Ronald Wayne Fields v. Angela Zuccaro Fields
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CA-01287-COA
RONALD WAYNE FIELDS
v.
ANGELA ZUCCARO FIELDS
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
06/04/2001
HON. PAT WISE
HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
KATE S. EIDT
ROBERT RUSSELL WILLIARD
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
APPELLANT AWARDED VISITATION EVERY OTHER
WEEKEND, NOT INCLUDING HOLIDAYS
DISPOSITION:
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 09/03/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 10/2/2002
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., MYERS, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
CHANDLER, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case comes to this Court on appeal from the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi. The
chancellor granted limited visitation privileges to Ronald Wayne Fields (Wayne), holding that the detrimental
influence Wayne had upon his minor son, Patrick, prevented the court from granting unrestricted, standard
visitation privileges. Wayne now argues that the chancellor erred in limiting his visitation privileges where
there was no evidence indicating that Patrick was in danger of being harmed while in Wayne's custody. We
agree, finding that the chancellor abused her discretion by limiting Wayne's visitation privileges; therefore,
we reverse and remand this case for further consideration.
FACTS
¶2. On August 3, 1998, Wayne and Angela Zuccaro Fields were granted a divorce in the Hinds County
Chancery Court on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The judgment granted primary custody of their
only child, Patrick, to Angela and awarded Wayne certain limited visitation privileges, including four hour
visitation periods every other Saturday and Sunday and additional four hour periods during Christmas,
Thanksgiving, Easter, and Patrick's birthday. The parties agreed to review the visitation agreements again in
September 1999. However, when the time came to review the agreement, Angela refused to address
Wayne's requests, forcing Wayne to file a motion for contempt and modification of the previous visitation
order.
¶3. On June 19, 2000, the chancellor conducted a hearing and approved a temporary agreement reached
by the parties, awarding Wayne overnight visitation, from Saturday to Sunday, every other weekend.
Additionally, the chancellor granted Wayne Thanksgiving visitation privileges. On December 9, 2000, the
matter was reconvened and, after considering the testimony of both parents, the chancellor awarded Wayne
temporary standard visitation privileges, including alternate holiday visitation privileges. The chancellor also
appointed Paul Davey to evaluate and identify any psychological or behavioral disorders that Patrick might
have developed as a result of the divorce and the subsequent visitation schedules.
¶4. The matter resumed on May 2, 2001, following the completion of Davey's evaluation of Patrick. During
the hearing, the chancellor listened to several witnesses, including Davey who concluded that Wayne should
be awarded standard visitation privileges. Nonetheless, the chancellor awarded Wayne limited visitation
rights, confined to alternate weekends from five o'clock on Friday until six o'clock on Sundays. The
chancellor refused to include any provisions regarding summer visitations or week-long extensions.
Furthermore, the chancellor ruled that Wayne, during the time he had visitation privileges, would have to
ensure that Patrick participates in any church related functions as determined by Angela. However, fearing
that Angela might enroll Patrick in an excessive number of church activities so as to burden Wayne's
visitation privileges, the chancellor limited the number of activities to three. The chancellor concluded by
emphasizing that Wayne's visitation rights did not extend to any holidays.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶5. When confronted with issues pertaining to a visitation, the chancellor is granted broad discretion.
Rogers v. Morin, 791 So. 2d 815, 820 (¶9) (Miss. 2001). Accordingly, this Court will not reverse the
chancellor's decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence found in the record. However, this
Court will not hesitate to reverse a chancellor's decision in cases where the decision is replete with manifest
error or suggests that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Forsythe v. Akers, 768 So. 2d 943, 949 (¶17)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
¶6. Our courts have adopted a policy of maintaining relationships between parents and their children even
though the parent may be non-custodial. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992); Rayburn
v. Rayburn, 749 So. 2d 185, 187 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). As such, the non-custodial parent is
reasonably entitled to more than limited and short periods of visitation. Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So. 2d 956,
961 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). See also Crowsen v. Moseley, 480 So. 2d 1150, 1153 (Miss. 1985)
(noting that some holiday visitation, along with overnight weekend visitation privileges, is required as part of
standard visitation). Restrictions on a non-custodial parent's visitation privileges should only be ordered on a
limited basis. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated, "there must be evidence presented that a
particular restriction on visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child before a chancellor may properly
impose the restriction." Harrington v. Harrington, 648 So. 2d 543, 545 (Miss. 1994). See also Dunn,
609 So. 2d at 1286; Cox v. Moulds, 490 So. 2d 866, 868 (Miss. 1986). Absent evidence that standard
visitation would likely cause actual harm to the child, the chancellor may not impose limitations on visitation
and to do so represents both an abuse of discretion and manifest error. Harrington, 648 So. 2d at 544.
