PEOPLE OF MI V HARVEY ALLEN ZEEK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 294024
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 09-57391-FC
HARVEY ALLEN ZEEK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and FITZGERALD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving a child
under the age of 13, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving
a child under the age of 13, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). The trial court sentenced defendant to
concurrent prison terms of 18 to 35 years for the first-degree CSC conviction and 54 months to
15 years for the second-degree CSC conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. This appeal has
been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). We affirm.
Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
at trial. Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is a question of
constitutional law and fact. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). This
Court generally reviews a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error and questions of
constitutional law de novo. Id. However, in this case we review defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim for mistakes apparent in the appellate record because defendant
failed to move the trial court for a new trial and the court did not hold a Ginther1 hearing. See
People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the twopart test set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984). People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599 - 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). First, defendant
must show that his counsel’s performance was so deficient “that counsel was not functioning as
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 US at 687.
To do so, defendant must show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-688. This Court presumes
that counsel rendered adequate assistance. Id. at 690. Second, defendant must show that his
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687. To do so, “defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
As to the deficiency component of the Strickland test, defendant contends that his trial
counsel’s cross-examination of the victim and other prosecution witnesses was professionally
unreasonable because it was repetitive of direct examination testimony, failed to support his
case, and actually strengthened the prosecution’s case. We disagree.
It is well established that a trial lawyer’s decision on how to cross-examine a witness is a
matter of trial strategy. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 23; 608 NW2d 132 (1999). This Court
will find counsel’s representation ineffective on the basis of strategy only if the strategy
employed was unreasonable. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007).
Failure of trial strategy does not render counsel’s assistance ineffective. People v Kevorkian,
248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defense counsel’s trial strategy is evident from his cross-examination of the
prosecution’s witnesses. Counsel attempted to create reasonable doubt for the jury by attempting
to make the victim’s story sound far-fetched and fabricated. It was professionally reasonable for
counsel to attempt to obtain testimony that indicated that the victim’s story may be fabricated,
particularly given the victim’s claim that her grandfather also perpetrated criminal sexual
conduct on her in a similar manner. Counsel’s performance was not deficient under Strickland
merely because his strategy failed.
We reject defendant’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his attorney elicited testimony on cross-examination that ultimately did not support his
case. The record clearly indicates that counsel obtained the complained-of testimony in an effort
to advance his trial strategy. Whether counsel would have been better off strategically by not
asking some of the questions that he did is not for this Court to consider in hindsight and is not a
sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient. See People
v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999) (“This Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s
competence with the benefit of hindsight.”). Accordingly, defendant has not shown that
counsel’s performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test.
Assuming that counsel’s cross-examination was deficient, defendant has not
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt absent the deficiency. The cross-examination bout which defendant complains was largely
counsel’s elicitation of testimony previously stated by the prosecution’s witnesses on direct
examination. Even if counsel had not obtained this testimony during cross-examination, it was
already in evidence. Moreover, defendant elected not to testify on his own behalf and did not
call any witnesses. Defendant has not pointed to any additional evidence that he believes
counsel failed to present at trial. Thus, despite counsel’s alleged deficiency, the jury had before
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it all of the evidence put forth by the prosecution, which was substantial and fully supported
defendant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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