Gerda Ann Arnleend, Plaintiff, vs. Paul A. Arnleend, Appellant, and Jay Paul Arnleend, a/k/a Jay Paul Jacobson, Respondent, vs. Paul A. Arnleend, Appellant.

Gerda Ann Arnleend, Plaintiff, vs. Paul A. Arnleend, Appellant, and Jay Paul Arnleend, a/k/a Jay Paul Jacobson, Respondent, vs. Paul A. Arnleend, Appellant. A05-504, A05-801, Court of Appeals Unpublished, February 21, 2006.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-504

A05-801

 

Gerda Ann Arnleend,

Plaintiff,

 

vs.

 

Paul A. Arnleend,

Appellant,

 

and

 

Jay Paul Arnleend, a/k/a Jay Paul Jacobson,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Paul A. Arnleend,

Appellant.

 

Filed February 15, 2006

Reversed Willis, Judge

 

Meeker County District Court

File Nos. F0-63-14127 & C0-03-722

 

Marc A. Al, Robert A. McLeod, Lindquist & Vennum, P.L.L.P., 4200 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN  55402; and Sheldon R. Brown, Young Brown & Pagel, L.L.P., 63 Oak Avenue South, P.O. Box 859, Annandale, MN  55302 (for appellant)

 

Frank J. Rajkowski, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., 11 Seventh Avenue North, P.O. Box 1433, St. Cloud, MN  56302 (for respondent)

 

            Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Worke, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

Appellant argues that the district court erred by interpreting a 1963 dissolution judgment to prohibit appellant perpetually from disinheriting respondent.  Because we conclude that the district court's interpretation is erroneous, we reverse.

FACTS

Gerda and appellant Paul Arnleend married in 1961.  Their only child together, respondent Jay Arnleend, was born in 1962.  In 1963, Gerda Arnleend initiated divorce proceedings, and she and appellant stipulated to the terms of the judgment.  Paragraph VI of their stipulation provides:

            In the event of the death of the father, this Defendant, the entire support of the minor may rest upon the Plaintiff who is of limited circumstances; in order to obviate the possibility of such loss to the Plaintiff and keeping in mind the obligations of the Defendant to his minor child, the Defendant agrees as part of the consideration herein as follows:

 

1)  To apply for, and if found insurable, obtain a term life insurance policy on Defendant's life by the terms of which, in the event of the death of the Defendant, the child still surviving, the child will be named as the sole beneficiary thereunder and in the sum of at least Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars; it is further agreed that said policy until the child reaches the age of ten (10) years, shall be maintained at the level of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars as a term policy; at said time, at the option of the Defendant, the said policy may be maintained on a reducing term basis until the child shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) years; in the event of death of the Defendant and pay of said sum to and for the benefit of the child, it is agreed that such Trustee may be named by the father by the terms of said policy or otherwise, as will secure to the child the full benefits of said insurance policy and for his care, maintenance, education and support.

 

2)  It is further agreed, as a part of the consideration herein which may be made a part of any judgment to be entered on trial of this action as valid as any contract agreement between the father and said child, and considered to be such, that the Defendant shall not disinherit the child, to-wit: Jay Paul Arnleend, by Will or otherwise, and that the said child shall inherit from the father a full distributive share as determined by the laws of intestate succession, shall the said Jay Paul Arnleend survive his father; shall the said son not survive his father, then and in that event this provision shall be entirely null and void and of no force or effect whatsoever.

 

In its judgment, the district court found the stipulation "acceptable and reasonable" and adopted it "in full as part of the [f]indings herein."  In its conclusions of law, the district court reproduced the stipulation, but it made minor language modifications not relevant here and changed the paragraph structure of the stipulation.  The district court incorporated paragraph VI of the stipulation as paragraphs VII and VIII of its judgment.  Paragraph VII of the judgment provides:

            The Defendant, in order to obviate the possibility of the entire support of the child resting upon the plaintiff, shall be, and he is, required to do the following:

           

a) To apply for and, if found insurable, obtain a life term insurance policy on his life by the terms of which, in the event of the death of the Defendant, the child still surviving, the child will be named as the sole beneficiary thereunder, the face amount of said policy to be in the sum of at least Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars; when the child reaches the age of ten (10) years, the said policy may be maintained at the option of the Defendant, on a reducing term basis until the child shall have reached the age of eighteen (18) years; in the event of the death of the Defendant and payment of said sum to and for the benefit of the child, such Trustee may be named by the father by the terms of said policy or otherwise, as will secure to the child the full benefits of said insurance policy, for his care, maintenance, education and support.

