State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. James P. Edgerton, Appellant.
Annotate this CaseThis opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A04-2181
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
James P. Edgerton,
Appellant.
Filed March 7, 2006
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Wright, Judge
Pine County District Court
File Nos. K5-04-184, K8-03-475, K5-03-983
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, James R. Peterson, Assistant State Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and
John Carlson, Pine County Attorney, Pine County Courthouse, 315 Sixth Street, Pine City, MN 55063 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Presiding; Wright, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WRIGHT, Judge
In this sentencing appeal, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an upward durational departure on one count of second-degree burglary based on the career-offender statute and that judicial imposition of a three-month sentence enhancement based on his custody status violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as recognized in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTSI.
The decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within the district court's discretion. State v. Geller, 665 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn. 2003). But the district court must impose the presumptive guidelines sentence unless there are grounds for departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. Application of the career-offender statute to undisputed facts presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Freundschuh v. Freundshuh, 559 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 1997). The career-offender statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4 (2002), [1] permits the district court to depart from the presumptive guidelines sentence if the defendant has five or more prior felonies and the present felony is part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
Edgerton also maintains that the district court erred when, based on his custody status, it imposed a three-month enhancement to the sentences on counts three and four. Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the duration of an offender's sentence may be enhanced through the assignment of a custody-status point if the offender "was released pending sentencing at the time the felony was committed . . . ." Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.B.2.b. Edgerton asserts that this sentence enhancement violates the rule announced in Blakely because it is based on a fact not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Under Blakely, the greatest sentence a judge can impose is "the maximum sentence [that may be imposed] solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (emphasis in original). A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of any fact, except the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the sentence above this maximum. Id. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
A challenge to the constitutionality of a sentence presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Hagen, 690 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. App. 2004). The Minnesota Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 2005), governs this issue. In Allen, the supreme court held that the assignment of a custody-status point is analogous to Blakely's exception for the fact of a prior conviction. Id. at 48. Accordingly, Blakely does not mandate that a jury find, or a defendant admit, the basis for imposing a custody-status sentence enhancement. Id. Because Edgerton does not contest the factual basis for imposing the custody-status point, the district court did not err in imposing a three-month sentence enhancement on this ground.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
[1] The career-offender statute provides in relevant part:
Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a sentencing guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may impose anaggravated durational departure from the presumptive sentence up to the statutory maximum sentence if the judge finds and specifies on the record that the offender has five or more prior felony convictions and that the present offense is a felony that was committed as part of a pattern of criminal conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 4.
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