PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN SCHUH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291259
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-013141-FH
KEVIN SCHUH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and ZAHRA and K.F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of misconduct in office, a common-law crime, MCL 750.505,
forgery, MCL 750.248, uttering and publishing, MCL 750.249, and conspiracy to commit
insurance fraud, MCL 500.4511(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of
nine months in jail on all counts. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant formerly worked as a Detroit police officer, and the charges in this case
stemmed from his preparation of an accident report (a UD-10) containing false information.
Defendant authored a report documenting a three-car collision that occurred in Detroit on
December 27, 2004. Investigators for the companies that had insured the vehicles purportedly
involved in the December 27, 2004 accident described at trial the series of events leading to their
scrutiny of the claims lodged by vehicle owners Norman Dehko, Mahir Kada, and Latifa
Ibrahim.1 In Dehko’s recorded phone conversation with his insurer, Dehko averred that as his
Cadillac Escalade sat stationary in a left-turn lane, a car struck the Escalade from behind while
traveling at least 40 miles an hour, causing him to rear end a Mercedes sport utility vehicle in
front of him. After a GMAC fraud investigator became curious about the legitimacy of the
claim, he spoke with defendant, who initially denied any recollection of the crash. Some brief
discussion prompted defendant’s recall that he had come upon the scene of the accident
1
Some of the primary bases for insurance company skepticism that the reported accident had
occurred included that (1) an accident reconstruction firm hired by the insurance companies
determined that the damages to the three involved vehicles did not match the insurance
claimants’ accounts of the crash, and (2) the insurance investigators believed that Dehko had
given telephone accounts of not only his own claim information, but that of the other two crash
victims, under a different name than Dehko’s own.
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coincidentally before drafting the accident report, and that defendant knew Dehko, although he
did not have any familiarity with the other two crash victims.
Eventually, an investigator for the National Insurance Crime Bureau and an officer
working with the Detroit Police Department’s internal affairs division referred the investigation
to FBI Special Agents Derek Schoon and Michael Hanie. In February 2008, Schoon and Hanie
interviewed defendant in front of his home. The trial testimony of Schoon and Hanie
consistently recounted the following relevant details of defendant’s interview:
We started by informing him that we had reviewed these
reports and that there were activity logs that showed him at one
part of the city and at the same time he would file an accident
report showing him in another part of the city and we had a
dialogue and we agreed that you couldn’t be in two places at one
time so we asked him if he could explain that to us, which he did.
***
[Defendant] identified Norman Dehko as the owner of
Somerset Collision, a person that he had written some reports for.
***
He [also] had mentioned [preparing reports for] a Wally—I
don’t think we had the last name . . .
***
Yes, [defendant] did mention Wally. He said Wally was
associated with Platinum Collision.
***
And also Angie and Samir Cotter who were associated with
Broadway Collision.
***
. . . We asked him how—what were the circumstances
when he made those reports cause the reports clearly could not
have been taken at the scene as they were written up because he
was at another point in the city doing other enforcement activities
or other police calls that were verified.
So he said that he had been provided information by these
shop owners; that they would ask him to complete an accident
report for them and that he would put the information he had been
provided by the shop owners into the report and file it.
***
He told us he had done it approximately 15 times.
***
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He agreed that he had not been at the scene where the crash
was reported at the time of the crash and he also told us that the
information that had been input into the actual report was that
which had been provided by the collision shop owners.[2]
***
We asked [defendant] [if he received anything in exchange
for preparing the requested accident reports]. He said he had never
received anything per report, but he admitted that he had received
between five and seven thousand dollars from loans from these
collision shop owners over a period of time and that these loans
had no payback arrangement and that I don’t believe, to the best of
my recollection, any payment had ever been made, any restitution
was ever made.
***
. . . We asked in talking with him, we said, you do
understand the value that a collision shop owner would have to
having a police officer sign a report saying that he was at the
scene? It would give it a certain credibility in the eyes of an
insurance agent or somebody else if a police officer had been to the
scene, had recorded this accident and had somewhat observed the
vehicles at that place.
***
[Defendant’s answer] was, yes, he understood that there
would be a value to that.
I
With respect to all four convictions, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting them. We consider de novo defense insufficiency claims. People v Harrison, 283
Mich App 374, 377; 768 NW2d 98 (2009). This Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine “whether a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646
NW2d 158 (2002). An appellate court should not interfere with the factfinder’s role to gauge the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515;
489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to
draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury
verdict. The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or
2
FBI agent Schoon added defendant’s explanation that after writing the “false reports,” “later he
would view the vehicles to see that the damage lined up with what the accident seemed to
indicate.”
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circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from
that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. [People
v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (internal quotation
omitted).]
