Veronica Jo Lockert v. Robert Lynn Lockert
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-02104-COA
VERONICA JO LOCKERT
v.
ROBERT LYNN LOCKERT
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
11/20/2000
HON. WILLIAM HALE SINGLETARY
HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
WES W. PETERS
BARRY W. GILMER
LESLIE R. BROWN
CHARLES H. KEETON
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MARITAL ESTATE DIVIDED PER ORDER
AFFIRMED - 5/7/2002
5/28/2002
BEFORE KING, P.J., THOMAS, AND MYERS, JJ.
KING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This is an appeal from the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi, where Robert Lynn and
Veronica Jo Lockert consented to and were granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
Aggrieved by the chancery court's division of martial property, Mrs. Lockert appeals. She presents two
issues for this Court's consideration, which we cite verbatim:
I.
The Chancellor erred in Awarding Mr. Lockert an equity interest in Veronica's pre-existing
home, without making a "substantial contribution" to its acquisition and without considering
the substantial use and enjoyment he made of it during the period of the marriage.
II.
Alternatively, Mr. Lockert's interest should have been awarded with the same attendant
obligations as Veronica.
FACTS
¶2. Robert and Veronica Lockert were married on March 15, 1980, and separated in April 1999. The
couple did not have any children together. Although, Mr. Lockert had four children from a previous
marriage. The children were two, four, six, and eight when the couple married.
¶3. Mrs. Lockert purchased a home in 1976, four years before marrying Mr. Lockert. During the marriage,
Mrs. Lockert was employed as an accountant, while Mr. Lockert was employed as a construction worker.
His employer closed its operations in Mississippi and Mr. Lockert received a $27,000 severance payment.
¶4. On September 2, 1999, Mr. Lockert filed a complaint for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel
and inhuman treatment or alternatively irreconcilable differences. On October 29, 1999, Mrs. Lockert filed
an answer and counterclaim for divorce on the grounds of adultery or alternatively irreconcilable
differences. On October 18, 2000, the parties filed a "Joint Motion to Withdraw Contested Pleadings." On
October 20, 2000, the parties filed a "Consent to Divorce on Irreconcilable Differences and Submission of
Other Issues to the Court." On October 20, 2000, the chancellor entered an "Order Allowing Parties to
Withdraw Contested Pleadings," and granted them a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
On October 20, 2000, the chancery court issued an opinion on the division of the marital assets. That
opinion stated, "The assets of these parties which are in dispute and about which the Court is called upon to
make a finding as to the character and proper distribution are approximately $50,000 cash saved by Robert
during the course of the marriage, and approximately $82,000 in equity in the marital domicile." The
chancery court's opinion stated that
[T]he martial estate should equitably be divided by an award to Robert of one-third of same, and to
Veronica two-thirds. Finding the marital estate of [sic] be valued at $132,000, the above division
would result in an award to Robert of $44,000, and to Veronica $88,000. The Court finds that an
equitable distribution on that basis would best be accomplished by an award to Veronica of the
house, and an additional $6,000 from the cash estate, and awarding to Robert the remaining cash
estate.
¶5. On November 1, 2000, Mrs. Lockert filed a motion to reconsider the division of marital property. On
November 17, 2000, the chancery court denied Mrs. Lockert's motion. On November 28, 2000, the
chancery court filed its final judgment following its opinion of October 20, 2000.
RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES
¶6. Mrs. Lockert appeals the chancery court decision as to the equitable distribution of the marital assets.
She contends that the chancery court erred in awarding Mr. Lockert an equity interest in the marital home
without first determining whether he made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the home.
Alternatively, Mrs. Lockert argues that any interest in the marital domicile awarded to Mr. Lockert should
have been awarded subject to a proportional share of the on-going cost associated with the home. These
obligations include mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance.
¶7. This Court will not reverse the equitable division of marital property when supported by substantial
evidence unless the chancery court failed to apply an appropriate legal standard or abused its discretion.
