Lars Madison v. DeSoto County, Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CP-01155-COA
LARS MADISON
v.
DESOTO COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
06/19/2000
HON. PERCY L. LYNCHARD JR.
DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
PRO SE
JAMES ARDEN BARNETT JR.
L. BRADLEY DILLARD
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - OTHER
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO DESOTO
COUNTY ON MADISON'S COUNTERCLAIM.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 2/12/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 2/22/2002; denied 4/16/2002
CERTIORARI FILED:
4/30/2002; denied 8/8/2002
MANDATE ISSUED:
8/29/2002
BEFORE KING, P.J., IRVING, AND BRANTLEY, JJ.
KING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This is an appeal from the DeSoto County Chancery Court. DeSoto County filed a petition for
mandatory injunction against Lars Madison to require compliance with zoning and building regulations.
Madison filed a counterclaim against DeSoto County alleging fraud and malicious prosecution. The
chancellor granted DeSoto County's motion for summary judgment on Madison's counterclaim. On appeal,
Madison has raised the following issues:
I. Whether the chancellor erred in granting DeSoto County's motion for summary judgment
and not granting Madison's motion for extension of time to respond to summary judgment
and a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion for good cause.
II. Whether the chancellor erred in having two standards of court rules, one for a licensed
practicing attorney and one for a private litigant.
III. Whether the chancery court was absent all jurisdiction in this case.
FACTS
¶2. On March 15, 1999, DeSoto County Code Enforcement Officer Archie Baldwin wrote Madison
regarding a complaint about junk vehicles parked on his property. On April 5, 1999, another letter was sent
to Madison advising that unless he complied with county zoning regulations, legal action would be taken
against him. Madison failed to comply with DeSoto County's request.
¶3. On June 3, 1999, DeSoto County filed a petition for mandatory injunction to force compliance with
zoning and other regulations. The petition alleged that Madison had allowed junk motor vehicles,
equipment, and scrap materials to accumulate on his property in willful violation of the zoning ordinances.
¶4. On June 21, 1999, Madison filed a response to the petition and filed a counterclaim alleging fraud and
malicious prosecution. He claimed that the affidavit of Merritt Powell, director of the DeSoto County
Planning Commission, was not a proper affidavit because it was false and fraudulent on its face. Madison
also claimed that DeSoto County failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
¶5. On June 28, 1999, DeSoto County responded to Madison's petition to dismiss and cross-complaint
and denied all liability. In that response, DeSoto County alleged the following affirmative defenses against
Madison's cross-complaint: (1) that Madison failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, (2) that the cross-complaint should be dismissed because DeSoto
County enjoyed absolute immunity, (3) that DeSoto County enjoyed immunity from Madison's tort claims
pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, (4) that DeSoto County enjoyed qualified immunity, (5) that
Madison failed to substantially comply with notice requirements set forth in Miss. Code Ann. Section 1146-1 (Supp. 1999), (6) that DeSoto County is entitled to any and all protection provided by Miss. Code
Ann. Section 85-5-7 (Supp. 1999), (7) that DeSoto County affirmatively stated that all attempts to enforce
zoning regulations against Madison are a lawful exercise of DeSoto County's police powers granted under
the laws of the State of Mississippi, (8) that DeSoto County claims and reserves all rights and defenses
afforded by Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-1-65 (Supp. 1999), (9) that DeSoto County enjoyed immunity
from all punitive and exemplary damages, (10) that Madison's alleged injuries and damages, if any, were
proximately caused by his own actions, (11) that DeSoto County acted in good faith at all times relevant to
this action, and (12) that DeSoto County was justified in filing the mandatory injunction against Madison.
¶6. Pursuant to the request of DeSoto County, the chancellor signed an order on July 26, 1999, setting the
case for trial on September 22, 1999. On August 12, 1999, Madison filed an objection to the setting of the
trial date. Madison stated that discovery was pending and that the trial date should not be set until
discovery had been completed.
¶7. DeSoto County employed new counsel, and as a result requested a continuance. This continuance was
granted on September 13, 1999.
¶8. On May 5, 2000, DeSoto County filed another motion to set trial date. By order, filed on June 6, 2000,
the trial was set for August 4, 2000. On May 10, 2000, DeSoto County filed a motion for summary
judgment. On May 18, 2000, Madison requested an extension of time until July 7, 2000, in which to
respond to the motion for summary judgment. In his response, Madison stated that he was presently under
the doctor's care for damages to his arms and unable to respond. The chancellor denied Madison's request
for an extension of time to respond on June 19, 2000, and granted DeSoto County's motion for summary
judgment on the same day.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
I.
Whether the chancellor erred by denying Madison's motion for extension of time to respond
to summary judgment and a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion
and by granting DeSoto County's motion for summary judgment.
¶9. Madison contends that because there were other motions pending before the court, the chancellor erred
when he failed to grant his motion for an extension of time to respond to DeSoto County's motion for
summary judgment and granted DeSoto County's motion for summary judgment.
¶10. He argues that his counterclaim stated a cause of action and that there were genuine issues of disputed
material facts presented by his pleadings. Madison's counterclaim states that DeSoto County brought a false
and frivolous complaint against him. He contends that the original suit constituted malicious prosecution.
¶11. Madison claims that his health problems were good cause for an extension of time to respond to the
summary judgment motion. In addition to his health problems, Madison contends that the law library was
not open at that time of the year at night and that he could not write at that particular time nor take notes.
¶12. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for an extension of time, this Court's review is "plenary,
" if the decision is based on a question of law. When it is not, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.
Young v. Hooker, 753 So. 2d 456 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). In this case, we apply the abuse of
discretion standard.