A. FORGERY
In defendant’s view, the evidence did not suffice to sustain his forgery conviction
because the record contained no proof “that anything in the UD-10 was false,” and defendant
made no effort to “attempt to make the report appear to be anything but what it was: an accident
report.” A person commits forgery when he “falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits a
public record . . . with intent to injure or defraud another person.” MCL 750.248(1). As
reflected in the language of MCL 750.248(1), this Court has recognized that “[t]he elements of
the crime of forgery are: (1) an act which results in the false making or alteration of an
instrument (which makes an instrument appear to be what it is not); and (2) a concurrent intent to
defraud or injure. The key is that the writing itself is a lie.” People v Kaczorowski, 190 Mich
App 165, 171; 475 NW2d 861 (1990). We review de novo the legal question whether conduct
“falls within the statutory scope of a criminal statute.” People v Rutledge, 250 Mich App 1, 4;
645 NW2d 333 (2002).
Defendant heavily relies on this Court’s opinion in People v Hodgins, 85 Mich App 62,
63; 270 NW2d 527 (1978), in which the Court framed the “central issue [a]s whether one who
opens a checking account using the name, identification and address of another person is guilty
of forgery under MCL 750.248 . . . when she writes a check on that account for more than the
balance.” In Hodgins, the defendant used her landlord’s driver’s license, social security card,
and car registration to open a bank account in the landlord’s name. Id. at 63-64. The defendant
made a small deposit into the account, and then tried to buy a television set with a check in an
amount that exceeded her deposit. Id. at 64. This Court emphasized that the prosecution had
premised the forgery charge “not . . . on the opening of the account as described above,” but
instead “on the fact that [the] defendant used one of the checks she had obtained from the bank
when attempting to purchase” the television. Id. The Court held that the act of writing the check
and presenting it for payment did not constitute forgery because the check was what it purported
to be:
. . . There may have been a litany of offenses committed, but not forgery.
The check given by [the] defendant did not purport to be anything other than a
personal check drawn by the person who presented it on an account that that
person had opened. The misrepresentation of identity to the bank in opening the
account did not make the creation of a draft on that account a forgery when
presented to pay for the television set.
Simply stated, the writing itself was not a lie. Under MCL 440.3401. . . ,
only defendant would be liable on the instrument. . . . The risk of loss to which
the store was exposed was the result of the lack of funds in the account, not the
manner in which the instrument was prepared. [Id. at 65-66.]
The underlying facts of this case do not resemble the scenario deemed insufficient to
sustain a forgery charge in Hodgins, 85 Mich App 62. Here, the prosecutor grounded the forgery
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count against defendant on his actions in “falsely mak[ing], alter[ing], forg[ing] or
counterfeit[ing] a public record, with intent to injure or defraud, to wit: UD-10 Police Traffic
Crash Report No. 6547452.” And the testimony and other evidence at trial amply supported a
reasonable jury’s determination beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed both
forgery elements reiterated by this Court in Kaczorowski, 190 Mich App at 171. First, Schoon
and Hanie testified concerning defendant’s acknowledgement that, with accident or collision
details defendant received from Dehko, defendant authored fabricated accident reports and
falsely recorded on the UD-10s that he had inspected the accident scenes.3 From this testimony
alone the jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
“act[s] which result[ed] in the false making or alteration of an instrument.” Id. Second, a
rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed an “intent to defraud
or injure” when he prepared the UD-10’s Dehko requested, id., in light of the trial evidence that
(1) defendant admitted to Schoon and Hanie his awareness that an insurance company assessing
an accident claim would deem the claim more credible when accompanied by a UD-10 prepared
by a police officer, and (2) defendant acknowledged having written approximately 15 false
accident reports.
B. UTTERING & PUBLISHING
Defendant insists that his uttering and publishing conviction is unsustainable given the
absence of any evidence that he “present[ed] the UD-10 for payment.” As our Legislature set
forth in MCL 750.249(1), “A person who utters and publishes as true a false, forged, altered, or
counterfeit record, deed, instrument, or other writing listed in section 248 knowing it to be false,
altered, forged, or counterfeit with intent to injure or defraud is guilty of a felony . . . .” “The
elements of uttering and publishing are: (1) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
instrument was false; (2) an intent to defraud; and (3) [a] presentation of the forged instrument
for payment,” People v Shively, 230 Mich App 626, 631; 584 NW2d 740 (1998), or (b)
presentation of a forged “record,” “public record,” or other document specified in MCL 750.248
in a manner “capable of affecting the rights of others or creating liability in others.” People v
Cassadime, 258 Mich App 395, 399-400; 671 NW2d 559 (2003); People v Carter, 106 Mich
App 765, 767; 309 NW2d 33 (1981).
