Alvin Edwards v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-KA-00937-COA
ALVIN EDWARDS A/K/A ALVIN NICK EDWARDS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
05/21/2001
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. C. E. MORGAN III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CARROLL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
LELAND H. JONES III
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
DOUG EVANS
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
05/21/2001: COUNT I: STATUTORY RAPE - SENTENCED
TO SERVE A TERM OF EIGHT YEARS WITH THE
MDOC WITH FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED FOR A
PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AND FOUR YEARS TO
SERVE. UPON HIS RELEASE FROM INCARCERATION,
THE DEFENDANT IS TO BE PLACED UPON FOUR
YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION. THE
DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES
AND ASSESSMENTS IN THIS MATTER.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 08/13/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
9/3/2002
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, AND BRANTLEY, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Grand Jury of Carroll County indicted Alvin Edwards on one count of statutory rape for the rape
of GJH. The jury found Edwards guilty, and Edwards moved for a JNOV. The court denied Edwards's
motion and sentenced Edwards to eight years in the custody of MDOC with four years suspended for a
period of five years and four years to serve; upon completion of the sentence, Edwards was to be placed
on probation for four years. Edwards perfected his appeal to this Court in a timely fashion.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN RULING THAT EDWARDS HAD NOT MADE A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A BATSON
CHALLENGE?
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE STATE'S GENDER NEUTRAL
REASONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO ACCEPT PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF
CERTAIN JURORS?
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING AN INSTRUCTION THAT CONSENT IS
NOT A DEFENSE TO STATUTORY RAPE?
IV. DID THE COURT ERR IN ACCEPTING DR. CLEVELAND AS AN EXPERT?
V. DID THE COURT ERR IN PREVENTING EDWARDS FROM ADVANCING A
THEORY THAT THE VICTIM'S MOTHER HAD A VENDETTA AGAINST
EDWARDS?
FACTS
¶2. Alvin Edwards, while staying overnight at the Thomas home, entered the victim's bedroom and had
sexual intercourse with her. Edwards was in his thirties, and the victim fourteen. The next morning, Edwards
left the Thomas residence early. Three days later, the victim told her mother, Denise Thomas, that Edwards
had raped her, and Thomas drove her daughter to the emergency room, where she was examined by Dr.
Robert Cleveland, who determined through a physical examination that a rape had indeed taken place.
ANALYSIS
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN RULING THAT EDWARDS HAD NOT MADE A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A BATSON
CHALLENGE?
¶3. A great deal of deference is accorded trial courts in handling a Batson challenge. Spann v. State, 771
So. 2d 883, 904 (¶ 61) (Miss. 2000). This Court will not reverse factual findings relating to a Batson
challenge unless they are clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 577, 583 (Miss. 1988).
Edwards has a high burden to overcome if he wishes to show that the court improperly ruled that he did not
make a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection.
¶4. Edwards has to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for Batson purposes; thus, Edwards must
demonstrate that the totality of the facts surrounding the State's peremptory challenges give rise to an
inference of a discriminatory purpose. Puckett v. State, 788 So. 2d 752, 756 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2001).
Edwards established with little difficulty that he is black and the State exercised peremptory challenges to
keep certain blacks off of the jury. But in the trial court's judgment, Edwards was unable to prove a
discriminatory purpose in the State's peremptory challenges, and we agree.
¶5. When the State began to exercise its peremptory challenges, it faced a jury pool that was predominantly
black (fourteen out of eighteen). Following the State's peremptory challenges, the tendered panel contained
ten black jurors and three white jurors. One of the black jurors was an alternate. The proportion of black
jurors to white jurors remained consistent, which indicates no overt discrimination by the State. Further,
several of the jurors were among those that the court had not chosen to excuse for cause. Finally, the State
had remaining challenges available to it. Taken together, and absent any new evidence suggesting purposeful
discrimination, we affirm.
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE STATE'S GENDER NEUTRAL
REASONS WERE SUFFICIENT TO ACCEPT PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF
CERTAIN JURORS?
