JACK LEONARD DARMER V CITIZENS INSURANCE CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JACK LEONARD DARMER,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 290805
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 03-001881-NI
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
COALITION PROTECTING AUTO NO FAULT,
INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF MICHIGAN,
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,
MICHIGAN INSURANCE COALITION,
MICHIGAN CATASTROPHIC CLAIMS
ASSOCIATION, MICHIGAN ASSOCIATION
FOR JUSTICE, and MICHIGAN CITIZEN
ACTION,
Amicus Curiae.
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BORRELLO and STEPHENS, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Citizens Insurance Company appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting
plaintiff Jack Leonard Darmer’s motion for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(10)
and denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. This case has been before this Court
previously. Darmer v Citizens Ins Co, memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
July 7, 2005 (Docket No. 260479), lv den 475 Mich 907 (2006). In our previous decision, we
reversed, in part, and remanded for the trial court to consider whether, under MCL 500.3109a, “a
question of fact exists as to whether an appropriately reduced premium was provided in light of
[plaintiff’s] employer’s self-funded long-term disability plan and whether the reduction was
‘reasonably related’ to his being entitled to such benefits.” Id., slip op p 2. On remand, the trial
court exceeded the scope of this Court’s remand instructions. Therefore, for the reasons stated in
this opinion, we again reverse and remand for the trial court to consider whether, under MCL
500.3109a, a question of fact exists as to whether an appropriately reduced premium was
-1-
provided in light of plaintiff’s employer’s self-funded long-term disability plan and whether the
reduction was reasonably related to his being entitled to such benefits.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose after plaintiff was involved in a disabling automobile accident on October
11, 2002. Plaintiff was a General Motors employee and was entitled to no-fault work loss
benefits under a coordinated policy issued by defendant. He was also entitled to receive
compensation under General Motors’ self-funded long-term disability (LTD) plan. Defendant
paid plaintiff no-fault work loss benefits, but deducted amounts equivalent to plaintiff’s
disability benefits. Plaintiff filed suit to challenge the coordination of benefits. Defendant
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the reduction or set-off
was proper under MCL 500.3109a. The trial court ruled that defendant was not entitled to
reduce plaintiff’s no-fault work loss benefits by his disability benefits and denied defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. Defendant appealed to this Court. We held the case in
abeyance pending our Supreme Court’s decision in Jarrad v Integon Nat’l Ins Co, 472 Mich 207;
696 NW2d 621 (2005).1 On May 3, 2005, the Supreme Court decided Jarrad, holding “that a
self-funded long-term disability plan constitutes ‘other health and accident coverage’ that is
subject to coordination under MCL 500.3109a.” Jarrad, 472 Mich at 209.
After our Supreme Court released Jarrad, plaintiff filed with this Court a motion to
affirm or to remand for the trial court to engage in further fact finding and consider whether
defendant provided an appropriately reduced premium to plaintiff in light of his employer’s selffunded long-term disability plan and whether any reduction was reasonably related to his being
entitled to such benefits. On July 7, 2005, this Court denied plaintiff’s motion to affirm as
moot.2 On the same day, we issued an unpublished opinion, holding that pursuant to Jarrad,
plaintiff’s LTD plan constituted “other health and accident coverage” that is subject to
coordination under MCL 500.3109a. Darmer, slip op p 2. We therefore reversed the trial
court’s ruling that defendant was not entitled to set-off plaintiff’s LTD benefits and remanded the
case to the trial court with the following instructions:
[P]laintiff maintains that Jarrad, supra, does not resolve the issue of whether
coordination is required here. Instead, pointing to the language of MCL
500.3109a above, he argues that a question of fact exists as to whether an
appropriately reduced premium was provided in light of his employer’s selffunded long-term disability plan and whether the reduction was “reasonably
related” to his being entitled to such benefits. Plaintiff did not argue this claim
below, nor was it decided by the trial court. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s
1
Darmer v Citizens Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 20, 2005
(Docket No. 260479).