The evidence here reasonably supported findings beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)
defendant authored and filed false accident reports at Dehko’s request, including the December
27, 2004 accident report, (2) defendant intended to defraud the insurance companies, i.e., he
knew that his submission of the false UD-10 made more likely that the insurance companies
would pay policy benefits for the false claims, and (3) defendant’s filing of the false UD-10’s
amounted to the presentation of a record in a manner “capable of . . . creating liability in others,”
namely any insurance company that made a payment on behalf of a claimant identified in
defendant’s false accident reports. Cassadime, 258 Mich App at 399-400; Carter, 106 Mich App
at 767-769. Even accepting, as defendant claims, that the insurance companies did not rely on
3
Unlike People v Thomas, 182 Mich App 225, 229-230; 452 NW2d 215 (1989), aff’d 438 Mich
448; 475 NW2d 288 (1991), also cited by defendant, the instant police report does not contain a
single false statement within the body of an otherwise accurate recitation of pertinent facts.
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his false UD-10 in making their payments to Dehko and the other claimants, the elements of
uttering and publishing nonetheless were satisfied. People v Harrison, 283 Mich App 374, 381;
768 NW2d 98 (2009) (“To utter means to put something into circulation. To utter and publish
means to offer something as if it is real, whether or not anyone accepts it as real.”).
C. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT INSURANCE FRAUD
The prosecutor charged defendant with entering “an agreement or conspiracy to commit a
fraudulent insurance act under section 4503.” MCL 500.4511(2). Specifically, the prosecutor’s
charging documents averred that defendant had engaged in conduct prohibited under MCL
500.4503 by “enter[ing] into an agreement or conspir[ing] to prepare a written or oral statement
knowing or believing that it would be presented by or to an insurer or an agent of an insurer,
knowing that it contained false information concerning a fact material to an insurance claim.”
The charging language employed by the prosecutor most closely tracked MCL 500.4503(c) and
(d). The plain language of subsections 4503(c) and (d) reveals the following elements necessary
for establishing guilt of “[a] fraudulent insurance act”: (1) any knowing act or omission, (2)
done with the specific intent to deceive, defraud, or injure, (3) that (a) “[p]resents or causes to be
presented to” an insurer “any oral or written statement” [subsection 4503(c)], or (b) assists
“another to prepare or make any oral or written statement . . . intended to be presented to . . . any
insurer” [subsection 4503(d)], (4) in connection with a claim for payment under a policy, and (5)
with knowledge that the statement contains false information about any fact material to the
insurance claim.4
In addition to proving the elements of insurance fraud under MCL 500.4511(2) and MCL
500.4503(c) or (d), to obtain a conspiracy conviction the prosecutor also must present evidence
substantiating the conspiracy aspect of the charge.
Conspiracy is defined by common law as a partnership in
criminal purposes. Under such a partnership, two or more
individuals must have voluntarily agreed to effectuate the
commission of a criminal offense. Establishing that the individuals
specifically intended to combine to pursue the criminal objective
of their agreement is critical because the gist of the offense of
conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement[,] meaning the crime is
complete upon formation of the agreement.
4
In considering whether statutory offense elements exist in a particular case, we bear in mind the
statutory interpretation principles summarized in Cassadime, 258 Mich App at 398:
To discern the Legislature’s intent, this Court must first look to the
specific language of the statute. Further, this Court must presume that every
word, phrase, and clause in the statute has meaning and must avoid any
construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.
Every word or phrase in the statute is accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.
[Internal quotation omitted.]
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The specific intent to combine, including knowledge of that
intent, must be shared by two or more individuals because there
can be no conspiracy without a combination of two or more. . . .
Accordingly, there must be proof demonstrating that the parties
specifically intended to further, promote, advance, or pursue an
unlawful objective. [People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich
334, 344-346; 562 NW2d 652 (1997) (footnotes and internal
quotation omitted).]
A review of the record in this case reflects that a rational jury could have found defendant
guilty of conspiring to commit insurance fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, the substance of defendant’s admissions establish or give rise
to reasonable inferences that (1) defendant knowingly authored and filed accident reports, (2)
defendant assisted Dehko in preparing accident reports entirely on the basis of information
supplied by Dehko, (3) defendant knew or reasonably should have known that Dehko intended to
submit the accident reports in support of insurance claims, and (4) defendant knowingly
documented false collision details in the accident reports requested by Dehko, which details
defendant knew had materiality to Dehko’s intended insurance claims. And defendant’s actions,
especially in light of his concession that he knew the insurance companies relied on police
reports in paying collision claims, reasonably supported a jury finding that he prepared the false
accident reports with an intent to deceive, defraud, or injure. Although defendant emphasizes
that “the UD-10 was not material to the claim” by Dehko because none of the involved insurance
companies made a payment of benefits on the basis of the accident report, the pertinent portion
of the statute clearly and unambiguously envisions only that defendant have knowledge “that the
statement contains any false information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.”
