PEOPLE OF MI V TANISHA A HOLLIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 295432
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 09-014229-FC
TANISHA A. HOLLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: DONOFRIO, P.J., and CAVANAGH and FITZGERALD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her bench trial conviction of assault with intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. The trial court sentenced defendant as a second
habitual offender to seven to 15 years in prison. Because sufficient evidence supported
defendant’s conviction, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and
defendant’s sentence was not invalid, we affirm.
Defendant and the victim, Milton Robinson, have five children in common. All five
children lived with him and his wife of three years, Tanisha Sharon Jalise Robinson (Jalise
Robinson) at their home in Taylor. Robinson testified that during the early morning hours of
April 18, 2009, his thirteen-year-old son called him and asked him to meet him at defendant’s
house in Detroit to give him a ride home. Robinson stated that he was drunk so defendant’s
brother or cousin dropped him off at defendant’s residence. When Robinson went inside
defendant was there but their thirteen-year-old son was not. Robinson testified that the next
thing he remembers was waking up the following morning at defendant’s residence. He stated
that he wanted to leave so he kicked the door open because it was locked and he did not have a
key. Robinson testified that as he began walking away from defendant’s residence, defendant
ran after him yelling that he was going to have to pay for her door. Robinson stated that he kept
walking and said he would not pay for the door but defendant continued running after him
yelling loudly. When he was about three blocks away from defendant’s house, Robinson stated
that he put down the bottle of beer he had with him and turned around to face defendant who was
still running after him yelling about her door. As he turned around he saw defendant take a
seven or eight inch knife out of her pants and swing it at him once which resulted in a stab
wound to Robinson’s chest. Robinson stated that his body began to shut down and he lay down
on the ground. At this point he heard defendant say, “I finally got that bitch,” and then, “you
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finna [sic] die, bitch.” Robinson testified that he woke up in the hospital three months later after
having surgery on his heart and lungs.
Robinson further testified that he and defendant had a tumultuous relationship over many
years involving arguments and reciprocal domestic violence and assaultive behavior. Robinson
stated that unbeknownst to his wife, he and defendant had a sexual relationship through March
2009. Robinson testified that about a month before the stabbing at issue in this case, defendant
had stabbed him in his lower back. Robinson stated that he did not make a police report because
of the sexual relationship with defendant and he did not want anyone to know where he was or
that he had been with defendant. Robinson told his wife, Jalise Robinson, that he was attacked
by someone at the gas station while he was pumping gas and did not know who did it.
Jalise Robinson stated that she had dropped defendant off at his grandmother’s house at
approximately 4:00 pm the day before the stabbing. Jalise Robinson testified that she was
surprised to hear defendant’s voice on the phone at approximately 8:30 am on April 18, 2009
because she had a new unlisted phone number. Jalise Robinson stated that she answered the
phone even though it had a foreign number on the caller ID because she was expecting to hear
from defendant so she could pick him up from his grandmother’s house. Jalise Robinson stated
that defendant said the following to her on the phone: “You need to come get your husband. . . .
[H]e came over to my house acting belligerent, telling me who I can have in my house, I’m tired
of the n-----. I’m sick, y’all. Y’all think y’all slick. . . . I just stalled the n----- a month ago.
Shit, I just had to stab him today.” Jalise Robinson called the hospital and determined that her
husband was in critical but stable condition at St. John Hospital. Jalise Robinson testified that
she told police about the phone call she received from defendant. According to Jalise Robinson,
Robinson was discharged from the hospital on July 2, 2009.
Alicia Hamilton, who does not know defendant or Robinson, lives near the corner of
Hoover and Seven Mile and heard arguing on the morning of the incident. She looked outside
and saw defendant and Robinson arguing in the middle of the street and continued to watch the
argument unfold for about ten minutes. Hamilton stated that defendant followed Robinson
telling him that he was going to fix the door he broke and Robinson kept saying “get away from
me” and continued to walk away from defendant. Hamilton said defendant then had a knife in
her right hand and pointed at Robinson who was about four feet away from defendant. Robinson
then picked up a bottle and told defendant that if she came any closer he was going to throw the
bottle at defendant. Defendant then ran toward Robinson, pulled her arm back with the knife in
her right hand, and then swung the knife at Robinson. Robinson then let the bottle go and
clutched his chest. Hamilton stated that Robinson attempted to walk very slowly toward a gas
station and defendant walked away. As defendant walked away, Hamilton heard defendant
saying that she hated Robinson and that he was still going to fix her door.
