ELYSA ROTT V MADISON DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ELYSA ROTT,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 294291
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-092261-CL
MADISON DISTRICT PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and SAAD and K.F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition dismissing her
retaliation claim brought under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et. seq.
Defendant sought summary disposition asserting multiple failures to state a claim or establish a
question of fact under the Act. The trial court granted summary disposition on the grounds that
plaintiff had not suffered a material adverse employment action. We affirm the grant of
summary disposition and the dismissal of plaintiff’s case, albeit on other grounds. Specifically,
we conclude that plaintiff has failed to create a question of material fact whether the actions she
asserts were retaliatory were in response to a “charge . . . a complaint or [participation] in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing . . . under [ELCRA].” 1
Plaintiff was hired by defendant in 2000 as a special education teacher. She was certified
as such and had worked in special education beginning in 1973. Immediately after being hired
by the Madison District, however, she was reassigned to work as a guidance counselor, a second
field in which she was certified, and from 2000-2007 she worked as a guidance counselor at
Madison High School. In the 2005-2006 school year another individual, Mark Chapman, was
hired as a second, but part-time counselor, at Madison High.
1
The trial court also dismissed plaintiff’s counts alleging that her discharge was itself
discriminatory rather than retaliatory. Notably, Plaintiff has not appealed the dismissal of those
counts.
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Due to increasing budget deficits, defendant eliminated several positions in the 20062007 school year and in March, 2007 offered a buy-out to teachers at the top of the pay scale.
Five fully employed and several laid off teachers accepted the buy-out.
In March 2007, plaintiff was involuntarily transferred by the district to Community High
School to provide both counseling and special education services. Defendant asserted that the
transfer was required because an internal report had revealed that Community High School was
not providing state and federally mandated special education and counseling services; that
budget constraints prevented any new hires; and that plaintiff was the only employee with the
certifications that would allow her to handle both those responsibilities. Plaintiff was transferred
to Community High School, beginning March 12, 2007. Mark Chapman, who had been a half
time counselor and half time biology teacher, was made the “Dean of Students” and apparently
handled counseling duties in that position at Madison High School at a salary approximately
$22,000 less than Plaintiff was earning. 2
Plaintiff complained about the involuntary transfer in a letter to defendant’s
superintendant on March 26, 2007. The superintendant agreed to move her back to Madison
High School at the beginning of the next school year. However, on September 10, 2007, the
superintendant informed plaintiff that she would instead be transferred to the middle school
where her hours would be divided between counseling and special education duties and that her
salary would not be affected. According to the district, this transfer was necessary because over
the summer the middle school counselor had resigned to take a job in another district and the
middle school special education instructor announced her retirement effective October 1, 2007.
The district maintained that due to continuing budget constraints, it could not hire outside
replacements for these positions and had to use existing personnel.3
Plaintiff began the 2007-2008 school year at the middle school, but she worked for only
three weeks, at which time she took medical leave for psychiatric reasons. She did not return to
work. Plaintiff testified that her ultimate retirement on August 14, 2008 constituted a
2
Chapman was hired as the Dean of Students in March 2007, a position created at that time by
the district. As this new position required counseling work and it, unlike the position of
guidance counselor, was not a union position, the union grieved the elimination of a bargaining
unit position. The district then reestablished the eliminated counseling position. Chapman, who
was initially not certified as a counselor, did obtain his full certification in the summer of 2007, a
procedure that was approved by the State Department of Education.
3
At the same time, the Madison High special education instructor was transferred to Community
High and the full-time Madison High social worker’s assignment was changed to half-time at
Community High and half-time at Madison.
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constructive discharge resulting from defendant “shuffling the plaintiff from position to position,
closing out positions . . . and ultimately forcing the plaintiff to leave the school district.” 4
The relevant provision of ELCRA, MCL 37.2701, provides:
Two or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a
violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint,
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this act.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the
defendant; (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. [Garg v Macomb County Community Mental
Health Services, 472 Mich 263, 273; 696 NW2d 646 (2005), quoting DeFlaviis v
Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).]
Defendant sought dismissal alleging a lack of evidence on each of these elements. The
trial court held that the involuntary transfers did not constitute “materially adverse action”. On
appeal, plaintiff argues that there was a question of fact as to this element under the standard for
materially adverse actions in retaliation cases recently enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Burlington N and Santa Fe Co v White, 548 US 53; 126 S Ct 2405, 165 L Ed 2d 345 (2006). We
agree with the plaintiff that the decision in Burlington does broaden the definition of “materially
adverse action.” Burlington held that a reassignment of duties can constitute retaliatory
discrimination where both the former and present duties fall within the same job description. Id.
at 70-71. Here, whether the change from counseling high school students to teaching elementary
and middle school special education students is “materially adverse” is a question for the jury.