MCL 500.4503(c) and (d) (emphasis added). Moreover, the statute does not define “material,”
which Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed), p 1066, explains, in pertinent part, as, “2. Having some
logical connection with the consequential facts,” or, “3. Of such a nature that knowledge of the
item would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.” From the evidence, the
jury properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s completion of accident reports
with details supplied by Dehko constituted the declaration of false information having a logical
connection or materiality to Dehko’s claims; alternatively phrased, the jury reasonably found that
the false UD-10’s had some logical connection to Dehko’s claims, or that the false reports
naturally would affect an insurance company’s decisionmaking with respect to Dehko’s claims.
Furthermore, the admissions of defendant sufficed to permit the jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant had intentionally entered an agreement with Dehko, and that
both defendant and Dehko shared the specific intent “to further, promote, advance, or pursue an
unlawful objective,” namely to fabricate accident reports for Dehko’s submission to his
automobile insurer in connection with an accident claim. Justice, 454 Mich at 345 n 18, 347.
D. MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE
“At common law, misconduct in office was defined as corrupt behavior by an officer in
the exercise of the duties of his office or while acting under color of his office.” People v
Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 456; 662 NW2d 727 (2003) (internal quotation omitted). An officer
could face conviction of misconduct in office “(1) for committing any act which is itself
wrongful, malfeasance, (2) for committing a lawful act in a wrongful manner, misfeasance, or (3)
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for failing to perform any act that the duties of the office require of the officer, nonfeasance.” Id.
“In the case of malfeasance and misfeasance, the offender also must act with a corrupt intent,
i.e., with a sense of depravity, perversion or taint.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “Moreover,
the officer’s wrongdoing must result from or directly affect the performance of his official
duties.” Id.
As we have previously observed, the instant trial record amply established that defendant
authored and filed accident reports containing false information, acts of misfeasance.
Defendant’s concessions that he manufactured and filed accident reports, for Dehko and others,
in exchange for purported loans that had no repayment timetable reasonably tends to establish
that defendant authored the false accident reports with a corrupt intent. People v Milton, 257
Mich App 467, 471; 668 NW2d 387 (2003) (explaining that corruption in the context of
misconduct in office “is used in the sense of depravity, perversion or taint,” and that “[p]ursuant
to the definitions of depravity, perversion and taint, a corrupt intent can be shown where there is
intentional or purposeful misbehavior or wrongful conduct pertaining to the requirements and
duties of office by an officer”) (internal quotation omitted). Also, the record evidence agrees
that defendant authored and filed the false accident reports in his capacity as a Detroit police
officer. Notably, the Legislature codified an officer’s duty to prepare and file accident reports in
collisions causing more than $1,000 in property damage. MCL 257.622 (directing that “[t]he
officer receiving the report, or his or her commanding officer, shall immediately forward each
report to the director of the department of state police on forms prescribed by the director of the
department of state police,” and that “[t]he forms shall be completed in full by the investigating
officer”).
II
Defendant next disputes the propriety of the trial court’s admission of other acts evidence
concerning his alleged forgery of approximately 15 other accident reports. This Court reviews
for a clear abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to admit evidence. People v Starr,
457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Defendant insists that the trial court’s admission of the other acts evidence violated MRE
404(b)(1), because “corroborating a government agent’s testimony is not” a proper purpose for
admissibility, “the evidence was insufficient that [defendant] actually falsified (or even admitted
to falsifying) 15 additional crash reports,” and admission of the evidence “was far more unfairly
prejudicial than probative.” MRE 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s
other acts or crimes when introduced solely for the purpose of showing the defendant’s action in
conformity with his criminal character. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 56; 614
NW2d 888 (2000). But evidence of a defendant’s other acts or crimes qualifies as admissible
under the following circumstances: (1) the prosecutor offers the evidence for a proper purpose
under MRE 404(b)(1); (2) the other acts evidence satisfies the definition of logical relevance
within MRE 401; and (3) any unfair prejudice arising from the admission of the other acts
evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value, MRE 403. Starr, 457 Mich at 496;
People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 439-440; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
Before trial, the prosecutor sought to admit evidence of 10 other false accident reports
written by defendant, in the form of a witness who could “produce the documents and testify
from Internal Affairs that this is a pattern that was revealed in the investigation of . . .