Parsons v. Parsons, 741 So. 2d 302, 306 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). Marital property is defined as
"any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated
during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the
chancellor." Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994). The Mississippi Supreme Court has
determined that non-marital property "commingled with marital assets or used for familial purposes" maybe
converted into marital property. Heigle v. Heigle, 654 So. 2d 895, 897 (Miss. 1995).
¶8. The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted guidelines to assist chancellors in the equitable division of
marital property. Those guidelines are:
(1) the economic and domestic contributions by each party to the marriage,
(2) the expenditures and disposal of the marital assets by each party,
(3) the market value and emotional value of the marital assets,
(4) the value of the non-marital property,
(5) tax, economic, contractual, and legal consequences of the distribution,
(6) elimination of alimony and other future frictional contact between the parties,
(7) the income and earning capacity of each party, and
(8) any other relevant factor that should be considered in making an equitable distribution
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). The Ferguson court stated that the chancery
courts must support their decisions with findings of fact and conclusions of law for the purpose of appellate
review. Id. at 929. "The chancellor need not make findings as to all the Ferguson factors, but may consider
only those factors he finds 'applicable' to the property in question." Carrow v. Carrow, 741 So. 2d 200
(¶10) (Miss. 1999).
¶9. In its decision, the chancery court determined that Mrs. Lockert purchased the marital domicile as her
separate property prior to marriage to Mr. Lockert. However, its use changed its character from Mrs.
Lockert's personal property to a marital asset.
¶10. Based upon the evidence, the chancery court correctly concluded that the house was a marital asset.
The chancery court found that the house was used for familial purposes, and that Mr. Lockert had made
substantial contributions to the upkeep and maintenance of the house.
¶11. Both parties acknowledged that Mr. Lockert contributed to the upkeep of the house. He paid the
utilities, painted and repaired, oversaw maintenance, and replaced the carpet, washer and dryer and central
heating and cooling systems from his separate income. Mr. Lockert also paid the second mortgage on the
home, which was used to finance Mrs. Lockert's business and a truck for himself. Mr. Lockert also built a
small shop on the property for his use.
¶12. The chancery court determined that the cash reserve of $50,000 saved by Mr. Lockert during the
marriage should also be included in the marital property. Mr. Lockert testified that over a five-year period
he was able to save $50,000. The savings was generated by Mr. Lockert's $5200 per year vehicle
reimbursement from Law Construction, $8,000 to $9,000 worth of job bonuses and savings from a regular
weekly paycheck. The chancery court concluded that Mrs. Lockert, who had the greater income, provided
the majority of support of the household and the persons residing therein. Therefore, it was Mrs. Lockert's
financial contributions to the household which allowed Mr. Lockert to save $50,000 during the marriage.
¶13. Before rendering its final judgment, the chancery court took up Mrs. Lockert's motion for
reconsideration. Her motion requested that a sale of the marital domicile be made so that a true equitable
distribution might be realized. The chancery court denied the motion. On appeal, Mrs. Lockert argues that
the two-thirds and one-third division would be equitable if there was a sale of the home, whereby the
remaining obligations of the mortgage payment, taxes, insurance, and utilities, would be shared
proportionately by both parties.
¶14. After review of the record, there is no evidence that the chancery court abused it discretion or
manifestly erred in the distribution of the Lockerts's marital property. Applying the Ferguson factors, the
chancery court determined that the marital property totaling $132,000 would be distributed two-thirds to
Mrs. Lockert and one-third to Mr. Lockert. The chancery court found that Mrs. Lockert made the greatest
contribution to the accumulation of the parties marital assets. She paid the first and second mortgages (the
second has been paid off). The chancery court found that as an accountant, Mrs. Lockert's income and
earning capacity were substantially greater than that of Mr. Lockert.
¶15. The sole remaining indebtedness on the marital home was the balance of the original purchase price.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has upheld a chancery court's decision as equitable where a husband's
income and earning capacity were diminished and a wife's obligation to pay the mortgage after divorce was
offset by her benefit from living in the home. Selman v. Selman, 722 So. 2d 547 (¶18-19) (Miss. 1998).
This Court sees no abuse of discretion in the chancellor's decision and accordingly affirms the same.
¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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