Ernest Glenn Lancaster v. Robert Kendrick Boyd
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2001-CA-00187-COA
ERNEST GLENN LANCASTER, LINDA JEAN LANCASTER DYKES,
HELEN ELAINE LANCASTER STEVENS AND CYNTHIA RENEE
LANCASTER DUGAS
v.
ROBERT KENDRICK BOYD
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLANTS
APPELLEE
12/21/2000
HON. GAIL SHAW-PIERSON
YAZOO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
DEREK E. PARKER
SAMUEL H. WILKINS
KYLE BOYD AINSWORTH
CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 1/8/02
1/29/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Ernest Glenn Lancaster, Linda Jean Lancaster Dykes, Helen Elaine Lancaster Stevens, and Cynthia
Renee Lancaster Dugas (here after Lancasters) brought suit against Robert Kendrick Boyd in order to have
an inter vivos transfer of land by their father, Ernest Lancaster, set aside. The chancellor found in favor of
Boyd, and the appellants now come to this Court raising four issues:
1. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE
DEED AFTER FINDING THAT A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED
BETWEEN ERNEST LANCASTER AND ROBERT KENDRICK BOYD;
2. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL
STANDARD IN NOT SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE PROPONENT OF
THE DEED UPON FINDING A CONFIDENTIAL, FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP;
3. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ERNEST
LANCASTER WAS COMPETENT TO EXECUTE AND DELIVER THE DEED ON
DECEMBER 30, 1997; AND
4. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION FOR THE DEED.
Finding error, we reverse and remand.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶2. This suit arises out of a land transaction in which Ernest Lancaster sold some of his land to Robert
Kendrick Boyd. Ernest and Boyd had known each other for approximately twenty-two or twenty-three
years prior to Ernest's death, and Ernest worked in Boyd's convenience store in Bentonia. The two men
had an arrangement where Boyd did not pay Ernest a salary, but Boyd allowed Ernest to take any
groceries or gas he needed without having to pay for it. Ernest owned a trailer which he kept on some of
Boyd's land next door to the store. Boyd stayed in the trailer a great deal of the time and provided gas and
electricity for the trailer. Boyd also acted as signatory on Ernest's checking account.
¶3. On December 9, 1997, Ernest was hospitalized at the Veteran's Administration Hospital for a broken
hip and prostate cancer. Boyd and the Lancasters alternated staying with Ernest while he was in the
hospital. Ernest remained in the hospital until December 22. When Ernest was released, his children and
Boyd agreed Ernest would be best served by convalescing at Boyd's home in Florence where Boyd could
care for him. Glenn Lancaster, Ernest's son, testified Boyd was the one who suggested Ernest live with him.
Ernest's children continued to check on Ernest and periodically stayed with him while he was at Boyd's
house. However, Boyd was Ernest's primary caregiver.
¶4. A deed was executed on December 30, 1997, conveying Ernest's land to Boyd. The deed was
prepared by Boyd's attorney, Mr. Wilkins, and Boyd got the land's legal description from the courthouse.
Boyd testified Ernest had discussed doing this for two or three years prior to the conveyance and had
asked Boyd to have the deed prepared. Boyd arranged for Sammy Ainsworth, Vice President of
Trustmark Bank in Florence, to come to Boyd's house and notarize Ernest's signature. Boyd testified he
gave Ernest $1000 as consideration for the land and placed the money in Ernest's billfold. The billfold and
the money were never found.
¶5. During his stay at Boyd's house, Ernest was in a great deal of pain and was taking several different
types of medication. Elaine Stevens, an appellant and one of Ernest's daughters, testified the drugs her
father was taking made him drowsy and unaware of what was happening around him, and that Ernest took
good care of his property. Elaine testified Ernest had sold her some land at an earlier time, and that same
land was included in the legal description of the land he sold to Boyd. Elaine stated that had he known what
he was doing, Ernest would never have signed a deed which contained land he had already sold to her. In
contrast, Boyd testified Ernest knew what he was doing during the transaction. Ainsworth testified Ernest
knew and appreciated what he was doing during the execution, but Ainsworth did not remember who
produced the deed and did not ask Ernest if he knew what he was doing. Cynthia Luby, the home health
care nurse responsible for visiting Ernest, also testified. Luby testified Ernest was knowledgeable about his
medication, was alert, but was also forgetful and weak. After all the testimony was heard, the chancellor
dismissed the appellants' request to set aside the inter vivos transfer of Ernest's land.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6. "The chancellor's decision will not be reversed unless the decision is manifestly wrong." In the Matter
of the Estate of Arthur Green v. Johnson, 755 So. 2d 1054 (¶4) (Miss. 2000). "The Court will not
hesitate to reverse if it finds the chancellor's decision is 'manifestly wrong, or that the court applied an
erroneous legal standard . . .'" In re Estate of McClerkin v. Martell, 651 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Miss.
1995) (citing Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993)).
ANALYSIS
1. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE
DEED AFTER FINDING THAT A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTED
BETWEEN ERNEST LANCASTER AND ROBERT KENDRICK BOYD.
2. WHETHER THE CHANCERY COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL
STANDARD IN NOT SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE PROPONENT OF
THE DEED UPON FINDING A CONFIDENTIAL, FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP.