¶6. In Mississippi, the trial court's ruling on Batson related challenges will not be overturned unless they are
clearly erroneous. Hatten v. State, 628 So. 2d 294, 299 (Miss. 1993). The judge should make a "clear
and reasonably specific" explanation for his decision. Id. Batson challenges to peremptory strikes of jurors
may also be brought on grounds of gender discrimination. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994).
Although it appears that in this case the judge accepted the State's proffered gender-neutral reasons without
reservation, this is not in itself sufficient to demonstrate clear error on the court's part. In any case, this
Court must review the findings of the trial court in the light most favorable to those findings. Berry v. State,
703 So. 2d 269, 295 (Miss. 1997).
¶7. The first peremptory strike by the State was against a man whom the State had attempted to have
discharged for cause, on the grounds that he had contact with the defendant the day prior to the trial, and
then concealed it initially during voir dire, which caused the prosecutor to distrust the potential juror. The
judge properly accepted this as a gender-neutral reason. The next peremptory strike by the State was not
subject to the Batson challenge, since that juror was female, and Edwards had not objected to the State
excluding women. The State's third strike was brought against a man whose daughter-in-law was at that
time under indictment. See Magee v. State, 720 So. 2d 186, 190 (¶ 13) (Miss. 1998). Edwards objected
that this information had not been brought out during voir dire, and the court accepted the State's genderneutral reason.
¶8. The State's fourth strike was brought against a man whom the State believed would place a lower value
on one's right to be free from sexual assault, as he worked next door to a strip club. The court accepted this
reasoning as gender-neutral, over Edwards's objection that this fact was not brought out in voir dire. See
Baldwin v. State, 784 So. 2d 148, 155 (¶¶ 22-23) (Miss. 2001).
¶9. The State's fifth strike was against a man who was twenty-four years old and worked in a factory,
based on his age and employment. Id. Edwards objected that this was pretextual, and in fact that the State
wanted the man off the jury because he was black and male, rather than because he was close in age to
Edwards and had a blue-collar job. The court considered Edwards's objection, and accepted the State's
reasoning as gender-neutral.
¶10. The record does not demonstrate any error by the court. Edwards's objections, while cogent, are
insignificant, because peremptory strikes do not have to be based solely on knowledge gleaned from the
venire process, but may be based on known facts, and Edwards admitted that he was aware of the factual
basis the State relied upon for their gender-neutral reasons. Further, Edwards offers no argument that these
are not gender-neutral reasons. He instead focuses solely on the issue of race, for which he failed to
establish a prima facie case at trial, and again failed to do in his appeal. We find that the court committed no
error here.
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING AN INSTRUCTION THAT CONSENT IS
NOT A DEFENSE TO STATUTORY RAPE?
¶11. Instructions to a jury are not to be considered within a vacuum, but reviewed as a whole. Malone v.
State, So. 2d 360, 365 (Miss. 1986). The State's instruction, S-6, defined an element of the crime, and
came directly from the statute. Even though Edwards did not attempt to raise consent as a defense to the
crime, in Mississippi there is no error if the requested instruction is part of the definition of the crime. Eakes
v. State, 665 So. 2d 852, 871 (Miss. 1995). As the State's given instruction merely served to define the
crime, the court properly instructed the jury, even though consent was never raised by Edwards as a
defense. Finding no error, we affirm.
IV. DID THE COURT ERR IN ACCEPTING DR. CLEVELAND AS AN EXPERT?
¶12. The court initially accepted Dr. Cleveland as an expert in emergency medicine, and as an expert in
family practice, which included obstetrics and gynecology. An expert's qualifications are ultimately within the
discretion of the trial court. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1287 (Miss. 1994). Thus, Edwards must
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in ruling that Dr. Cleveland was qualified to present an
expert opinion concerning gynecology and obstetrics within the field of family medicine.
¶13. The court found Dr. Cleveland's expertise as a family practitioner, coupled with his experience as an
emergency room doctor who treated several rape victims, compelling enough to allow Dr. Cleveland to
render an expert opinion on the gynecological matters in this case. Edwards did not contest Dr. Cleveland's
familiarity with rape cases at trial, and does not in his brief. The nub of Edwards's assignment of error is that
Dr. Cleveland had not been a doctor long enough to be an expert.
