In the Matter of the Welfare of: W.A.P.

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (1996).

 STATE OF MINNESOTA

 IN COURT OF APPEALS

 C1-97-1618

In the Matter of the Welfare of:

W.A.P.

 Filed March 24, 1998

 Affirmed

 Short, Judge

Kanabec County District Court

File No. J09750135

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Charlann E. Winking, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue, S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Hubert H. Humphrey, III., Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, and

Norman J. Loren, Kanabec County Attorney, Lisa B. Jones, Assistant County Attorney, Courthouse, 19 North Vine Street, Mora, MN 55051 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Short, Judge, and Mansur, Judge.*

*Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

 SHORT, Judge

A trial court adjudged W.A.P. delinquent after finding him guilty of felony motor vehicle theft, felony theft, and minor consumption in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.52, subd. 2(17) (1996), 609.52, subd. 2(1) (1996), 340.503, subd. 1(2) (1996). On appeal, W.A.P. argues his adjudication for felony motor vehicle theft must be reversed because the state failed to prove "lack of consent" beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

 D E C I S I O N

When a juvenile challenges his or her delinquency adjudication on the basis of insufficient evidence, we do not retry the facts, but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and assume the trial court believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. See In re Welfare of J.G.B., 473 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978), and applying this rule to delinquency adjudication); see also State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 646 (Minn. 1996) (applying this standard to criminal action). Viewing the record from this perspective, we must affirm if the finder of fact could reasonably conclude the juvenile was guilty of the offense charged. J.G.B., 473 N.W.2d at 344-45 (quoting Merrill, 274 N.W.2d at 111).

W.A.P. argues the evidence is insufficient to prove lack of consent. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (1996) (providing person commits theft if he or she intentionally takes or drives motor vehicle without consent of owner or an authorized agent of owner). However, the record demonstrates: (1) the victim saw W.A.P. driving his car without permission; (2) by using a friend's truck, the victim attempted to catch W.A.P.; (3) when the chase proved unsuccessful, the victim called the police; (4) the police found the victim's abandoned car approximately three city blocks from the residence of W.A.P.'s sister; (5) the victim's car had been damaged and its stereo equipment removed; (6) police found W.A.P. lying underneath a child's bed at his sister's home; and (7) W.A.P. led police to an old shed where they found the victim's car stereo equipment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and assuming the trial court believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary, there is substantial evidence that W.A.P. was driving the victim's car without consent. See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984) (concluding resolution of conflicting testimony is exclusive function of trier of fact because it has opportunity to observe witnesses); In re Welfare of T.J.D., 351 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. App. 1984) (concluding credibility of witness is matter for finder of fact). Under these circumstances, the trial court could reasonably have determined that the state carried its burden.

  Affirmed.