Defendant’s . . . activity logs and crash reports.” The prosecutor also theorized that the other
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acts evidence would rebut an anticipated attack by defendant on the credibility of the special
agents set to testify regarding defendant’s inculpatory statements. The trial court expressed its
view that the other acts evidence carried a significant danger of unfair prejudice and declined to
admit it, with the caveat that if at trial defendant maintained “the defense of mistake or
falsehood; that is the FBI agent is deliberately not being candid, or in other words, lying to the
jury, then the Court will allow you to renew your motion to allow these other acts in to
corroborate that statement.”
After the testimony by special agent Schoon, during which defense counsel questioned
the soundness of Schoon’s account of defendant’s inculpatory statements, the prosecutor
renewed his motion to admit other acts evidence. The trial court declined to admit the proffered
documentary evidence consisting of multiple other accident reports prepared by defendant and
defendant’s activity logs, finding the probative value inherent in the documentary evidence
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. However, in light of the defense
suggestion that the special agent testimony was incredible, the court allowed the prosecutor “to
go into, with the second witness, an opportunity to say, . . . there were other reports and they
found discrepancies in those reports, but not get into the sum and substance of the other reports”
“to corroborate essentially the testimony of the first witness.”5
We initially address defendant’s dispute that an adequate foundation existed for the trial
court to deem admissible “evidence . . . that [he] actually falsified (or even admitted to
falsifying) 15 additional crash reports.”
Where the admissibility of evidence is disputed, the burden
of establishing a proper foundation rests with the party seeking
admission. Foundational elements of fact must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. . . . MRE 104(a). The trial court is
not restricted to considering admissible evidence in ruling on the
admissibility of evidence under MRE 104(a) . . . . [In re Brock,
193 Mich App 652, 669; 485 NW2d 110 (1992), rev’d on other
grounds 442 Mich 101; 499 NW2d 752 (1993).]
Here, defendant himself acknowledged when interviewed by agents Schoon and Hanie that he
had authored approximately 15 false accident reports for Dehko and others, and a Detroit police
internal affairs investigator testified that he uncovered around 15 or 20 discrepancies between
accident reports filed by defendant and defendant’s daily police activity logs. This evidence
formed an adequate foundation for the trial court to admit evidence of defendant’s other acts.
With regard to admissibility under MRE 404(b)(1), first, the prosecutor did offer the
other acts evidence for a proper purpose—augmenting the basis for Schoon’s trial testimony
5
The prosecutor subsequently offered into evidence Schoon’s handwritten notes of defendant’s
admissions and the report that Schoon had authored to document defendant’s admissions. The
court admitted the documents on the ground that they contained admissions by defendant, MRE
801(d)(2)(A), and agreed with the defense request to redact irrelevant portions of the documents.
Defendant offered no other objection at trial to the admissibility of Schoon’s notes and report.
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about his and Hanie’s interview of defendant. Notwithstanding that MRE 404(b)(1) does not
mention witness credibility as a proper basis for introducing other acts evidence, the list of
“some . . . permissible uses” of other acts evidence set forth in MRE 404(b)(1) “is not . . .
exhaustive.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 56.6 Second, the other acts evidence had probative value
toward establishing the credibility of Schoon and Hanie, to whom defendant made several
incriminating admissions; specifically, the other acts evidence tended to substantiate the
probability of the agents’ account of defendant’s statement, a matter of consequence in this case,
especially after defense counsel at trial attempted to impugn Schoon’s account of defendant’s
statement. MRE 401.
Critical to the instant case and a fact that is also “of
consequence” to a determination is the credibility of the witnesses
offering testimony. (M)atters in the range of dispute may extend
somewhat beyond the issues defined in the pleadings . . . . (T)he
parties may draw in dispute the credibility of the witnesses and,
within limits, produce evidence assailing and supporting their
credibility.” 1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 185, pp 773-774.
As noted in 1 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 401[05], p 401-29,
evidence may be admitted to assist the evaluation of “the
credibility of a witness.” Here, the test is whether the evidence
will aid the court or jury in determining the probative value of
other evidence offered to affect the probability of the existence of a
consequential fact.” [Emphasis omitted.]
If a witness is offering relevant testimony, whether that
witness is truthfully and accurately testifying is itself relevant
because it affects the probability of the existence of a
consequential fact. [People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 72; 537 NW2d
909, mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995) (emphasis added).]
