Donald Reeves v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-00915-COA
DONALD REEVES
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
05/29/2001
HON. KEITH STARRETT
PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PAUL MCGERALD LUCKETT
GRETA D. MACK HARRIS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY JR.
DUNNICA O. LAMPTON
CRIMINAL - FELONY
ARSON - TWO COUNTS: SENTENCED TO FIFTEEN
YEARS ON EACH COUNT TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY.
THE DEFENDANT SHALL SERVE THE FIRST TWENTY
YEARS WITH THE REMAINING TEN YEARS TO BE
SERVED ON POST RELEASE SUPERVISION. THE
DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY FULL
RESTITUTION, COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY FEES
IN THE AMOUNT OF $500 AND COURT COSTS.
AFFIRMED - 08/27/2002
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
9/17/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES AND THOMAS, JJ.
THOMAS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Donald Reeves was convicted in the Circuit Court of Pike County of two counts of arson and
sentenced to serve fifteen years on each count to run consecutively with the last ten years to be served on
post release supervision. He was also ordered to pay restitution, court appointed attorney fees, and court
costs. Aggrieved he asserts the following on appeal:
I. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD A HEARING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE APPELLANT WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL.
¶2. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3. Donald Reeves and Glenda Graham were live-in lovers. On July 10, 2000, Graham and Reeves
decided that the living situation had become inharmonious, and Donald Reeves moved out of the trailer
home the two were renting and occupying together. After arguing, the two parted ways and Graham went
to see Marty Travis, as she was scared after the quarrel with Donald Reeves. Later that evening Glenda
Graham was attempting to fall asleep on the couch at the trailer when, awakened by the smell of smoke, she
found a fog of smoke filling the hall of the trailer. She left the trailer and called the fire department as well as
Marty Travis. Travis arrived first and kicked a large can with a rag in it out from under the trailer. Minimal
damage was suffered.
¶4. On July 17, 2001, Graham and Travis went to a drugstore to have a prescription filled and in the same
drugstore was Reeves. As Graham and Travis were leaving, Reeves followed them out and made an
indecorous gesture toward them. On July 18, 2001, at about 2:30 A.M., Graham and Travis, both sleeping
in the trailer once occupied by Graham and Reeves, were awakened by a loud explosion. Upon hearing the
explosion, Travis ran into the living room and then back to the bedroom screaming at Glenda Graham to
leave. She went to a neighbor's and rang the fire department. About a week after the second fire Graham
visited Reeves at a hospital in Metairie, Louisiana. During this visit Reeves explained that he was injured
while setting fire to Graham's trailer and offered to buy her a new car. Accompanying Reeves on the
evening he set fire to the trailer was Jennifer Graham, Glenda Graham's daughter. She remained in the car
intoxicated when the act of setting the fire took place.
¶5. A state fire marshal testified that the skirting around the trailer was missing in one section and that
someone had crawled under the trailer to start the fire. An arson investigator testified that upon inspection
of the trailer on both July 11 and 19, 2000, it was his view that both fires had been intentionally set.
I. WAS THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE?
¶6. Reeves argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, his
motion for judgement notwithstanding the verdict. Reeves claims a reasonable juror could not have
concluded he intentionally set fire to Glenda Graham's trailer. Reeves contends this even though he stated to
Graham that he had set himself on fire in the process of burning down the trailer.
¶7. The standard of review in determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence is well settled. "[T]his Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will
reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial."
Dudley v. State, 719 So. 2d 180, 182 (¶8) (Miss. 1998). On review, the State is given "the benefit of all
favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence." Griffin v. State, 607 So. 2d 1197,
1201 (Miss. 1992). "Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on
appeal." Dudley, 719 So. 2d at 182.
¶8. Reeves argues on appeal that due to the lack of credibility of the State's witnesses this Court should
reverse the conviction. Reeves asserts that due to the lack of credibility of witnesses Glenda Graham,
Marty Travis, and Jennifer Graham, a reasonable juror could not have concluded that he was guilty of two
counts of arson. It has been established that "the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility of testimony
and is free to accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness." Meshell v. State, 506
So. 2d 989, 991 (Miss. 1987). See also Hilliard v. State, 749 So. 2d 1015, 1017 (¶9) (Miss. 1999);
Lewis v. State, 580 So. 2d 1279, 1288 (Miss. 1991);Gandy v. State, 373 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Miss.
