State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Marlin Byron Parks, Appellant.

 STATE OF MINNESOTA
 IN COURT OF APPEALS
 C1-99-263

Douglas Charles Selander, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed June 29, 1999
 Affirmed
 Short, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 476374

Dennis B. Johnson, Jeffrey D. Bores, Mylene A. Peterson, Chestnut & Brooks, P.A., 204 North Star Bank Building, 4661 Highway 61, White Bear Lake, MN 55110 (for appellant)

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Kelly S. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN 55103 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N SHORT, Judge

This case involves the revocation of a driver's license under Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1998). On appeal, Douglas Charles Selander argues the trial court erred in concluding his limited right to counsel was vindicated. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

Whether a driver's limited pretesting right to counsel has been vindicated is a mixed question of law and fact. Parsons v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 488 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Minn. App. 1992). Once the facts are established, whether that right was vindicated is a question of law, which we review de novo. Kuhn v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 488 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); cf. Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985) (once facts established, reviewing court should determine as a matter of law whether objective basis for stop existed).

Selander argues his constitutional right to counsel was violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult with an attorney of his own choosing. See Gergen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 548 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. App. 1996) (noting "limited right to counsel" means right to consult with lawyer of driver's own choosing), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996). But the record shows: (1) a police officer stopped and arrested Selander in Richfield; (2) at the police station, the officer read the Implied Consent Advisory form to Selander; (3) Selander told the officer he wanted to consult with "Dennis Johnson," a Minneapolis lawyer, before making a decision regarding alcohol testing; (4) the officer gave Selander a telephone, two phone directories, and a list of attorneys who practice in the areas of criminal and DWI defense; (5) with the officer's assistance, Selander called two Minneapolis attorneys named Dennis Johnson; (6) neither attorney was working at 10:00 p.m. on Saturday, August 8, but an attorney from one of the offices returned Selander's call; (7) Selander spoke to that attorney for 18 minutes; (8) after that telephone conversation, Selander still asked to speak to attorney Dennis Johnson; and (9) Selander had personal access to the telephone and directories for 37 minutes. Because the officer provided a telephone and a reasonable amount of time to contact and speak with an attorney, we conclude Selander's limited pretesting right to counsel was vindicated. See Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Prideaux v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 421, 247 N.W.2d 385, 394 (1976) and noting conditions under which right to counsel is vindicated). Selander's right to counsel was not violated merely because he was unable to locate and consult with the attorney of his choice.

 Affirmed.