 

Paragraph VIII of the judgment provides:

The judgment shall further contain a provision, the Court concludes, that the Defendant shall be enjoined and restrained from, in any manner, disinheriting the child, to-wit: Jay Paul Arnleend, by Will or otherwise, and to the end that said child shall inherit from the father, this Defendant, a full distributive share as determined by the laws of intestate succession of Minnesota, shall the said Jay Paul Arnleend, the child, survive his father; shall the son not survive the father, then this provision shall be void and of no further force or effect whatsoever.  This provision in the judgment shall have the force of a legal contract between the father and said child not to disinherit him by any means, shall the child survive the father.

 

            In 2003, appellant moved to vacate paragraph VIII of the judgment, which respondent claims prohibits appellant perpetually from disinheriting respondent.  Respondent then commenced an action for declaratory judgment interpreting and enforcing paragraph VIII.  Appellant withdrew his motion to vacate and sought a declaratory judgment construing the stipulation and judgment.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.

            The district court construed the stipulation and judgment.  It concluded that paragraph VIII of the judgment is ambiguous and that, when read in conjunction with paragraph VI of the stipulation, paragraph VIII of the judgment prohibits appellant perpetually from disinheriting respondent.  Appellant challenges this interpretation on appeal.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant argues that the district court erroneously interpreted the judgment.  We review de novo stipulated provisions in a dissolution judgment.  Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. App. 1993).

Stipulated dissolution judgments are binding contracts.  Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997); Blonigen v. Blonigen, 621 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 2001).  A district court may interpret a stipulated dissolution judgment only after determining that it is ambiguous.  Stieler v. Stieler, 244 Minn. 312, 319, 70 N.W.2d 127, 131 (1955).  The district court may consider the record and parole evidence when interpreting a stipulated dissolution judgment.  Palmi v. Palmi, 273 Minn. 97, 103, 140 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1966).  But "full effect must be given to that which is necessarily implied in the judgment, as well as to that actually expressed therein."  Stieler, 244 Minn. at 319, 70 N.W.2d at 13132.

When parties stipulate to the terms of their divorce, that stipulation is "accorded the sanctity of binding contracts."  Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 521.  A district court has discretion to accept all or part of a stipulation, but it cannot "impose conditions on the parties to which they did not stipulate and thereby deprive the parties of their ‘day in court.'"  Clark v. Clark, 642 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted).

Neither paragraph VII nor paragraph VIII of the judgment is ambiguous when read in isolation.  But ambiguity arises when these paragraphs are considered together, along with the language in the judgment stating that the stipulation is adopted in full.  Interpretation of the judgment is, therefore, appropriate.

Paragraph VIII of the judgment prohibits appellant from disinheriting respondent so that respondent can receive a full intestate share from appellant should respondent survive appellant.  Nothing in paragraph VIII of the judgment limits the duration of the prohibition to respondent's minority.  But the judgment also provides that the stipulation is "acceptable and reasonable," and the district court adopted the stipulation "in full."  We cannot, therefore, interpret paragraph VIII of the judgment without considering paragraph VI of the stipulation.

The introductory language of paragraph VI of the stipulation notes that should appellant die, Gerda Arnleend would be unable to provide for respondent.  To "obviate the possibility of such loss to [Gerda Arnleend] and keeping in mind the obligations of [appellant] to his minor child," paragraph VI of the stipulation requires appellant to apply for a life-insurance policy and to name respondent as the sole beneficiary.  It also prohibits appellant from disinheriting respondent.  Both the concern that Gerda Arnleend will not be able to provide for respondent should appellant die and appellant's obligations to his minor child are present only during respondent's childhood.  We therefore conclude that paragraph VI of the stipulation prohibited appellant from disinheriting respondent only until respondent reached the age of majority.

The introduction and first provision of paragraph VI of the stipulation is incorporated as paragraph VII of the judgment.  Paragraph VII of the judgment has a subdivision a, but it does not have a corresponding subdivision b.  For reasons not clear from the record, the district court separated what would have been subdivision b from subdivision a and instead made it paragraph VIII of the judgment.  But for this apparent clerical error, paragraph VIII of the judgmentthe prohibition on disinheriting respondentwould have been subdivision b of paragraph VII.  We conclude that the introductory language from paragraph VII of the judgment also applies to paragraph VIII of the judgment.  This interpretation more accurately reflects Gerda Arnleend and appellant's intent as expressed by the stipulation.  

When considered with the introductory language of paragraph VII of the judgment and with paragraph VI of the stipulation, paragraph VIII of the judgment served to protect Gerda Arnleend's ability to provide for respondent during his childhood and resulted from appellant's obligations to respondent as a "minor child."  We conclude that the prohibition against disinheriting respondent in the judgment is not perpetual and ended when respondent reached the age of majority; therefore, the district court's interpretation is erroneous.

Appellant argues alternatively that the district court erred by concluding that appellant anticipatorily breached his obligations in the dissolution judgment and that the district court's order is unconstitutionally vague.  Because we conclude that the district court erred by determining that appellant had an ongoing obligation not to disinherit respondent, we need not address appellant's alternative arguments.

Reversed.