In re the Petition of P.L. and T.L. to adopt D.L.S.

In re the Petition of P.L. and T.L. to adopt D.L.S. A07-1263, Court of Appeals Unpublished Decision, December 21, 2007.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2006).

 

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A07-1263

 

In re the Petition of P.L. and T.L.
to adopt D.L.S.

 

Filed December 21, 2007

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Willis, Judge

 

 Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-JV-FA-07-239

 

 

Gary A. Debele, Marian E. Saksena, Walling, Berg & Debele, P.A., 121 South Eighth Street, Suite 1100, Minneapolis, MN  55402 (for appellants P.L. and T.L.)

 

Mike Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nancy K. Jones, Assistant County Attorney, 525 Portland Avenue South, Suite 1210, Minneapolis, MN  55415 (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department)

 

Howard Kleyman, Kleyman & Associates, 2400 Hennepin Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN  55405 (for guardian ad litem)

 

            Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Wright, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

Appellants challenge the order of the district court dismissing for lack of standing their petition to adopt D.L.S.  Appellants argue that the district court erred by (1) concluding that an adoptive placement of D.L.S. with appellants was required before their petition to adopt her could proceed, and (2) failing to consider whether it would be in D.L.S.'s or appellants' best interests to waive the requirement of an adoptive placement.  Additionally, appellants argue that due process and other considerations require that their adoption petition be considered on its merits.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

The facts are not disputed.  In April 2006, appellants P.L. and T.L. applied to the Hennepin County Human Services and Public Health Department (the county) for approval as foster parents through the county's Foster Care with Adoption Option (FCAO) program.  Under that program, appellants committed to adopting a foster child if that child could not be reunited with her mother or placed with a relative.  The county approved appellants as FCAO parents and entered into an "Out of Home Placement Plan" with them, under which the county placed D.L.S. in appellants' home four days after her birth.  The terms of the "Out of Home Placement Plan" provided that the FCAO placement would be temporary if the county succeeded either in reuniting D.L.S. with her mother or placing her with other relatives. 

            Two months after D.L.S.'s birth, her mother's parental rights were terminated, and the Commissioner of Human Services took legal custody of D.L.S. and became her legal guardian.  The county is the agent of the commissioner responsible for managing D.L.S.'s pre-adoptive placement.  After ruling out D.L.S.'s relatives as placement options, the county contacted the adoptive parents of D.L.S.'s half-sister and asked if they would be interested in adopting D.L.S.  They expressed interest, and the county determined that it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to be placed for adoption in that home so that she could enjoy the benefits of the sibling relationship with her half-sister. 

            Appellants filed a petition to adopt D.L.S. and a motion to stay the county's removal of D.L.S. from appellants' home, pending a formal hearing on the adoption petition.  The county requested that it not be restrained from removing D.L.S. and moved to dismiss appellants' adoption petition for lack of standing or, alternatively, on the ground that it would not be in D.L.S.'s best interests to waive the "agency placement requirement" and allow appellants' adoption petition to proceed.  The "agency placement requirement" appears in Minn. Stat. § 259.22, subd. 2 (2006), which provides that "[n]o petition for adoption shall be filed unless the child sought to be adopted has been placed by the commissioner of human services, the commissioner's agent, or a licensed child-placing agency."  And rule 35.04, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure, provides that "[n]o petition for adoption of a child may be filed unless the adoptive placement of the child was made by [the commissioner, the commissioner's agent, or a child-placing agency]". 

At a hearing on the parties' various motions, appellants moved the district court to waive the "agency placement requirement."  The district court took the matter under advisement and subsequently dismissed appellants' adoption petition for lack of standing.  The district court explained that appellants lack standing because the county had not made an "adoptive placement"[1] of D.L.S. with appellants.  In addition, the district court concluded that the "certain limited circumstances" in which the courts may waive the adoptive-placement requirement do not apply.  Accordingly, the district court ordered that the county could remove D.L.S. from appellants' home and "place her in a pre-adoptive placement with the adoptive parents of her older [half-sister.]"  The county then transferred D.L.S. to the home of her half-sister's adoptive parents. 

            Appellants challenge the district court's dismissal of their adoption petition.

D E C I S I O N

Adoption is a creation of statute, and a court's authority in matters relating to adoption is limited to that set forth in the statute.  In re Adoption of C.H., 554 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. 1996).  This case, therefore, presents issues of statutory interpretation, which are reviewed de novo.  See id. at 742 (citing Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985)).  The interpretation of court rules, such as the Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure, is also reviewed de novo.  See Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 662 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Minn. 2003). 