The other acts evidence in this case made more likely than not that the agents had a foundation
for their inquiries to defendant, a fact of consequence at defendant’s trial. Third, we detect no
impropriety in the trial court’s assessment of the probative value and potential for unfair
prejudice arising from the other acts evidence. The court declined to admit the proffered paper
trail documenting defendant’s other acts, and instead permitted the prosecutor to reference only
generally the existence of other discrepancies between defendant’s accident reports and activity
logs. In light of the significant probative value inherent in the other acts testimony and the
limited, general fashion in which the trial court admitted the evidence, the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding no danger that any risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
6
The prosecutor in Sabin urged the admission of other acts evidence to show the defendant’s
“motive and intent, show the absence of mistake, demonstrate the possibility that adults can be
sexually attracted to, and engage in sex acts with, children, and bolster the complainant’s
credibility.” Id. at 59 n 6. The Supreme Court found that “the prosecution clearly offered the
evidence for permissible purposes.” Id.
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probative value of the other acts evidence. MRE 403. In summary, the trial court acted within
its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence in the general fashion it did so.
III
Defendant further submits that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with respect
to uttering and publishing, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for neglecting to object to the
erroneous instruction. Our review of the record reveals that defense counsel affirmatively
expressed his satisfaction with the trial court’s instruction of the jury, thus waiving and
extinguishing any asserted instructional error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612
NW2d 144 (2000). The trial court instructed the jury concerning the elements of uttering and
publishing in terminology closely tracking CJI2d 28.2. Defendant’s complaint about the trial
court’s instruction that he must have “represented either by words or actions or both that the
document was genuine or true and presented it,” reiterates his prior argument that an uttering and
publishing conviction must involve a presentation for payment. But defendant again ignores that
a police officer’s false report filing can satisfy the presentation aspect of MCL 750.249 if the
report affects the rights or liabilities of other parties. Because the trial court fully and fairly
instructed the jury concerning the elements of uttering and publishing, defense counsel need not
have lodged a groundless objection to the instructions. People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 130;
695 NW2d 342 (2005); People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 225; 663 NW2d 499 (2003).
IV
Defendant additionally raises several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. At trial,
defendant offered no objection to any of the purported instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Because the alleged error[s were] not preserved by a contemporaneous
objection and a request for a curative instruction, appellate review is for plain
(outcome-determinative) error. Reversal is warranted only when plain error
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Further, [this
Court] cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have
alleviated any prejudicial effect. [People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329-330;
662 NW2d 501 (2003).]
This Court reviews properly preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct according to
the following standards:
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided case by case, and the
reviewing court must examine the pertinent portion of the record and evaluate a
prosecutor’s remarks in context. Prosecutors may not make a statement of fact to
the jury that is unsupported by the evidence, but they are free to argue the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to the theory
of the case. Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in
light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted
at trial. [People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000),
criticized on other grounds in Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 64; 124 S Ct
1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004).]
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We review alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct in context to determine whether the
defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001).
Defendant argues that the following portions of the prosecutor’s opening statement and
closing and rebuttal arguments contain improper appeals to the jurors’ sense of civic duty,
personal disparagement of defendant, and repeated emphasis on defendant’s “series of 15
successful insurance frauds” in a manner that made “the forbidden propensity argument”:
Now, what we’re concerned about is the report here by this
Defendant, a Detroit police officer, entrusted by us in the
community, empowered by us to go out and enforce the law, make
life and death decisions for us.
That’s the trust that we’ve imposed in our offices [sic] and
that’s what this case is going to be about and this—the betrayal of
trust by this kind of conduct of filing this false report.
***
I think that the evidence in this case has demonstrated
[defendant’s] guilt way beyond a reasonable doubt. It just has and
I don’t feel good about it.
I mean, as a prosecutor I work with police and I defend
police and I’m always trying to explain police and all that. This is
conduct, his against everything that the police stand for.
***
. . . Look at the evidence in this case. You know, Kevin
Schuh . . . new [sic] the game was up when the FBI came out to
talk to him because he knew there was a paper trail of some fifteen
instances where he pulled this stunt on behalf of several other shop
owners and that’s why he talked.
They didn’t employ any trickery on him. Maybe his
thinking was at that time, cut his loses [sic] to do whatever.
Somehow from between then and now it was obviously some
change in thinking about that, you know. His emotional release
and getting it off his chest at that time was what he did then and
somehow and for some reason that’s not the way it is today, but he
still has to be held accountable, but that’s why he talked, fifteen
times, fifteen times this was done.
This isn’t an accident. This isn’t picking on. This isn’t a
bunch of people who think they’re perfect picking on poor Officer
Schuh. . . .
[Defendant] asked you to assume a whole lot, that
somehow he got this information legitimately. Somehow, although
it’s not reflected anywhere, he just got it. You didn’t hear
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anything. There was not one tiny bit of evidence to say that he
went and somehow this evidence is not what it appears . . .