Defendant testified on her own behalf at trial. Defendant stated that she and Robinson
had planned for him to come to her house on the evening of April 17, 2010 and that her cousin
dropped Robinson off at her house. Defendant testified that Robinson was intoxicated when he
arrived at her house, brought three 40 ounce bottles of beer with him, and spent the night at her
house. She also stated that the following morning an argument ensued when Robinson, who was
still drunk, asked her to make him sausages. Defendant stated that she was on the phone with a
friend and washing dishes in the kitchen. According to defendant, Robinson got very angry, took
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her phone, and “launched” it at the wall. Defendant testified that as she was trying to put her
phone back together Robinson began choking her over the counter. Defendant stated that she
was gasping for air and trying to fight Robinson off when she grabbed a “little steak knife” out of
the dish rack on the counter and reached upward trying to get Robinson off of her when she
stabbed him because she was afraid for her life. She testified that she did know she had stabbed
Robinson but had no idea how badly he was hurt. She testified that after the physical altercation
Robinson took his coat, kicked the door down, and left. Defendant stated that she followed him
with the knife still in her hand yelling at him that he was going to fix her door. Defendant
testified that she called Janise Robinson to tell her about the relationship she had with defendant
and also to tell her to come pick him up.
Defendant was convicted, after a bench trial, of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. Defendant now appeals as of right.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. We review
sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d
322 (2002). In doing so, this Court must review “the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Johnson, 460 Mich
720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from
that evidence may be satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. People v Lee, 243 Mich App
163, 167-168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000).
“The elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder are: ‘(1) an
attempt or threat with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.’” People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703
NW2d 230 (2005), quoting People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997).
MCL 750.84. The second element requires proof of specific intent, as opposed to general intent.
Parcha, 227 Mich at 239; Brown, 267 Mich at 147. “[T]he distinction between specific intent
and general intent crimes is that the former involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act
done, while the latter involve merely the intent to do the physical act.” People v Beaudin, 417
Mich 570, 573-574; 339 NW2d 461 (1983) (citation omitted). “This Court has defined the intent
to do great bodily harm as ‘an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.’” Brown, 267
Mich App at 147, citing People v Mitchell, 149 Mich App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986). “An
intent to harm the victim can be inferred from defendant’s conduct.” Parcha, 227 Mich App at
239.
The facts indicate that defendant chased Robinson down the street yelling at him for
nearly three blocks with a knife in her possession. All the while, Robinson repeatedly told
defendant to get away from him. When Robinson stopped walking and turned around, defendant
pulled out the knife and pointed it at him, threatening him. When Robinson picked up a bottle
and told her not to come any closer defendant took that opportunity to lunge at Robinson with
the seven or eight inch knife stabbing him in the chest. Hamilton, a disinterested eyewitness,
witnessed the circumstances unfold and testified that she saw defendant run toward Robinson,
pull her arm back with the knife in her right hand, and then swing the knife at Robinson, after
which Robinson clutched his chest. Defendant did not attempt to get help for Robinson and
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instead fled the scene after the stabbing. The stabbing caused serious and life-threatening
injuries to Robinson’s heart and lungs that required multiple surgeries and a hospital stay of two
and a half months. There was also evidence that defendant called Robinson’s wife and admitted
to stabbing Robinson. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended to stab the victim in the chest with a knife. Furthermore, a rational trier of
fact could have also inferred that because defendant stabbed him with a knife, a potentially
deadly weapon, she intended to cause serious bodily injury and harm. See, e.g., Parcha, 227
Mich App at 239; People v Cunningham, 21 Mich App 381, 383-384; 175 NW2d 781 (1970).
While defendant argues that the trial court should have believed her account of the incident, that
the stabbing occurred as the result of self-defense, “[t]his Court will not interfere with the trier of
fact’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v
Passage, 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007).
Next, defendant argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
Defendant specifically argues that the outcome of the trial would have been different had her
counsel called witnesses who could have testified that defendant turned herself in to the police,
and also obtained police and medical records supporting her claim that Robinson had attacked
her in the past. We review defendant’s unpreserved ineffective assistance of counsel claim for
plain error affecting her substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). Because defendant did not raise her ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
the trial court, our review of that claim is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v
Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242
Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed
and defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67,
69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for
counsel’s error. People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007).
“Decisions regarding what evidence to present and whether to call or question witnesses
are presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy.” People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649
NW2d 94 (2002). The failure to call witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance only if it
deprives defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398; 688
NW2d 308 (2004). “A defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome
of the trial.” People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710-711; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), vac’d in
part on other grds, 453 Mich 902 (1996).