 

I.          The district court did not err by concluding that an adoptive placement of D.L.S. with appellants was required before appellants' petition to adopt D.L.S. could proceed.

 

Adoption in Minnesota is governed by Minn. Stat. §§ 259.20-.89 (2006) and the Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure.  Minn. Stat. § 259.22, subd. 2 (2006), provides that "[n]o petition for adoption shall be filed unless the child sought to be adopted has been placed by the commissioner of human services, the commissioner's agent, or a licensed child-placing agency."  (Emphasis added.)  Similarly, the Minnesota Rules of Adoption Procedure, promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2004, provide that "[n]o petition for adoption of a child may be filed unless the adoptive placement of the child was made by [the commissioner, the commissioner's agent, or a child-placing agency] . . . ."  Minn. R. Adoption P. 35.04, subd. 1 (emphasis added). 

The district court concluded that D.L.S. was not in an "adoptive placement" with appellants, as required by Minn. R. Adoption P. 35.04, subd. 1, which must occur before their petition to adopt her may proceed.  The district court emphasized that the county's placement of D.L.S. with appellants was for "foster care placement only," not for "adoptive placement," and that appellants did not enter into an "adoption placement agreement" with the county, but rather an "Out of Home Placement Plan."  Appellants contend that D.L.S. was "placed by the commissioner," as required by section 259.22, subdivision 2, because the county, acting as the commissioner's agent, "placed" D.L.S. with appellants under the FCAO program.  They claim that because rule 35.04, subdivision 1, differs from section 259.22, subdivision 2, in that the rule requires an "adoptive placement," while the statute requires that the child be "placed," in order for their petition to proceed, the statute supersedes the rule.  The county responds that there is no conflict between the rule and the statute, and, therefore, the rule controls. 

A statute supersedes a court rule only when the rule directly conflicts with the statute.  See Parker v. O'Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 536 (Minn. App. 1987), aff'd 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988).  Although the language of rule 35.04, subdivision 1, differs from that of section 259.22, subdivision 2, we conclude that the rule does not conflict with the statute.  A court rule conflicts with a statute only if "the essential purpose of the statute would be frustrated by application of the rule."  In re Brainerd Nat'l Bank, 383 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. 1986).  The legislature has identified the essential purpose of the adoption statutes as being to ensure "that the best interests of children are met in the planning and granting of adoptions . . . ."  Minn. Stat. § 259.20, subd. 1(1) (2006).  We see nothing in the rule's requirement that a child be in an "adoptive placement" with the party seeking to adopt that child before the adoption petition may proceed that is in any way inconsistent with this purpose. 

Court rules also cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of a litigant.  DeGrande v. Demby, 529 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. App. 1995), review granted (Minn. May 16, 1995) and appeal dismissed (Minn. July 27, 1995).  Appellants argue that rule 35.04, subdivision 1, has the effect of modifying substantive rights.  But appellants offer no explanation and cite no authority in support of their claim that their right to petition to adopt a child in a foster-care placement with them has been modified by rule 35.04.  And we note that appellate decisions issued before the rules were promulgated that involved petitions by foster parents to adopt a child in a foster-care placement with them, describe a procedural history that includes waiver by the district court of the requirement that the child be in a "placement" in order for the foster parents' petitions to adopt to proceed.  See, e.g., In re Petitions to Adopt K.L.L., 515 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn. App. 1994) (describing the procedural history of the case, which included waiver by the district court  of the requirement of placement and consideration of the merits of the party's petition to adopt a child who was in a foster-care placement with that party); In re S.T. and N.T., 512 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn. 1994) (describing the procedural history of the case, which included granting by the district court of foster parents' motion to waive the requirement of placement).  Appellants' right to have their petition to adopt a child in a foster-care placement with them considered is no different from the right they would have had before the rule was promulgated.  Thus, rule 35.04, subdivision 1, modifies no substantive rights.  We conclude that the statute and the rule both require an adoptive placement of a child with the party seeking to adopt in order for the party's adoption petition to proceed.

