELLY: (nods head affirmative)
HOSEY: Ok. I'm going to read this waiver to you now, ok? This is another part of the rights form, I
have read this statement or have been read this statement as I'm reading it to you, now, of my rights
and I understand what my rights are. I hereby waive all these rights. I am willing to make a statement
and answer questions, like you have answered questions for us previous to this meeting here. I do not
want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. This statement is wholly
voluntary. No violence, threats of violence, coercion, inducements of any kind or promises of reward
have been directed toward me by anyone in an effort to secure this statement. Furthermore, it is not
the result of any sympathetic feelings I have toward any person. I want to back over one part of this,
that says no violence. I hadn't threatened you with violence or has anybody threatened you with
violence? Capt. Pickering, Chief Buckhalts or Capt. Dearman?
KELLY: (shakes his head no)
HOSEY: Coercion. Do you know what coercion is?
KELLY: (shakes his head no) No sir.
HOSEY: Nobody has uh beat you or anything like that?
KELLY: No.
HOSEY: Inducements of any kind. Nobody has offered you money to talk to us or given or promised
you any type of reward for doing this, so that's what, what we're talking about, nobody has done that
for you, is that correct?
KELLY: (shakes his head affirmative)
HOSEY: Ok. Now, you can understand this waiver?
KELLY: Yeah. (shakes his head affirmative).
¶10. From this excerpt of the transcript from the videotape, we have clear evidence that before Kelly
responded to any questions from Hosey, even if the questions were based on Kelly's afore signed
statement, at the time he was videotaped, Kelly was well aware of his rights and he decided to go ahead
with his confession. This being the case, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the
taped confession into evidence.
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN ALLOWING CERTAIN EXPERT TESTIMONY?
¶11. With his third issue, Kelly argues that the court erred in allowing Dr. Hayne to testify concerning an
alleged mark on Tina Kelly's face which Dr. Hayne testified was an imprint of her husband's watch. Kelly
claims that Dr. Hayne's opinion was "rank speculation," since he only visually examined the evidence and
did not explain how many "points of comparison" he had used in positively identifying the wound as having
been inflicted by Kelly's watch.
¶12. "The admission of expert testimony is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 'Unless we
conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion, that
decision will stand." Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322 (¶57) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted). In reviewing
the testimony of Dr. Hayne, we find that he clearly described the basis for his conclusion that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, the watch caused the wounds to Tina Kelly's face. When asked to
explain how he arrived at the conclusion that the watch or a similar watch caused the injuries, the doctor
explained:
DR. HAYNE: On the nose of Tina Kelly, there is a clear rectangular pattern forming an incomplete ushape corresponds to the u-shape, and corresponds to the pattern. You can see squiggly lines on it.
In addition, there was a small abrasion adjacent to it that is in line with the first block adjacent to the
second block. The distances are the same; the width is the same and the length is the same. So we
have multiple points of comparison; cross-sectional, one to the other, right angeles [sic], distances,
presents of a incomplete second abrasion adjacent to the first one. So they are multiple points of
comparison that showed and that has characteristics of the injury corresponding to an injury produced
by this object or an object like this object.
¶13. Concerning injuries to Erica Kelly, one of the children, Dr. Hayne also found marks on her face were
consistent with the watch:
DR. HAYNE: After looking at the forehead of Erica Kelly, I recognized in my opinion having multiple
points of identity produced by two knobs on the side of watch, located towards the mid side of the
forehead, and the presence of two rectangular blocks, semi circular curvatures that are identifiable,
and also the notch on the opposite side of the watch. So there were multiple points of comparison, the
relationships of the two rectangular blocks, and to the relationship to the individual points, curvatures,
the distance across, and the like. So they are many, many points of comparison that I thought
matched this watch or an object just like this watch that would produce those types of injuries.
¶14. Contrary to Kelly's assertion, as described in the transcript excerpts, Dr. Hayne did have numerous
points of comparison which he described with specificity. Thus, we cannot find that the judge abused his
discretion in allowing Dr. Hayne's testimony.
IV. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND WAS
KELLY'S RIGHT TO PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATED?
¶15. Finally, Kelly states that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; however, in
actuality he makes a sufficiency argument. We cite our familiar standard of review.
[W]e must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidence -- not just the
evidence which supports the case for prosecution -- in the light most favorable to the verdict. The
credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be
given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters
regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We
may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the
evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not
guilty.
Neal v. State, 805 So. 2d 520 (¶19) (Miss. 2002).
a. Sufficiency of evidence
¶16. Kelly states that since the jury did not find him guilty for the deaths of his two children, they could only
have found him guilty of the death of his wife if they believed the videotaped confession, yet did not believe
Kelly's other initial statements of denial, which he claims is unlikely. We recognize that judgment on the
credibility of the evidence is reserved to the jury.
We have repeatedly held that in a criminal prosecution the jury may accept the testimony of some
witnesses and reject that of others, and that they may accept in part and reject in part the evidence on
behalf of the state or on behalf of the accused. In other words, the credibility of witnesses is not for
the reviewing court.
Mangum v. State, 762 So. 2d 337 (¶35) (Miss. 2000). The jury viewed the videotape themselves, heard
very thorough testimony from the officers and experts and other witnesses, and viewed numerous exhibits,
all of which combined to enable them to reach their informed decision. We find that in viewing the evidence
in a light favorable to the verdict and accepting the evidence in support of the verdict as true, reasonable
and fair-minded jurors could have found Kelly guilty. Thus, we find no merit to Kelly's argument in this
regard.
b. Double jeopardy
¶17. Under this issue, Kelly also offers what he calls a "double jeopardy" type argument that, according to
jury instruction S1-A, he could only be found guilty of one death if he were found guilty of all three deaths,
since the deaths were related. Thus, since the jury failed to convict on the deaths of the two children, their
finding of guilty for Kelly's wife was improper. Whether or not this actually is the case, we cannot find any
place in the record where Kelly previously made this argument. Consequently, we find him to be barred
now on appeal from raising this argument.