Defendant’s first allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on her claim that
had her counsel called witnesses who could have testified that defendant turned herself in to
police rather than being apprehended by the fugitive apprehension team, the outcome of her trial
would have been different. At trial, defendant specifically testified that she turned herself in to
police on May 1, 2009. Thereafter, the prosecutor provided a rebuttal witness, Kimberly
Gaddies, a Detroit police officer, who testified that defendant did not turn herself in but was
eventually arrested by the fugitive apprehension team. On cross-examination of Gaddies,
defense counsel further questioned Gaddies about the specifics regarding defendant’s arrest.
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Defense counsel asked several questions of Gaddies raising the inference that defendant actually
turned herself in to the fugitive apprehension team in a vacant lot. When the witness got
frustrated with the line of questioning, she stated, “Are we going to argue?” At which point, the
trial court stated, referring to the line of questioning about whether defendant turned herself in or
whether she was in fact apprehended, “[i]t’s not even necessary, not even relevant.” Apparently,
taking a cue from the trial court, defense counsel ceased questioning Gaddies. The record is
clear that the trial court was aware of the apprehension issue and found it irrelevant. This was so
despite defense counsel’s repeated efforts to place significance on defendant’s assertion that she
turned herself in to police. Again, the failure to call witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance
only if it deprives defendant of a substantial defense. Dixon, 263 Mich App at 398. On this
record, defendant has not established ineffective of counsel with regard to this allegation when
the trial court in a bench trial found the line of questioning irrelevant and further witnesses would
not have provided defendant a substantial defense.
Defendant’s second assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on her claim
that had her counsel obtained police and medical records supporting allegations that Robinson
had attacked her in the past, the outcome of her trial would have been different. This claim is
likewise without merit. Defendant herself testified to two previous occasions where she alleges
Robinson assaulted her including beating her and “busting” her head in four places. Defendant
alleged that on those occasions Robinson was drunk. She also testified that Robinson was
arrested for domestic violence when he injured her head. Defendant also testified that Robinson
had a reputation for being violent. She also admitted that she similarly had a reputation for being
violent. Robinson also testified that the two would fight mostly when he was drunk and that he
had hit defendant in the past and caused her to have a black eye. On this record, it was plain to
the trial court that defendant and Robinson had a turbulent and often violent relationship. The
outcome of the proceedings would not be different when the claimed deficiency involves the
failure to seek admission of cumulative evidence. See People v Hill, 257 Mich App 126, 140;
667 NW2d 78 (2003).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it based her sentence on inaccurate
information and also abused its discretion when it sentenced defendant “near the very top” of the
sentence guidelines. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s imposition of a
sentence. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 126; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). We must affirm if
the defendant’s minimum sentence falls within the properly scored sentencing guidelines.
People v Powe, 469 Mich 1032; 679 NW2d 67 (2004); MCL 769.34(10).
Here, defendant does not allege that the trial court improperly scored the guidelines.
Rather, the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment,
which, as defendant concedes, was near the maximum allowed under the minimum guideline
range of 38 to 95 months. Thus, this minimum sentence was within the guidelines range and we
must affirm it. Powe, 469 Mich at 1032. Defendant, does, however, suggest that her sentence
was based on inaccurate information and is disproportionate, given the history of domestic
violence between defendant and the victim. Defendant asserts that the trial court’s sentence did
not reflect the particularized history between defendant and Robinson, including a continuing
relationship despite Robinson’s marriage, as well as the mutuality of assaultive conduct between
the parties. Defendant contends that these factors weigh in her favor and thus the trial court
failed to tailor the sentence to her unique circumstances. “[L]egislatively mandated sentences
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are presumptively proportionate and valid.” People v DiVietri, 206 Mich App 61, 63; 520 NW2d
643 (1994). Defendant has failed to overcome this presumption. Defendant stabbed Robinson in
the chest with a seven inch knife. As a result, Robinson suffered life-threatening injuries to his
heart and lungs requiring multiple surgeries, an extended stay at the hospital, rehabilitation, and
lingering physical effects. Defendant did not call 911 or attempt to assist him in any way.
Instead defendant fled the scene and called Robinson’s wife to tell her about their affair and that
she had just stabbed Robinson. Given these facts, and the fact that defendant has one prior
conviction, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion; rather, the record
reflects that the sentence was based on accurate information and was proportionate to the
seriousness of the crime.
Defendant finally argues that her sentence is invalid under Blakely v Washington, 542 US
296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004) because the trial court used facts “neither admitted
by [defendant] during [a] plea, nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” when it assigned
defendant a sentence near the top of the guidelines range. However, our Supreme Court has
determined that Blakely, which prohibits a sentencing court from increasing the penalty for a
crime beyond its statutory maximum based on facts not found by a jury, is not applicable to
Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme. See People v Harper, 479 Mich 599, 644-645;
739 NW2d 523 (2007). Thus, defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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