¶13. While claiming health problems as the basis for his requested extension, Madison failed to present the
chancellor with appropriate information, to establish his problem and demonstrate a need for the extension.
Accordingly, this Court finds no abuse of discretion.
¶14. Madison's next contention is that the chancellor erred in granting DeSoto County's summary judgment
motion.
¶15. When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment by the chancery court, this
Court applies the following standard of review:
We review de novo the record on appeal from a grant of a motion for summary judgment. In Brown
v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983), we interpreted Rule 56 and the standards
that the trial courts should use in considering a motion for summary judgment. We explained that the
trial court must review carefully all of the evidentiary matters before it --admissions in pleadings,
answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If in this view the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor.
Otherwise the motion should be denied. Gulf Guaranty Life Insurance Co. v. Duett, 671 So. 2d
1305, 1307 (Miss.1996) (quoting Northern Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So. 2d 1278, 1281
(Miss.1995)). Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 697 So. 2d 400, 402-3 (Miss. 1997).
¶16. The chancellor determined that the petition filed by DeSoto County fell within Mississippi Code
Annotated Section 11-46-9 (Supp. 1999), entitled "Exemption of governmental entity from liability on
claims based on specified circumstances," which states in part that:
(1) a governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or
duties shall not be liable for any claim:
(a) Arising out of a legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a
legislative or judicial nature;
(b) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity exercising ordinary
care in reliance upon, or in the execution or performance of, or in the failure to execute or perform, a
statute, ordinance or regulation, whether or not the statute, ordinance or regulation be valid;
...
(e) Arising out of an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt a statute, ordinance or regulation.
Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-46-9 (1)(a)(b)(e) (Supp. 1999).
¶17. The chancellor found that Madison's claims against DeSoto County were barred by sovereign
immunity. The chancellor further noted that Miss. Code Ann. Section 11-46-15 (1972) as amended,
provides that no governmental body, or employee thereof, may be held liable for punitive damages in any
action in the courts of the State of Mississippi. Therefore, Madison's claims for punitive damages are barred
pursuant to the above referenced statute. The chancellor determined that Rule 56 (c) of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure, which pertains to summary judgment, and the relative statutes above did not
reveal that Madison had genuine issues of material fact which existed regarding his claims against DeSoto
County. Having determined that summary judgment was appropriate, the chancellor granted summary
judgment in favor of DeSoto County.
¶18. Madison has failed to provide evidence which suggests that the granting of summary judgment to
DeSoto County was inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm the chancellor's decision.
II.
Whether the chancellor erred in having two standards of court rules, one for a licensed
practicing attorney and one for a private litigant.
¶19. Madison contends that the chancellor erred by applying one standard of court rules for the licensed
practicing attorney and another standard for a private litigant. Madison claims the chancellor "appears to
cover and run interference for attorneys" who are challenged by petitioners that do not have the assistance
of an attorney. He contends that the licensed practicing attorney can request extensions of time and the
request is granted without showing good cause.
¶20. The Mississippi Constitution article 3, Section 25 permits a person to represent himself, pro se, in a
civil proceeding. It is not necessary that an attorney be employed. Bullard v. Morris, 547 So. 2d 789, 790
(Miss. 1989). However, having elected to proceed without an attorney, a person is bound by the same
rules of practice and procedure as an attorney. Id.
¶21. Madison maintains that he was subject to a different set of rules than opposing counsel. He contends
that he showed good cause which would justify an extension of time to respond to the summary judgment
motion. Madison suggests that the denial of his motion, while DeSoto County's similar motion was granted,
is indicative of the difference in treatment accorded a pro se litigant and one represented by counsel.
¶22. Standing alone, this does not show that the chancellor used a different set of rules for each party.
There is nothing in the record which reveals that either party was judged by a different set of rules. Absent
such proof, Madison has failed to demonstrate that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying his
request for an extension of time. Therefore, the chancellor's failure to grant Madison's motion was not an
abuse of his discretion. Young, 753 So. 2d at 456 (¶17). Upon review of the evidence presented, this
Court finds no abuse of discretion.
III.
Whether the chancery court was absent all jurisdiction in this case.
¶23. Madison contends that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over this matter. He argues that since
DeSoto County's complaint charged him with violations of Miss. Code Ann. §§17-1-19(1) and 17-1-27(2)
(Rev. 1995), the chancery court should not be allowed to hear the matter. It is well settled that claims
regarding title, possession and use of land are within the chancery court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947, 952 (Miss. 1988). Therefore, a county may seek injunctive
relief in chancery court to enforce a zoning ordinance. Id. at 957. Having determined that the chancery
court was within its jurisdiction to hear this matter, we find this issue is without merit.
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
1. Miss. Code Ann. §17-1-19 (Rev. 1995): Remedies of local governing authorities. In case any
building or structure is erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired, converted or
maintained, or any building, structure, or land is used in violation of the zoning law or of any ordinance
or other regulation made under authority conferred hereby, the proper local authorities of any county
or municipality, in addition to other remedies, may institute any appropriate action or proceedings, to
prevent such unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, conversion,
maintenance or use, to restrain, correct, or abate such violation, to prevent the occupancy of said
building, structure or land, or to prevent any illegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about such
premises.
2. Miss. Code Ann. §17-1-27 (Rev. 1995): Penalties for violations. Any person, firm or
corporation who shall knowingly and wilfully violate the terms, conditions or provisions of a zoning
ordinance adopted under the authority of sections 17-1-1 to 17-1-25, inclusive, for violation of which
no other criminal penalty is prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction therefor
shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00), and in case of
continuing violations without reasonable effort on the part of the defendant to correct same, each day
the violation continues thereafter shall be a separate offense.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.