¶7. These issues have been combined because they are interrelated to such a degree that the outcome of
one impacts the outcome of the other. The Lancasters agree the chancellor was correct in finding Boyd to
be in a confidential relationship with Ernest. However, the Lancasters argue the chancellor erred by failing
to recognize the presumption of undue influence which arises when a confidential relationship is shown and
also in failing to shift the burden of proof to Boyd to rebut this presumption. Boyd answers this claim by
stating that while a presumption of undue influence does arise, the chancellor correctly found Boyd had
presented enough evidence to effectively rebut the presumption.
¶8. The chancellor in this case found Ernest was in a confidential relationship with Boyd at the time of the
execution of the deed. This Court agrees. Ernest had known Boyd for around twenty-two to twenty-three
years and was living with Boyd at the time. Ernest had worked at Boyd's convenience store and had
previously lived in a trailer located on Boyd's land without having to pay rent. Boyd was allowed access to
Ernest's checking account. Boyd was also Ernest's primary care-giver after his stint in the hospital. All of
these factors overwhelmingly support the chancellor's finding that the two men were in a confidential
relationship.
¶9. When a confidential relationship is found to exist in a situation where an inter vivos transfer was made, a
presumption of undue influence is established. In re the Last Will and Testament of McCaffrey v.
Fortenberry, 592 So. 2d 52, 60 (Miss. 1991). Therefore, the burden to rebut this presumption, in this
case, falls on Boyd. In order to effectively rebut the presumption of undue influence, a grantee/beneficiary
must prove by clear and convincing evidence each of the following:
1. The grantee/beneficiary acted in good faith. Proof requirements of this part of the test
require an examination of the record for an indication of bad faith or overreaching by the
grantee. Id. at 61. Other factors which can be important in showing good faith include: the identity of
the initiating party who prepared the instrument, place where the instrument was executed, the
consideration which was paid, who paid the consideration, and the degree of secrecy surrounding the
execution. Murray v. Laird, 446 So. 2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1984).
2. The grantor had full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and the consequences of
those actions. McCaffrey, 592 So. 2d at 60. This part deals with whether the grantor had full
knowledge of his actions, knew the consequences of those actions, and is designed to insure the
grantor gave thoughtful deliberation to these things before acting. Id. at 61. Important factors in
dealing with this prong also include: the grantor's awareness of his assets and their value, an
understanding of who would be the natural inheritors of his estate by will or by intestacy and how the
change will affect the previous outcome, whether non-relative beneficiaries will be included or
excluded, knowledge of who controls the grantor's finances and how dependent on or susceptible to
that person the grantor is. Murray, 446 So. 2d at 578.
3. The grantor/testator exhibited independent consent and action. McCaffrey, 592 So. 2d at 60.
The third prong requires clear and convincing evidence proving independent consent and action by the
grantor. Id.
¶10. In this case, the chancellor did not address each of these factors within her findings. In fact, after the
chancellor made the statement that a confidential relationship had been established, the chancellor went on
to state the next step is to examine the validity of the inter vivos deed. The chancellor then recited a great
deal of testimony regarding Ernest's mental state. After making these statements, the chancellor then
declared the Lancasters failed to overcome their burden to prove the deed was invalid.
¶11. Boyd addresses each of the three factors, as stated above, in his brief. In addressing the three factors,
Boyd makes several statements regarding Ernest's desire to convey the land, which he claims are
uncontested. The reason these statements cannot be contradicted is no one, besides Boyd, was around at
the time the statements were supposedly made, and no one heard Ernest espouse such a thing. This calls
into question the secrecy surrounding the circumstances under which the deed was executed. There was
also the testimony of Sammy Ainsworth which indicated Boyd had moved in with Ainsworth's elderly uncle,
and the uncle left Boyd his house. This was allowed into evidence to show a pattern of conduct. There was
also some question about whether Boyd wrote a $15,000 check to himself out of Ernest's account.
¶12. While these things may be so, they cannot be the grounds upon which any sort of reversal should be
based. As stated earlier, our standard of review demands this Court reverse a chancellor's decision if she
applies an erroneous legal standard. In re Estate of McClerkin, 651 So. 2d at 1055. Because the
chancellor failed to shift the burden of proof to Boyd after a confidential relationship was proven, the
chancellor applied an erroneous standard of proof. Boyd argues the chancellor's citing the case of Mullins
v. Ratcliff, 515 So. 2d 1183 (Miss. 1987) proves she applied the correct legal standard, and that because
the elements were not specified in writing does not mean she did not shift the burden of proof. This Court
finds no evidence, specified in writing or otherwise, which proves the chancellor applied the correct legal
standard. For this reason, this Court must reverse the chancellor's decision, and remand this case for a new
trial. Because this case is being remanded on the basis of the first two issues discussion of the last two
issues is not necessary here, but they should be resolved, and properly addressed, during the new trial.
CONCLUSION
¶13. This Court finds the chancellor erred in her failure to shift the burden of proof to Boyd once a
confidential relationship was found. Therefore, we reverse the chancellor's findings and remand for a new
trial.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE YAZOO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND REMANDED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DOES NOT
PARTICIPATE.
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