William Dustin Reeder v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-00148-COA
WILLIAM DUSTIN REEDER
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
12/22/1999
HON. GEORGE B. READY
DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
J. LANCE BUTLER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE THE IMPOSED
SENTENCE DISMISSED
AFFIRMED: 03/26/2002
5/15/2002; denied 8/13/2002
9/12/2002
EN BANC.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. William Dustin Reeder pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County to arson. He was
sentenced to ten years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) and placed in the
Regimented Inmate Discipline Program (RID). The sentencing order further provided that if Reeder
successfully completed the RID program he would be placed on supervised release for the remainder of his
sentence. The order also provided that Reeder would be under house arrest for the first full year following
his release from the RID program. Reeder successfully completed the RID program and was placed under
house arrest with the Justice Network, Inc. program, a privately run program. Shortly after being placed in
the house arrest program run by the Justice Network, Inc., Reeder found himself unable to pay the fee
associated with the program. As a result he was transferred to a state-run program at Fairland in
Clarksdale. While a resident of Fairland, Reeder assisted a female in bringing cocaine into his room.
Reeder, the female, and other residents staying at Fairland under the house arrest program smoked the
cocaine.
¶2. As a result of the cocaine incident, Reeder was removed from the house arrest program and placed in
the general prison population. Following his removal from the house arrest program, Reeder filed a postconviction relief motion in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County contending that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke his participation in the house arrest program.
¶3. The trial court, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, dismissed Reeder's PCR motion pursuant to
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2000). This code section permits the dismissal of
a PCR motion "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits . . . that the movant
is not entitled to any relief."
¶4. Reeder contends in this appeal, as he did in the court below, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
revoke his participation in the house arrest program and that the revocation constitutes a violation of his due
process rights. We agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, but we disagree with Reeder's assertion that
the trial court revoked his participation in the house arrest program. Quite the contrary, we find that Reeder
was removed from the house arrest program by the MDOC. Since we do not find that the trial court
revoked his participation in the house arrest program, we find no need to address Reeder's claim that the
revocation constitutes a violation of his due process rights.(1) Consequently, we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of Reeder's PCR motion.
FACTS
¶5. The record reveals the following facts taken from the MDOC's Rule Violation Report. On January 17,
1999, Fred Held, field officer with the MDOC, learned from Henry Atkins, house arrest program manager,
that Reeder had been kicked out of the house arrest program for using illegal drugs. Officer Held called
Fairland and spoke with Director David Cook. Cook informed Officer Held that Reeder brought drugs into
the facility and had tested positive for drugs. Officer Held then arrested Reeder at Reeder's residence and
transported him to the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office.
¶6. The violation report further shows that Reeder was charged with violating MDOC Rule 36-6-20 and
that he appeared before the MDOC's disciplinary committee, waived his right to a hearing on the violation
and admitted his guilt. The committee was composed of Lt. Annette Mack, chairperson, Sgt. Connie
Brown, Sgt. Tony Lewis, and CM. Jonathan Grant, members. The committee determined that the
punishment should be "reduction in custody from "U" custody to "C" custody pending initial class
psychological evaluation." The violation report bears a stamp of approval of the recommended
punishment.(2)
¶7. The record also contains a copy of the ISP Exit Form(3) for Reeder's case. This completed form shows
that Reeder was terminated from the house arrest program on January 17, 1999, and that the termination
was the result of a revocation. The form bears the signature of Fred Held, the MDOC's ISP field officer
and is dated January 17, 1999.
¶8. Additional facts as necessary will be provided during the discussion of the issue.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶9. We will first address the State's contention that this appeal is time barred. The State bases its contention
on the fact that the order denying post-conviction relief was filed on December 22, 1999, and Reeder's
notice of appeal is stamped filed January 24, 2000. The State is correct in its assertion regarding the filed
date of the notice of appeal. However, we note from the record that Reeder sent a letter to the clerk of the
circuit court purporting to transmit the notice of appeal and an affidavit for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This letter is dated January 14, 2000, and was filed January 24, but the affidavit which it purports
to transmit was filed January 21, 2000. The affidavit and notice of appeal are both dated January 19, 2000.