¶14. Edwards did not conduct a voir dire of Dr. Cleveland to test his expertise. Edwards merely fielded an
objection that he felt that Dr. Cleveland was not properly qualified to render such an opinion. Edwards did
not provide a specific ground of objection for the court to rule on, rendering his objection essentially
meaningless before this Court. Edwards asserts that the State had the responsibility of testing Dr.
Cleveland's qualifications; however, the burden was his to bring specific objections at trial. Hosford v.
State, 560 So. 2d 163, 168 (Miss. 1990).
V. DID THE COURT ERR IN PREVENTING EDWARDS FROM ADVANCING A
THEORY THAT THE VICTIM'S MOTHER HAD A VENDETTA AGAINST
EDWARDS?
¶15. The court ruled that to permit Edwards to advance a theory that Denise Thomas, the victim's mother,
had it in for him and had provoked the prosecution, would be more prejudicial than probative, and barred
any such testimony. When reviewing a judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, this Court treats the
trial court's decisions with great deference, reversing only if there has been clear error or abuse of
discretion. Under Mississippi's rules of evidence, the court must decide that each piece of evidence is more
probative than prejudicial before it may be brought before the jury. M. R. E. 403.
¶16. Edwards made a proffer following the State's objection, which consisted solely of the testimony of
Thomas, where she categorically denied the substance of Edwards's theory: she stated that she did not ever
have sexual relations with Edwards; that she had never wanted to have sexual relations with Edwards; that
she had never made advances towards Edwards; that Edwards had never rebuffed any advances; and that
she had no animus towards him for rebuffing her advances.
¶17. Edwards never made a proffer that anyone else had knowledge of Thomas's vendetta against
Edwards, although he intimated that he could produce witnesses who did. Edwards never made a proffer of
their testimony; his attorney merely suggested they would be able to testify to this vendetta. Offers of proof
are made to provide the court with the substance of the evidence. M. R. E. 103 (a)(2). Since Edwards did
not make an offer of proof to provide substance to this theory of his defense, this Court cannot properly
evaluate his claims. Thus, we must affirm.
CONCLUSION
¶18. Edwards makes five assignments of error in his appeal. First, he alleges that the court erred in ruling
that he had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination sufficient to sustain a Batson challenge. The
evidence did not demonstrate any purposeful discrimination on the basis of race, as the proportion of black
jurors to white jurors remained consistent with that of the jury pool. Further, the State did not use all of its
peremptory challenges, and struck jurors that the court had not excused for cause upon the State's request.
¶19. Second, Edwards argues that the court erred by finding that the State had provided sufficiently genderneutral reasons for its peremptory challenges to clear the Batson hurdle. Although the court accepted the
State's reasons without reservation, that does not constitute clear error. Edwards's objections to the
peremptory challenge stated that the State based its peremptory challenges on information not brought out
on voir dire. Edwards does not provide any authority for this argument, and in fact peremptory challenges
can be made for no reasons, or following a Batson challenge, any reason that is not racially or gender
motivated.
¶20. Third, Edwards argues that the court erred by granting an instruction stating that consent was not a
defense to statutory rape, on the grounds that consent was never argued before the court. However,
consent not operating as a defense to statutory rape is part of the definition of the crime, and in Mississippi,
instructions which include the definition of the crime are not erroneous. Fourth, Edwards argues that the
court erred in admitting Dr. Cleveland as an expert in the field of gynecology and family medicine. Edwards
argues that Dr. Cleveland is not a gynecologist, and that he had not been a doctor long enough to be an
expert. However, Edwards did not conduct a voir dire examination of Cleveland, and brought no specific
objections at trial beyond his tenure as a doctor.
¶21. Fifth, Edwards argues that he was inappropriately barred from presenting a theory of vendetta as his
defense. Edwards attempted to argue that Denise Thomas had it in for Edwards because he had rejected
her advances; but at trial he made no proffer of evidence beyond asking Thomas if this was in fact the case.
He alluded to other witnesses, but did not produce them.
¶22. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CARROLL COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH FOUR
YEARS TO SERVE AND FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF SUPERVISED
PROBATION IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO
CARROLL COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., THOMAS, LEE, MYERS, CHANDLER AND
BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. KING, P.J. AND IRVING, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.