We also agree with the district court that a foster-care placement does not satisfy the adoptive-placement requirement.  The supreme court's use of the term "adoptive placement" in rule 35.04 makes evident that other forms of placement, such as foster-care placement, are not sufficient to support consideration of an adoption petition.  The district court found that D.L.S. was with appellants in a foster-care placement, not an adoptive placement.  We recognize, as did the district court, that the county's placement of D.L.S. in appellants' home was not a traditional foster-care placement but rather a placement under the FCAO program.  But it was nevertheless not an adoptive placement.  The "Out of Home Placement Plan" under which the county placed D.L.S. with appellants unequivocally provides that the placement with appellants' was for foster care and that the "permanency plan" for D.L.S. was reunification with her birth mother.  And though the agreement acknowledges that appellants were willing to adopt D.L.S., it also provides, and appellants do not dispute, that appellants fully understood that they would be considered for adoptive placement only if the county was unable to reunify D.L.S. with her birth mother or place her with other relatives.  Therefore, the district court did not err by concluding that the requirement of an adoptive placement as a condition precedent to appellants' petition to adopt was not satisfied.

II.        The district court erred by dismissing appellants' petition to adopt D.L.S. for lack of standing without determining whether it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to waive the adoptive-placement requirement.

 

Although an adoptive placement with a petitioner for adoption is required in order for the adoption petition to proceed, the adoption statutes provide that the adoptive-placement requirement "shall not apply" if the district court waives the requirement in the best interests of the child or petitioners.  See Minn. Stat. § 259.22, subd. 2(d) (2006). [2]   Appellants argue that the district court erred by failing to determine whether it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to grant their motion for such a waiver and that the district court should have "carefully considered" the evidence that appellants presented regarding whether it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to waive the requirement. 

The district court dismissed appellants' adoption petition for lack of standing because the adoptive-placement requirement had not been met.  Standing "concerns a party's right to bring a particular action . . . ."  Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).  "The essential question is ‘whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.'"  Sundberg v. Abbott, 423 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. App. 1988) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205 (1975)), review denied (Minn. June 29, 1988).   A party who moves for waiver of the adoptive-placement requirement is not entitled to have his adoption petition considered on its meritsand thus, lacks standingif it is not in the child's best interests to grant the waiver.  The district court made no findings regarding whether it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to waive the adoptive-placement requirement.  Therefore, the record is inadequate to permit review, and we reverse and remand the matter for findings on this issue.  Cf. Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 311 Minn. 76, 82, 249 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1976) (noting, in the context of custody disputes, that best-interests findings are required to assure that the district court considers the relevant statutory factors to facilitate appellate review of the ruling in question and to satisfy the parties that the question was carefully and fairly considered by the court).

Appellants also argue that the district court erred by failing to consider whether waiver of the adoptive-placement requirement would be in their best interests.  Appellants contend that, because they filed the adoption petition and want to adopt D.L.S., it clearly is in their best interests to waive the adoptive-placement requirement. 

The goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.  Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2006).  If the statute is free from ambiguity, we look only to its plain language.  Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 558 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1997).  But if the literal meaning of the language of a statute would produce an absurd result, we are obligated to look beyond the statute to other indicia of legislative intent.  Id.  And we will disregard the plain meaning of a statute's language if the plain meaning "utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose."  Toth v. Arason, 722 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). 

As previously noted, the clearly stated legislative purpose of the adoption statutes is "to ensure that the best interests of children are met in the planning and granting of adoptions."  Minn. Stat. § 259.20, subd. 1(1).  If we were to interpret the language of section 259.22, subdivision 2(d), so literally as to allow waiver of the adoptive-placement requirement if it is in the best interests of the child or petitioners, it would permit such a waiver in the best interests of petitioners, without considering the child's best interests, or, worse yet, permit the waiver when it is not also in the child's best interests.  We will not interpret section 259.22, subdivision 2(d), in a way that it would be contrary to the clear legislative purpose of the adoption statutes.  Nor will we ignore "an extensive line of precedent" that shows that, in all matters involving court-established family relationships of children, a child's best interests are to be the "paramount consideration."  Frank-Bretwisch v. Ryan, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2007 WL 4234420, at *4 (Minn. Dec. 4, 2007).  The district court did not err by not considering whether it was in appellants' best interests to waive the adoptive-placement requirement.

Because we reverse and remand on the issue of whether it would be in D.L.S.'s best interests to waive the adoptive-placement requirement, we need not address appellants' remaining arguments.

            Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

[1] The parties used the term "agency placement," while the district court used the term "adoptive placement," which is the term used in the Rules of Adoption Procedure. We also will use the term that appears in the rules.

[2] The parallel exception in the Rules of Adoption Procedure provides for waiver of the adoptive-placement requirement only when it is in the best interests of the child.  See Minn. R. Adoption P. 35.04, subd. 2(d).