1979). This Court may not make an assessment on the credibility of the trial witnesses as this task is one for
the jury presiding over the matter. Kinzey v. State, 498 So. 2d 814, 818 (Miss. 1986). When this Court
analyzes a jury's verdict to determine whether it goes against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we
must keep in mind that the jury is the ultimate finder of fact. This Court does not have the task of reweighing the facts in each case to, in effect, go behind the jury to detect whether the testimony and evidence
they chose to believe was or was not the most credible. The law provides:
Jurors are permitted, indeed have the duty, to resolve the conflicts in the testimony they hear. They
may believe or disbelieve, accept or reject the utterances of any witness. No formula dictates the
manner in which jurors resolve conflicting testimony into finding of fact sufficient to support their
verdict. That resolution results from the jurors hearing and observing the witnesses as they testify,
augmented by the composite reasoning of twelve individuals sworn to return a true verdict. A
reviewing court cannot and need not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the
jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict. It is enough that the conflicting evidence
presented a factual dispute for jury resolution.
Langston v. State, 791 So. 2d 273, 280 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)(citing Groseclose v. State, 440
So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983)). We see no basis for doubting the verdict. The trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he denied the motion for a new trial or judgement notwithstanding the verdict.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO HOLD A HEARING TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THE APPELLANT WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL?
¶9. Donald Reeves contends that the trial court erred in its failure to grant a continuance the day before trial
in order to hold a competency hearing to determine if he was competent to stand trial. Therefore, the issue
before this court is not whether the court erred in refusing a competency hearing but rather did the court err
in its failure to grant a continuance in order that Reeves could be then granted a competency hearing.
¶10. The denial of a continuance is not an issue reviewable on appeal where the denial of the continuance is
not assigned as a ground for a new trial in the defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial. On motion for a
new trial, "certain errors must be brought to the attention of the trial judge so that he may have an
opportunity to pass upon their validity before this court is called upon to review them." Metcalf v. State,
629 So. 2d 558, 561-62 (Miss. 1993) (citing Weyen v. Weyen, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 608 (1932)).
"For example, the denial of a continuance in the trial court is not reviewable unless the party whose motion
for continuance was denied makes a motion for a new trial on this ground." Metcalf 629 So. 2d at 562
(citations omitted). See also Morgan v. State, 741 So. 2d 246, 255 (¶25) (Miss. 1999); Jackson v.
State, 423 So. 2d 129, 132 (Miss. 1982); Colson v. Sims, 220 So. 2d 345, 347 n. 1 (Miss. 1969).
Reeves did not properly reserve this issue for appeal. In his motion for a new trial and in his appeal the issue
presented was whether the trial court erred in failing to allow a competency hearing to determine if Reeves
was capable to assist in his own defense. The real issue, stated supra, was based on the trial court's failure
to grant a continuance.
¶11. Though this court is procedurally barred from addressing this issue on appeal, if Reeves had properly
preserved the issue, the outcome would still remain the same. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-15-29 (Rev. 2000)
provides that:
On all applications for a continuance the party shall set forth in his affidavit the facts which he expects
to prove by his absent witness or documents that the court may judge of the materiality of such facts,
the name and residence of the absent witness, that he has used due diligence to procure the absent
documents, or presence of the absent witness, as the case may be, stating in what such diligence
consists, and that the continuance is not sought for delay only, but that justice may be done. . . . A
denial of the continuance shall not be ground for reversal unless the supreme court shall be satisfied
that injustice resulted therefrom.
In the case sub judice, Reeves did not provide the court with affidavits setting forth the facts he expected to
prove by his absent witness or documents that the court may judge, or any other statutorily required
information. The trial judge determined that a competency hearing was not required based on the
observations made throughout the proceedings and the previous trial which ended in a mistrial due to a
conflict of interest issue with Reeves' previous attorney. The court did not observe any evidence that
Reeves was incompetent for trial purposes.
¶12. The legal standard for determining competency is well settled in Mississippi. "A defendant not
competent to stand trial is one who does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding, or does not have a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him." Gammage v. State, 510 So. 2d 802, 803 (Miss. 1987). See also Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). "[T]he court is concerned with a defendant being physically and
mentally able to confer with his counsel as to the merits of the case. . . . [H]e should be able to comprehend
his position and to participate rationally in his defense." May v. State, 398 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Miss. 1981)
(quoting Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 499-500, 157 So. 2d 403, 407 (1963)).
¶13. Reeves did not display behavior that would even remotely lead someone to believe that he was
incompetent to stand trial. The only evidence Reeves presented to support his motion for a continuance was
testimony that he was taking medication for cholesterol and depression. So are about a few million other
people in the United States. Reeves also provided, by testimony not affidavit, that a psychiatrist from
Louisiana stated at one time that he needed psychiatric help. Reeves was entirely able to assist in his
defense and at no time did he appear unable to comprehend his position or the proceedings. We see no
basis warranting the trial court to believe a competency hearing was needed. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. This issue is without merit.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PIKE COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF
TWO COUNTS OF ARSON AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN YEARS ON EACH COUNT TO
RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE APPELLANT SERVING THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE
REMAINING TEN TO BE SERVED ON POST RELEASE SUPERVISION AND TO PAY
RESTITUTION AND OTHER COSTS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO PIKE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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