¶18. Without waiving the bar, we also find the substantive argument has no merit. Kelly fails to recognize
the rule that all jury instructions are to be read and considered as a whole. Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d
581, 596 (Miss. 1995). We look to the remaining instructions and find that the court's own instruction
properly directed the jury that they were to determine for each of the three victims whether or not Kelly
was guilty for each's death. Reading this instruction in conjunction with instruction S-1A to which Kelly now
objects, we find it clear that the jury was properly instructed as to its obligation. Thus, Kelly's argument is
without merit on this issue.
¶19. As described herein, Kelly has not raised grounds with this appeal as would give rise to our reversal.
Accordingly, we affirm on all issues.
¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF JONES COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, MYERS, CHANDLER
AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. KING, P.J, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
KING, P.J., CONCURRING:
¶21. I concur only in the result of this case, and write separately to express my concerns about the Batson
issue.
¶22. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), prohibits the use of race as a basis for the exercise of
peremptory jury challenges. This prohibition extends to the use of seemingly race-neutral reasons to mask
an intent to discriminate. Bogan v. State, 811 So.2d 286 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). The burden is
placed upon the trial judge to ensure that so-called facially neutral challenges do not mask discrimination.
Id. at (¶7 ); Hatten v. State,628 So.2d 294, 309 ( Miss. 1993 ); Pearson v. State,746 So.2d 867 ( ¶9 )
(Miss. Ct. App. 1998)
¶23. The reasons given by the State for the exercise of its peremptory challenges are extremely shallow
even when considered in the best possible light. They represent the type of over generalizations, which serve
as a rationalization for discrimination. At worst these reasons are a pretext to mask a discriminatory
purpose by the State.
¶24. The first challenge was exercised against Retonya Jackson. The trial court had earlier denied the
State's effort to strike her for cause. The discussion regarding this attempted strike for cause was as
follows:
The Court: All right. Does the State have anybody for cause?
Mr. Hedgepeth: For cause, we would ask that Retonya Jackson, panel 1 number 3, she was sleeping
during voir dire, or appeared to be.
The Court: You should have told me to wake her up then.
Mr. Hedgepeth: She was non-responsive. She didn't fill out her juror information form. Didn't fill out
most of the slots. She just put "not applicable" on everything as to whether married or anything like
that?
The Court: Did she snore?
Mr. Hedgepeth: Didn't hear her snoring.
Mr. Ratcliff: She did respond to our questions.
The Court: For that reason, I would deny it. You said there was something wrong with her form.
What's wrong with her form?
Mr. Hedgepeth: The only thing she really answered was her name, address, telephone number, and
whether or not she had ever been on a jury. She left all of the other information-The Court: That's not-you can correct those things. You are an officer of the Court, and the bailiffs
are suppose to be paying attention. If they see somebody sleeping, apprise the Court of it and I'll
wake them up.
¶25. When the trial court declined to strike Retonya Jackson for cause, the State then exercised a
peremptory challenge against her. As to its exercise of this challenge, the record reflects the following:
Mr. Hedgepeth: Okay. On Retonya Jackson, as I stated earlier, she's young, unmarried, nonresponsive. She didn't fill out her questionnaire as we felt like she should. It doesn't rise to the level of
cause but it is certainly a race-neutral basis.
The Court: All right. The Court will accept that as a race-neutral reason.
¶26. While accepting these reasons as race-neutral, the trial court did not examine them to determine
whether they appeared to be pretextual. There is no question in the record which the State identified that
Jackson should have responded to and failed to do so. Nor is there a suggestion of a correlation between
age and marital status and the ability to listen to the evidence and render a fair and impartial verdict.
¶27. Ms. Jackson's juror information card is not a part of the record before this Court; therefore, we are
unable to see which information is or is not contained on it. If there was additional information which the
State required, it was free to pose those questions to Ms. Jackson. Abundantly clear in the record before
this Court is the fact that it did not do so.
¶28. Equally troubling are the reasons given for striking Constance McCann.
¶29. The first excuse offered by the State is that McCann was related to a witness. When the defense
pointed out this was not correct, the State abandoned that reason. Indeed a review of the trial transcript,
shows that McCann indicated merely that she knew a witness, not that she was related to him.
¶30. When the relationship excuse failed, the State gave as a general reason McCann was unstable. As
evidence of that, the State said (1) she had been working at her present job no more than seven weeks, and
(2) that she was young, unmarried and had several children.
¶31. The State made no effort to inquire as to whether McCann was in fact unstable. It did not inquire
whether this was her first job or just a new job. If it were a new job, then certainly the reason for the change
was relevant to the issue of stability. Was it a matter of advancement? Was it necessitated by childcare
considerations, or some other family responsibility? Again, the record is abundantly clear that the State
made no effort to determine whether McCann was a stable or unstable person.
¶32. The reasons offered by the State for the exercise of these challenges are the type of generalizations
which readily lend themselves to abuse, and under these circumstances appear to be highly suspect.
¶33. The appellant did not make a part of this record the jury roster or jurors' information cards, or any
other evidence which, this Court upon review, could clearly see that like conditions, were accorded
different treatment. Had the appellant done so, such information would have been very helpful to this Court
in resolving the Batson issues, and might have mandated a different result.
¶34. Lacking that information, I can only say that the majority opinion is very troubling to me, and I
therefore join in only the result.
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