There was no evidence of that. That’s all just the lawyer
talking and asking you, really, to assume a whole lot . . . it’s some
sense of a word game here, but just look at the evidence and the
evidence convicts him and while we didn’t bring out all fifteen
other documents, we’ve had testimony under oath, unimpeached,
that there’s a pattern of this; that this is what was looked at and he
admitted it.
He admitted doing this some fifteen times so this isn’t some
mistake. This isn’t something that occurred only once that
somehow he forgot to put it in an activity log. You don’t forget
that.
***
I mean, this would have worked . . . . That’s the thing
about Norm Dehko. That’s how this is brazen. This is how he
goes into this doing this. It’s somebody that’s done this before and
is getting away with it and his Ace up the sleeve is the police
report and that’s Kevin Schuh.
Fifteen times this has been working and he’s so casual and
it’s got to offend you. He’s making these calls and in his shop and,
you know, then we have the officer here and he’s making part of
his money and . . . when he’s confronted with it he has his reaction,
yeah, I did it and changed his mind and wants to—and we end up,
it’s being defended on evidence—attacking the evidence, attacking
the character of the people that testified, trying to make them out
to be the bad guys and wanting you really to not focus on the
evidence. [Emphasis added.]
The first two italicized portions of the prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments do not
equate to either improper appeals to the jury’s sense of civic duty or denigration of defendant.
They constitute appropriate argument by the prosecutor on the basis of the evidence admitted at
trial showing that defendant, in his capacity as a Detroit police officer, falsified the December
27, 2004 accident report. Schutte, 240 Mich App at 721. Given that the charged offenses in this
case included misconduct in office and three other offenses with elements of fraudulent intent,
and in light of the evidence tending to show that defendant fabricated the December 27, 2004
accident report, the prosecutor engaged in no impropriety when he characterized defendant’s
conduct as inconsistent with the duties of a police officer. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
66; 732 NW2d 546 (2007) (“The prosecution has wide latitude in arguing the facts and
reasonable inferences, and need not confine argument to the blandest possible terms.”).
The prosecutor made no reference to the 15 other instances when defendant fabricated
accident reports until his rebuttal closing argument. In the course of the defense closing
argument, defendant’s trial counsel at length attacked the credibility of Schoon and Hanie and
maintained that they had placed words in defendant’s mouth when making notes of his
statement. The prosecutor subsequently and fairly responded that defendant had confessed to
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Schoon and Hanie that he authored false accident reports because he had done so 15 times, a fact
borne out by the substance of defendant’s admission introduced through the special agents’
testimony at trial. Dobek, 274 Mich App at 64. The context of the prosecutor’s final mention of
the 15 false reports and the notion that the jury should feel offended clarifies that this passage
referred not to defendant, but Dehko’s conduct in making the false accident claims. To the
extent that defendant characterizes the final italicized comment as an improper denigration of the
defense, the prosecutor merely summarized the tenor of defense counsel’s closing argument
when he attacked the special agents and criticized the insurance investigators. The final portion
of the rebuttal declaration, that defendant did not want the jury to focus on the evidence of his
guilt, does not rise to the level of a forbidden contention that defendant and his counsel hoped to
mislead the jury, especially in light of defense counsel’s closing argument. Watson, 245 Mich
App at 592-593. Even assuming some minor impropriety in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument,
no risk of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights exists because the trial court
cautioned the jury that the attorneys’ arguments do not constitute evidence and that the jury
alone has the prerogative to decide the facts on the basis of the evidence admitted at trial. People
v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 237; 749 NW2d 272 (2008); Callon, 256 Mich App at 329-330.7
V
In a supplemental brief, defendant asserts his entitlement to a new trial on the basis that
his trial counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence in the form of two police officer
witnesses and testimony by defendant. Because defendant did not move for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing in the trial court, we limit our review to mistakes apparent in the trial court
record. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 38; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). “Whether a person has
been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A
judge must first find the facts, and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of
the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.” People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings
of fact, and considers de novo questions of constitutional law. Id.
“[I]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.” United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 654; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657
(1984), quoting McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759, 777 n 14; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763
(1970). In Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel includes two components: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” To establish the first component, a defendant must show that counsel’s
7
Because no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, defense counsel need not have made a
groundless objection to the alleged misconduct. Mack, 265 Mich App at 130. Even assuming
that some degree of prosecutorial misconduct took place, no ineffective assistance of counsel
was occasioned by defense counsel’s failure to object because no reasonable likelihood exists
that the result of defendant’s trial would have differed had counsel objected. People v
Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663-664; 683 NW2d 761 (2004).
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performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). With respect to
the prejudice aspect of the test for ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have
differed. Id. at 663-664. The defendant must overcome the strong presumptions that his
“counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance,” and that his counsel’s
actions represented sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 US at 689.