On these facts, we are unable to conclude with certainty that an error may not have occurred in the filing
process. Therefore, we decline to accept the State's invitation to dismiss the appeal as untimely.
¶10. Reeder's argument regarding the trial court's lack of jurisdiction is based on one document, the
MDOC's ISP form order, which was gratuitously signed by the circuit judge. However, that fact is not as
significant as the contents of the order itself. The order provides as follows:
This Defendant having been sentenced to the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
on 4-11-97 to serve 10 years for the crime of Arson, subject to the provision of Section 47-5-1001
through 47-5-1015, Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, being the Intensive Supervision
Program, and the court having maintained jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Section 47-7-47 and
the Court having been advised by the Mississippi Department of Corrections that the
Defendant has failed to complete the Intensive Supervision Program and the Court hereby
approves the Mississippi Department of Corrections' placement of the Defendant in whatever
facility deemed appropriate and the Defendant is to complete the original sentence of the
Court.
(emphasis added).
¶11. The documents previously discussed make it sufficiently clear that all the circuit court did was approve
the actions taken by MDOC. For certain, such approval was not necessary. However, we cannot accept
the notion that the trial judge's execution of an unnecessary order, which says nothing about revocation of
Reeder's sentence, somehow transforms the order into a revocation-of-sentence order, despite the limiting
language of the order which makes plain that the order only "approves the Mississippi Department of
Corrections' placement of the Defendant in whatever facility deemed appropriate." The trial judge's
approval of the MDOC's decision to terminate Reeder's participation in the house arrest program is not
synonymous with the judge's revoking Reeder's participation in the program.
¶12. This Court finds that Reeder's participation in the house arrest program was revoked by the MDOC,
the entity charged with such responsibility by Mississippi Code Annotated Section 47-5-1003(3) (Supp.
2001). This section reads:
To protect and to ensure the safety of the state's citizens, any offender who violates an order or
condition of the intensive supervision program shall be arrested by the correctional field officer and
placed in the actual custody of the Department of Corrections. Such offender is under the full and
complete jurisdiction of the department and subject to removal from the program by the classification
hearing officer.
Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1003(3) (Rev. 2001).
¶13. As previously observed, Reeder was arrested by Fred Held, field officer with the MDOC. According
to the rule violation report, as we have already pointed out, Reeder appeared before the MDOC's
disciplinary committee, waived his right in writing to a hearing, and admitted that he was guilty as charged.
Also, as previously noted, the disciplinary committee recommended that Reeder, as punishment for his
violation of the ISP agreement, be transferred from "U" custody to "C" custody. This recommendation,
according to the record, was approved by the classification committee.
¶14. The dissent contends that "[t]he circuit court revoked Reeder's house arrest based upon a violation of
the terms of his parole pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-47 (Rev. 2000)." Dissenting Opinion at (¶25).
Two points should be mentioned here. First, a reading of the order does not support this contention.
Second, the ISP exit form which was executed on January 17, 1999, two days before the judge's order in
question, states that Reeder entered the house arrest program on July 31, 1998, and that he was terminated
from the program on January 17, 1999. Revocation was the reason given for the termination. Also, as
already observed, this form was signed not by the trial judge but by Fred Held, the MDOC's ISP field
officer. The hearing held before the disciplinary committee on February 2, 1999, was merely perfunctory, in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the MDOC. It was perfunctory because Reeder had already,
on January 17, 1999, admitted that he was guilty of the charges. He again admitted his guilt during the
disciplinary hearing.
¶15. The dissent also contends that the order entered by the circuit court is void for lack of jurisdiction. We
agree, but we disagree with the dissent that it was this order that resulted in Reeder's removal from the
house arrest program. At that disciplinary hearing, Reeder admitted that he was guilty of the charges, and
since he admitted that he was guilty, there is no basis for further complaint. Neither the signing of the
gratuitous order by the trial judge nor the trial judge's belated written recognition that he lacked jurisdiction
to sign the gratuitous order changes this fact. We have no qualms with the dissent's contention that the
January 19,1999 order of the circuit court, approving the revocation of Reeder's house arrest, should be set
aside as void, and we so hold. However, our setting aside the judge's January 19, 1999 order does not
affect the validity of the trial judge's order dismissing Reeder's PCR motion. Our reasons for reaching this
conclusion is what we next discuss.
