Agent Real Estate Services, LLC, et al., Appellant, vs. Maciek G. Kaminski, a/k/a M.G. Kaminski, et al., Respondents.
Annotate this CaseThis opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2006).
STATE
OF MINNESOTA
IN
COURT OF APPEALS
A06-1769
Agent Real Estate Services, LLC, et al.,
Appellant, vs. Maciek G. Kaminski, a/k/a M.G. Kaminski, et al., Respondents. Filed October
16, 2007 Affirmed Harten,
Judge* Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-06-8505 William
R. Skolnick, Rolin L. Cargill, III, Skolnick & Associates, P.A., 527
Marquette Avenue South, Suite 2100, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellants) Considered and decided by Dietzen, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks,
Judge; and Harten, Judge. HARTEN, Judge Appellants,
real estate brokers, challenge the district court's dismissal under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(e) of their action for a commission. Because Minn. Stat. § 82.18 (2004) applies to
this action and provides that a broker may not bring an action for a commission
without a written agreement and appellants had no written agreement, we affirm
the dismissal. FACTS[1] In
August 2004, respondents Maciek Kaminski and Wayzata Properties, LLC, wanted to
purchase some commercial real estate.
They agreed to hire appellants Argent Real Estate Services, LLC, and Meridian
Real Estate Group, LLC, to be their real estate brokers and to pay them 1.5% of
the purchase price of any property purchased.
In October 2004, appellants presented Kaminski with a contract setting
forth terms of this agreement. Kaminski
declined to sign it. Appellants
nonetheless acted under the arrangement and eventually presented property that respondents
purchased for $112,687,500. But
respondents failed to pay appellants their 1.5% commission. In
April 2006, appellants brought this action to recover damages of 1.5% of the
purchase property, which respondents had refused to pay. Respondents moved to dismiss appellants'
action under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e), arguing that appellants were prohibited
by statute from bringing it. The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
and appellants now challenge the dismissal.
D E C I S I O N The
only question before a court reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) is whether the
complaint set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Barton
v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997).
Whether appellants' complaint set forth a legally sufficient claim for
relief is based on the construction of Minn. Stat. § 82.18, subd. 2
(2004). Statutory construction is a
question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Brookfield
Trade Ctr., Inc., v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1998). The statute provides: No person required by this chapter to
be licensed [as a real estate broker] shall be entitled to or may bring or
maintain any action in the courts for any commission, fee or other compensation
with respect to the purchase, sale, lease, or other disposition or conveyance
of real property . . . unless there is a written agreement with the person
required to be licensed. Minn. Stat. § 82.18, subd. 2. A written agreement must be signed by the
party against whom it is being enforced. See
Wells Const. Co. v. Goder Incinerator Co., 217 N.W. 112, 113 (Minn. 1927) (holding
that a document written and signed by one party and sent to the other is not
enforceable against the other). It is
undisputed that Kaminski never signed the written agreement appellants
presented to him. Therefore, Minn. Stat.
§ 82.18, subd. 2, precludes appellants from bringing an action to recover their
commission. Appellants
argue that they substantially complied with Minn. Stat. § 82.18 because three
separate documents collectively meet the "written agreement" requirement.[2] In addition to the unsigned commission
agreement, these documents are the seller's transaction roster, which
identifies appellants as respondents' brokers, and the purchase agreement,
which was signed by respondents and which identifies one or both appellants as
the buyers' brokers. But neither of these
documents appears in the record. Accordingly,
we do not consider them because appellate courts may not consider matters
outside the appellate record. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988). Appellants' "substantial
compliance" argument fails. Appellants also argue that their full
performance under the commission agreement satisfied the statute of frauds
element of Minn. Stat. § 82.18. For this
argument, they rely on Rosenberg v. Heritage
Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320, 325-26 (Minn. 2004) ("extensive
performance by both parties satisfied any statute of frauds aspect of [the
relevant statute]"). But here,
appellants were the only party that performed. When only one party performs and seeks to use
that performance to avoid a statute of frauds requirement, that party must
bring its action in equity. See Hallock
v. Anderson, 221 Minn. 30, 32, 20 N.W.2d 884, 885 (1945) ("The doctrine of part performance is purely an equitable
doctrine, unrecognized at law, and accordingly will not sustain an action at
law for damages based on a contract within the statute of frauds" (emphasis
added), quoted in In re Petroleum Carriers Co., 121 F. Supp. 520, 524 (D. Minn. 1954)); Hecht v.
Anthony, 204 Minn. 432, 435, 283 N.W. 753, 754 (1939) ("Equity may specifically enforce an oral
contract void under the statute of frauds where there has been full performance by the party seeking
the relief and it would work a fraud to deny the same" (emphasis added)); Krogness v. Best Buy, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn. App. 1994) ("The written agreement requirement . . . would be
defeated if a broker could recover compensation under an unjust enrichment or
quasi-contract theory."), review denied
(Minn. 25 Jan. 1995). Krogness also explicitly rejects allowing
brokers to defeat the "written agreement" requirement by bringing an action for
a commission under theories of implied-in-fact contract, quasi-contract, or
unjust enrichment. Id. at 286-87. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
139 cmt c illus. 3 (1979), considers a statutory "written agreement"
requirement in the context of the sale of a business opportunity: A orally promises to pay B a commission
for services in negotiating the sale of a business opportunity, and B finds a
purchaser to whom A sells the business opportunity. A statute extends the Statute of Frauds to
such promises, and is interpreted to preclude recovery of the reasonable value
of such services. The promise is not
made enforceable by B's reliance on it. If appellants had brought their
action in equity rather than for contractual damages, they might have been able
to defeat a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. But they did not bring an action in equity. Finally, in their
reply brief and at oral argument, appellants argued that the district court
erred in denying their motion to amend their complaint to add an equitable
claim. But appellants never moved in
writing to amend their complaint. Near
the end of the hearing on respondents' motion to dismiss, appellants' attorney
stated: [I]f the Court were
so inclined to do an injustice and allow the fraud to be perpetrated by denying
[appellants] compensation that they earned, then we would ask to seek leave to
amend a certain equitable claim. But we
really didn't assert an equitable claim because we saw this as a
straightforward contract case where there had been full performance. In their brief, appellants did not
challenge the denial of the motion to amend; rather they asserted that their
complaint was "not deficient because it seeks money damages instead of
equitable relief[,]" and the only relief they sought on appeal was reversal of
the dismissal and reinstatement of the complaint. The motion to amend was not properly
presented to the district court, and the denial of that motion was not before
this court. We have no basis for
reversing the denial of appellants' motion to amend. See
Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582 (this court does not generally address matters
not presented to and considered by the district court). Minn. Stat §
82.18, subd. 2, unequivocally precludes real estate brokers who do not have
written agreements from bringing an action for a commission. Appellants in effect invite this court to
repeal an applicable statute. But a
change in a statute must come from the legislature. Martinco
v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963). We conclude that the district court did not
err in dismissing appellants' action. Affirmed. * Retired judge
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn.
Const. art. VI, § 10. [1]
Facts are taken from appellants' complaint, which is assumed to be true for
purposes of this appeal. See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc.,
663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003) (court reviewing dismissal under Minn. R. Civ.
P. 12.02(3) "must consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting
those facts as true"). [2]
This argument does not appear to have been made to the district court either in
writing or orally, so it is not properly before us. See
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). But we address it in the interest of
completeness. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (appellate court may review any
matter as they interest of justice may require).
Gregory T. Spalj, Kristine K. Kroenke, Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson
P.A., 800 LaSalle Avenue, Suite 1900, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondents)
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