State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Joel William Bishop, Appellant.

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C4-98-750

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Mark David Hackney,

Appellant.

 Filed December 29, 1998

 Affirmed

Klaphake, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court

File No. K0-97-239

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Robert A. Stanich, Assistant Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55101; and

L. Douglas Storey, Cottonwood County Attorney, 1044 Third Ave., Windom, MN 56101 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Scott G. Swanson, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Ave. S.E., Ste. 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414-3230 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Mulally, Judge.[*]

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 KLAPHAKE, Judge

After appellant Mark David Hackney was stopped by a deputy sheriff, he abruptly left the scene while the deputy had his hand inside the window of the van Hackney was driving and engaged in a high speed chase. He thereafter was convicted of second-degree assault, obstructing legal process, and fleeing police officers in a motor vehicle. On appeal, Hackney argues that the evidence of his intent to assault the deputy was insufficient to support his conviction for second-degree assault. Because the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence of Hackney's intent are consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis, we affirm.

 D E C I S I O N

In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, this court is limited to ascertaining whether a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty based on the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences therefrom. State v. Wallace, 558 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. 1997). When, as here, the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, we consider whether the reasonable inferences from such evidence are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other rational hypothesis. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995). The evidence, when taken as a whole, need only make such other theories appear unreasonable. State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 78 (Minn. 1985).

Intent is generally determined by inferences drawn from a defendant's words or actions. State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996). All evidence surrounding an assault, both before and after, is relevant to determine intent. State v. Bliss, 457 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1990).

Hackney argues that the evidence is insufficient because it is just as reasonable to conclude that he was driving the van negligently or recklessly, rather than intentionally, when he assaulted the deputy. Hackney's theory, however, was clearly rejected by the jury as unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

That evidence showed that prior to the assault, the deputy had twice attempted to stop Hackney. During the third stop, Hackney appeared angry and was yelling at the deputy. Instead of cooperating, Hackney held his driver's license in his hand and rolled the electric windows up and down until the deputy finally reached in for the license. At that point, Hackney grabbed the deputy's fingers and accelerated, causing the deputy to run alongside the van for several steps until he could break free from Hackney's hold. In the process, the deputy's knuckle hit the doorjamb of the van as Hackney sped off.

The evidence further showed that after the assault, Hackney engaged in a high-speed chase that continued for over 100 miles. During the chase, Hackney appeared to speed up at least once as he approached a pedestrian, who had to run across the street to avoid getting hit by Hackney, severely damaged several police vehicles and a van parked on the street, and drove the wrong way in traffic while waving at officers, without apparent concern for others' safety.

When this evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could reasonably conclude that Hackney's actions were intentional. Indeed, no rational basis exists to conclude that Hackney's actions were merely reckless.

The second-degree assault conviction is therefore affirmed.

 Affirmed.

[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.