¶16. Reeder's pro se PCR motion in the trial court was styled "Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Intensive
Supervision Sentence, Pursuant to MCA Section § 99-39-5(1)(e), 1972." In his motion, Reeder listed the
issue as being "whether the court erred in ordering that the Petitioner serve the original sentence of ten (10)
years in the penitentiary." As to the facts, supporting his claim and being within his personal knowledge,
Reeder stated the following:
The Petitioner successfully completed the Regimeted [sic] Inmate discipline Program, and upon his
release reported to the DeSoto County probation office and was told he needed to report to the
Justice Network to be placed on house arrest.
After being unable to maintain the $75.00 per week payment under the Justice Network, the
petitioner was brought before the DeSoto County Circuit Court for a Revocation Hearing [sic] and
switched to the MDOC house arrest program.
¶17. Reeder is obviously confused as to when he was ordered to be placed in the house arrest program. A
review of Reeder's original sentencing order reveals that at the time of sentencing on April 11, 1997, the
trial judge ordered Reeder placed in the house arrest program following "the first full year after [his] release
from the RID program."
¶18. The probation revocation hearing of which Reeder complained in his PCR motion concerned a hearing
which was held July 31, 1998, following Reeder's release from the RID Program and his unsuccessful
matriculation in the Justice Network, Inc., program for failure to pay the expenses associated with that
program. The revocation hearing was held because Reeder failed to supply his probation officer with a
telephone number as requested by the officer. This hearing was indeed held before the circuit judge.
However, in an order dated July 31, 1998, the circuit judge did not disturb Reeder's placement in the house
arrest program. The judge ordered that Reeder would be "released from custody upon verification that all
conditions in the House Arrest Program have been met." This "custody" referred to Reeder's interim arrest
between completion of the RID program and enrollment in the house arrest program, not the arrest for the
cocaine incident which did not occur until January 1999. This is borne out by the transcript of that hearing:
THE COURT: I'm fixing to tell you something, Mr. Reeder: This is what I'm going to do: You're going
to sit in the jail until the house arrest gets all set up. The first time you mess up, you're going to do five
years in the penitentiary. I'm telling you now. We don't even need to have a hearing. Okay?
¶19. In his appellate brief, Reeder contends that he was re-sentenced on July 31, 1998. He further
contends that:
[He] should be placed back in the ISP program so that he can be evaluated and be allowed to serve
the remainder of his one year ISP sentence. In the alternative we are asking this Court [to] honor the
July 31, 1998 re-sentencing order wherein it states that maximum William Dustin Reeder can receive
is five years for a violation while on ISP status.
CONCLUSION
¶20. The trial judge properly dismissed Reeder's PCR motion. We reach this conclusion because it was the
MDOC and not the trial judge that revoked Reeder's participation in the house arrest program. The
gratuitous order entered by the trial judge on January 19, 1999, though done without jurisdiction, changes
nothing and is void as a matter of law. Reeder's assertion that the trial judge amended his original sentencing
order on July 31, 1998, wherein Reeder's sentence was changed from ten years to five years is totally
without merit. The order speaks for itself, and nothing in the order purports to change the original sentence.
The trial judge's comment at the July 31, 1998 revocation hearing regarding Reeder's serving five years in
the penitentiary the first time he messed up was not incorporated in the order that was signed by the judge;
therefore, it did not become a part of the order of the court. As already observed, Reeder admitted his guilt
in connection with the January 17, 1999 cocaine incident, leaving nothing for further adjudication or review.
Consequently, the order of the trial judge dismissing Reeder's PCR motion is affirmed.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DESOTO COUNTY DISMISSING
APPELLANT'S POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF
THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO DESOTO COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, MYERS, AND BRANTLEY,
JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J. DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION JOINED BY
SOUTHWICK, P.J.
CHANDLER, J., DISSENTING:
¶22. The majority finds sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that William Reeder's house arrest was
properly revoked by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC.) While I disagree that the house
arrest was revoked in accordance with statutory law, this is not the issue before this Court. On appeal,
Reeder asserts that the trial court lacked the authority to issue an order revoking his house arrest. I agree
and respectfully dissent with the majority's opinion.