Defendant attached to his supplemental brief an affidavit of Michigan State Police
Sergeant Melinda Logan, who formerly held a position as a “UD-10 Traffic Crash Report
Trainer,” and an email to which defendant’s former partner, Francis Tull, attested. Logan
advised that “the UD-10 Manual and all documents related to properly completing the crash
report, did not distinguish exactly when or under what circumstances an officer should or should
not complete the investigated at scene bubbles.” Logan added, “[I]f an officer were called to
take an accident report and went to the scene after the vehicle(s) had been removed, but looked at
the scene to determine how the crash occurred, the officer could mark on the report that the
accident was investigated at the scene.” Tull recounted that an academy instructor had played
Tull a telephone message from Sergeant Logan advising “that there is not anything stating that a
police officer cannot do an accident report that way [going to the scene of a car accident after the
cars were removed, yet checking the UD-10 box indicating that the officer had investigated the
accident at the scene] and that the officer [defendant] did not do anything wrong.” Defendant’s
contention that Logan’s and Tull’s testimony would have altered the outcome of his trial ignores
the thrust of the prosecution’s theory throughout trial—that defendant fabricated the December
27, 2004 accident report entirely, and that no accident ever existed for defendant to have
investigated. Even assuming that defense counsel should have introduced the evidence relating
to the checking of the accident report box denoting whether defendant had investigated the
reported vehicle collision at the scene, defense counsel did not deprive defendant of a substantial
defense. People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 371; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). Taking into account
the substantial properly admitted evidence establishing that defendant inserted fabricated content
into the December 27, 2004 accident report other than the accident-scene investigation detail, we
detect no reasonable likelihood that the admission of testimony regarding the circumstances
when an officer may check the “investigated at the scene” box would have affected the outcome
of defendant’s trial. Solmonson, 261 Mich App at 663-664.
To the extent that defendant premises an ineffective assistance of counsel complaint on
his trial counsel’s decision, against defendant’s wishes, not to call him to testify, the record
contradicts this proposition, which defendant sets forth in an abbreviated affidavit attached to his
supplemental brief. On the third and final day of trial, the trial court inquired on the record about
defendant’s decision against testifying, eliciting defendant’s age (36), his possession of 56
college credits, his desire not to testify, his understanding of the scope of a defendant’s
constitutional rights to remain silent or testify in his behalf, and the facts that no one had
promised defendant “anything or said anything to get you to . . . exercise your right to remain
silent,” among additional questions. Because defendant knowingly and voluntarily opted against
invoking his right to testify at trial, he has waived and thus extinguished any appellate claim of
error relating to his decision. Carter, 462 Mich at 214-215; People v Simmons, 140 Mich App
681, 684-685; 364 NW2d 783 (1985).
-15-
VI
Defendant lastly assigns as error the trial court’s admission of Schoon’s report into
evidence. He also maintains that his trial counsel should have objected to the admission of
Schoon’s report.8 In light of defendant’s failure to object at trial to admission of a redacted copy
of Schoon’s report, we review for plain error defendant’s evidentiary claim of error. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The FBI report by Schoon plainly consisted of hearsay that did not fall within any
recognized exception. MRE 801(c); MRE 803(8) (excluding from admissibility “in criminal
cases” public records and reports containing “matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel”). However, the evidentiary error does not equate to ineffective
assistance by defendant’s trial counsel or otherwise mandate reversal. The properly admitted
trial testimony by Schoon and Hanie concerning defendant’s inculpatory statements mirrored the
redacted content of Schoon’s erroneously admitted written report. People v Hill, 257 Mich App
126, 140; 667 NW2d 78 (2003) (explaining that because an “evidence technician properly
testified extensively with regard to the evidence found in defendant’s vehicle, . . . the admission
of her report was merely cumulative and did not place any relevant and damaging information
before the jury that the jury did not know already”). In summary, given the properly admitted
testimony by Schoon and Hanie and the substantial other properly admitted evidence of
defendant’s guilt, we detect neither a reasonable probability that but for defense counsel’s
purported error the result of defendant’s trial would have differed, id., nor any plain error that
affected defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
8
Although defendant suggests that the trial court also improperly admitted “his alleged
statements to FBI agents,” he neglects in the supplemental brief to develop the argument or cite
any authority in support of it. Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).
Moreover, Schoon’s and Hanie’s testimony recounting defendant’s own statements was
admissible pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(A). Defendant’s supplemental brief raises no challenge
to the trial court’s admission of Schoon’s handwritten notes, which he used as the foundation for
the written report. The record reflects defense counsel’s view that Schoon’s notes contained
some details and omissions of assistance to the defense.
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