Moreover, plaintiff presented evidence that as a result of the transfer she was not eligible to
perform and receive wages for certain extra work available only at the high school level.
Despite our disagreement with the trial court on this issue, we agree that the dismissal
was proper given plaintiff’s failure to establish other necessary elements of her claim.
4
During the proceedings below, plaintiff further maintained that she was retaliated against in
part by defendant’s decision not to hire her for the Dean of Students position defendant posted in
early 2007. However, plaintiff has not presented any evidence, even through an affidavit or
deposition testimony, that she actually applied for this position. Moreover, the position paid
approximately $20,000 less than plaintiff was earning.
-3-
Plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of the CRA without
establishing that she engaged in activity protected under the act. Garg, 472 Mich at 273; MCL
37.2701(a). Accordingly, we must determine whether plaintiff’s complaints concerning her
transfer to Central High School and her replacement at Madison High School by Chapman
amounted to a charge made under the CRA or opposition to a violation of the CRA. As to this
determination, this Court has held:
An employee need not specifically cite the CRA when making a charge
under the act. However, the employee must do more than generally assert unfair
treatment. See Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240 Mich App 679, 682; 613 NW2d 415
(2000) (holding complaints amounting to generic claims of “job discrimination”
did not qualify as a charge made under the Persons with Disabilities Act, MCL
37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550[101] et seq.). The employee’s charge must clearly
convey to an objective employer that the employee is raising the specter of a
claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant to the CRA. McLemore v Detroit
Receiving Hosp & Univ Medical Center, 196 Mich App 391, 396; 493 NW2d 441
(1992). [Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 318-319; 628
NW2d 63 (2001).]
Plaintiff has proffered three pieces of evidence in which she asserts that she “raised the
specter of a claim of unlawful discrimination.” However, none of these do so.
The first is plaintiff’s March 26, 2007, letter to the superintendant concerning the first
transfer. In this letter, plaintiff clearly states that she is displeased with the transfer and that the
need for coverage at the middle school should have been met by a different arrangement.
However, she does not assert, either directly or even by inference, that she is being discriminated
against due to her age or gender.
The second is plaintiff’s assertions regarding communications with her union
representatives. In a March 20, 2007, letter, the high school’s union representative stated that
given the superintendant’s stated intention to “groom” her for a higher position, he did not
believe that there were “ulterior motives” behind the transfer. Putting aside the fact that the
representative did not see any evidence of ulterior motives, this letter was not sent or
communicated to the superintendant or any other representative of the district. Even assuming
that a reference in a letter that an employer’s action did not have an ulterior motive could trigger
retaliation, it could not have in this case since there is no evidence that concern about an ulterior
motive was ever communicated to, or otherwise known by, the defendant. The defendant cannot
retaliate for actions or statements about which it has no knowledge, and here plaintiff does not
present any evidence that her allegation was communicated to the district. The other union
communication relied upon by plaintiff is her assertion that another union representative told her
the district would never put her back at Madison High. However, plaintiff does not provide any
testimony or affidavit from this union official, nor any documentary evidence to establish that
this statement was ever made, let alone the context in which it was made.
Third, plaintiff directs us to the fact that after the first transfer she telephoned the State
Department of Education to advise them that she did not think that Chapman was properly
certified as a counselor, and states that Defendant was aware that she made this report. If, in
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fact, plaintiff could have demonstrated that her second transfer was in retaliation for making this
report, it might have given rise to an action under the Whistle-Blowers Protection Act, MCL
15.361 et seq. However, plaintiff did not bring such a claim and there is nothing in the testimony
or documents relevant to that report that suggest she was claiming discrimination. The same is
true regarding the plaintiff’s statement to the superintendant that Chapman did not have
counselor certification; there is no evidence that it took place in the context of a claim of
discrimination, only that plaintiff did not want to be transferred and she raised the subject of
Chapman’s certification in hopes that the district would conclude that he could not fulfill any
counseling duties and thereby require defendant to keep plaintiff at Madison High.
Since plaintiff has not created a question of fact from which a reasonable jury could find
that she engaged in a protected activity under the CRA, we affirm the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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