¶23. The controlling statute in this case is Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1003(3) (Rev. 2000) which reads in
pertinent part:
To protect and to ensure the safety of the state's citizens, any offender who violates an order or
condition of the intensive supervision program shall be arrested by the correctional field officer and
placed in the actual custody of the Department of Corrections. Such offender is under the full and
complete jurisdiction of the department and subject to removal from the program by the classification
hearing officer.
¶24. The seminal case on this issue is Babbitt v. State, 755 So. 2d 406 (Miss. 2000). The Mississippi
Supreme Court in that case held that the circuit court had improperly removed the petitioner, Babbitt, from
house arrest. Id. at (¶14). Specifically, the court stated, "section 47-5-1003 (3) confers 'full and complete'
jurisdiction on the classification committee in matters relating to violations of the ISP." Id. at (¶11) (citing
Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-1003(3) (Rev. 2000)).
¶25. The circuit court revoked Reeder's house arrest based upon a violation of the terms of his parole
pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-47 (Rev. 2000). That statute does not apply under the present
circumstances. Babbitt, 755 So. 2d at (¶10). Babbitt noted that Chapter 7 of Title 47 governs probation
and parole; however, the terms of Reeder's ISP are governed by Chapter 5 of Title 47. Id. As stated
above, this statute grants complete jurisdiction to the classification committee; Reeder's ISP was not subject
to the parole statute.
¶26. This issue was addressed in Smith v. State, 766 So. 2d 50 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). In that case,
Smith was arrested because of a violation of his house arrest rules. Id. at (¶3). On November 9, 1998, the
Forrest County Circuit Court entered an order as follows:
This Defendant having been sentenced to the custody of the MDOC on § 12-2-97 to serve 10 (ten)
years for the crime of manslaughter, subject to the provision of § 47-5-1001 through § 47-5-1015,
Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, being the Intensive Supervision Program, and the Court
having maintained jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to § 47-7-47 and the Court having been
advised by the MDOC that the Defendant has failed to complete the Intensive Supervision
Program and the Court hereby approves the MDOC's placement of the Defendant in whatever
facility deemed appropriate and the Defendant is to complete the original sentence of the
Court.
Smith, 766 So. 2d at (¶12) (emphasis added). Except for the manslaughter charge and applicable statute,
the language of the above order mirrors that of the order entered by the Circuit Court of DeSoto County
revoking Reeder's house arrest.
¶27. On appeal, Smith argued that the November 9, 1998 order was void based on lack of jurisdiction. Id.
at (¶7). This Court agreed with Smith and found that the circuit court was without the jurisdiction to revoke
Smith's house arrest. Id. at (¶13). The Court noted that Section 47-7-47 relied upon by the circuit court
only relates to the court's jurisdiction in matters of probation and earned probation, not house arrest. Id.
¶28. As stated above, the January 19, 1999 order entered by the DeSoto County Circuit Court revoking
Reeder's house arrest is void for lack of jurisdiction. Such an order, even though it purports to be an
approval of MDOC action, is, by statute, without authority to remove the defendant from house arrest and
place him in a MDOC facility. See Miller v. State, 804 So. 2d 1062 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
¶29. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the circuit court's order was ineffective and without
jurisdiction; therefore it should be reversed and set aside.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
1. In his appellate brief, Reeder's due process argument centers on allegations of lack of due process
concerning what he perceives as a court-ordered revocation of his house arrest, but in his
memorandum brief in the court below, he made allegations of due process violations by MDOC
officials.
2. The approval stamp is dated February 3, 1999, and is signed by Officer Jordan. Jordan's official
position is not specified in the record. However, it is noteworthy that he was not a member of the
disciplinary committee. Given the fact that his stamp of approval appears one day after the
disciplinary committee hearing, it is perhaps safe to assume that he may be the classification hearing
officer. We also note that the violation report also contains the signature of the reviewing warden
designee, dated February 4, 1999.
3. ISP is an acronym for Intensive Supervision Program which is commonly referred to as the house
arrest program.
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