¶7. In Harrington, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a chancellor's decision to limit the visitation
privileges of the non-custodial, natural father who had cohabitated with a woman without the benefit of
marriage. Id at 547. The court reasoned that, despite the chancellor's findings, there was no evidence in the
record that the children were harmed or confused by their father's cohabitation. Id. The court concluded
that the likelihood of harm to the child must have a concrete, factual basis in order to overcome the
presumption that the non-custodial parent is entitled to standard, unrestricted visitation privileges. Id.
¶8. This Court will follow the reasoning set out in Harrington, holding that absent evidence that the child is
harmed by standard visitation, the chancellor may not impose limitations on the visitation privileges of the
non-custodial parent. In the case sub judice, the chancellor determined that the evidence justified the
limitation of visitation, even though she had previously granted Wayne standard visitation privileges through
a prior order.
¶9. In her findings, the chancellor cited to the testimony of Patrick's third grade teacher, Amy McKay and
Abby McAdams, Patrick's after-school caregiver. Angela called McKay and McAdams in an attempt to
show that Patrick's standard of behavior at school deteriorated around the weekends he was to spend with
Wayne. According to McKay, Wayne's influence over Patrick caused Patrick to become loud and
combative. McKay stated that she has had to "call him down" for being rough with other children on the
playground. Notwithstanding, McKay conceded that Patrick's behavior was normal for a male child of his
age. McAdams similarly testified that Patrick was more aggressive on the Fridays he was scheduled to
spend with Wayne. However, unlike McKay, McAdams testified that she had not noticed any difference in
Patrick's behavior following his weekend visits with Wayne. Although it is possible that Patrick's adolescent
behavior can be linked to the visitations with Wayne, the evidence presented by McKay and McAdams
fails to show a direct correlation. Moreover, we do not believe that Patrick's isolated aggressive behavior at
school can be considered a danger or substantial detriment, justifying the limitation of Wayne's visitation.
See Dunn, 609 So. 2d at 1286. Therefore, standing alone, this testimony was not enough to overcome the
presumption that Wayne was entitled to standard visitation.
¶10. The chancellor next alluded to the report and testimony provided by Paul Davey. However, contrary
to the chancellor's findings, neither Davey's report nor his testimony concluded that Wayne should receive
limited visitation. In actuality, Davey reached the opposite conclusion, stating that Wayne should receive
standard visitation in order to instill some normalcy into Patrick's life. Moreover, Davey testified that
Patrick's concerns about living with his father were unfounded and tied directly to the concerns Angela had
about Wayne, indicating that Angela had caused Patrick to resent his father. Davey concluded that
standard, not limited, visitation was necessary to help Patrick become closer to his father.
¶11. Lastly, the chancellor opined that Wayne lacked integrity. The chancellor relied on Wayne's own
admission that, as the principal of a school, he had borrowed a football helmet owned by the Jackson
Public School District and allowed Patrick to use it personally. According to the chancellor, this action, in
conjunction with other abnormal behavior, demonstrated that Wayne was not in the position to be granted
standard visitation privileges. Again, however, the chancellor failed to elucidate how Wayne's action was
detrimental to Patrick. In effect, it appears that the chancellor merely intended to punish Wayne for taking
the football helmet by granting less than standard visitation. See Crowson, 480 So. 2d at 1152 (noting that
custody and visitation determinations are not to be used as punishment for prior actions taken by the noncustodial parent). Accordingly, we find that the chancellor erred in considering Wayne's taking of the
football helmet when deciding to limit Wayne's visitation rights.
¶12. The evidence found in the record does not support the chancellor's restriction on Wayne's visitation
with Patrick. We note that if the granting of standard visitation privileges had been detrimental to Patrick,
the chancellor would not have awarded Wayne overnight visitation every other weekend. See Wood v.
Wood, 579 So. 2d 1271, 1273 (Miss. 1991) (stating that the chancellor's lack of reluctance in granting
limited visitation can be used to infer that there would be no danger posed to the child under standard
visitation). Likewise, prior to the final judgment, the chancellor did not hesitate in awarding Wayne standard
summer and holiday visitation privileges. While the chancellor undoubtedly acted in the manner she believed
most appropriate, her ultimate decision to grant limited custody and the basis for that decision was not
supported by the record; therefore, this case is remanded to the chancellor for further consideration.
¶13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE,
IRVING, MYERS AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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