2
Darmer v Citizens Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 7, 2005
(Docket No. 260479).
-2-
decision as it pertains to plaintiff’s LTD benefits, and remand for consideration of
plaintiff’s claim. [Id.]
On remand, additional discovery was completed in the form of the depositions of
Douglas Warner, State Manager for personal lines of insurance for defendant, and Randy Parlor,
a Departmental Analyst with the Office of Financial and Insurance Services, formerly the
Michigan Insurance Bureau. The parties filed cross motions for summary disposition. Plaintiff
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), arguing that the provisions of
MCL 500.3109a had not been satisfied because defendant failed to get “prior approval by the
Commissioner” of the reductions in premium rates that it charged for plaintiff’s coordinated
insurance policy. According to plaintiff, Parlor’s testimony established that the insurance
commission has never established any policies or procedures to enable it to determine whether or
not reduced premium rates under MCL 500.3109a are appropriately reduced. Therefore, plaintiff
contended that “the only appropriate relief is to deny coordination of [plaintiff’s] work loss
benefits with his long term disability benefits.” Defendant moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(I)(2), arguing, in relevant part, that plaintiff had not shown that there was a basis to
reform the insurance policy from a coordinated policy to an uncoordinated policy and that there
was no question of fact that defendant provided an appropriately reduced premium.
At the hearing on the parties’ respective motions for summary disposition, plaintiff
argued that reduced premium rates require the prior approval of the insurance commissioner and
that such approval had not been granted. Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s prior approval
argument was not based on this Court’s instructions in remanding the case. The trial court
agreed with plaintiff that defendants had not received prior approval of the insurance
commissioner as required by MCL 500.3109a and granted summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff, holding that “because the provisions of MCL 500.3109a have not been complied with,
the Plaintiff’s insurance policy with Citizens Insurance Company is not a coordinated policy[.]”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of a trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10)3 is as follows:
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
tests the factual support for a claim. Downey v Charlevoix Co Rd Comm’rs, 227
Mich App 621, 625; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). The pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the
parties must be considered by the court when ruling on a motion brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Downey, supra at 626; MCR 2.116(G)(5). When reviewing
a decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this
3
Because the trial court relied on documentary evidence in granting plaintiff’s motion, we will
review this issue as if the trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
-3-
Court “must consider the documentary evidence presented to the trial court ‘in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” DeBrow v Century 21 Great
Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463 Mich 534, 539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001), quoting
Harts v Farmers Ins Exchange, 461 Mich 1, 5; 597 NW2d 47 (1999). A trial
court has properly granted a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) “if the affidavits or other documentary evidence show that there is
no genuine issue in respect to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362;
547 NW2d 314 (1996). [Clerc v Chippewa Co War Mem Hosp, 267 Mich App
597, 601; 705 NW2d 703 (2005), remanded in part 477 Mich 1067 (2007).]
To the extent that this case requires us to engage in statutory interpretation of MCL
500.3109a, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Healing
Place at North Oakland Med Ctr v Allstate Ins Co, 277 Mich App 51, 55; 744 NW2d 174
(2007).
III. ANALYSIS
A. COORDINATION OF BENEFITS UNDER MCL 500.3109a
The no-fault act allows an insured party to elect to coordinate no-fault coverage with
health or accident insurance. MCL 500.3109a; see Smith v Physicians Health Plan, Inc, 444
Mich 743, 750; 514 NW2d 150 (1994). The legislative intent in permitting coordination “was to
provide individuals with an opportunity to reduce premiums if they already had health insurance
that covered automobile accidents.” Id. at 749. When an insured elects coordinated coverage,
the insured pays a lower premium and, in return, the no-fault carrier is secondarily responsible
for certain expenses arising from an accident, while the insured’s other insurer becomes
primarily responsible to the extent of the risk it contracted to cover. See Auto Club Ins Ass’n v
Frederick & Herrud, Inc (After Remand), 443 Mich 358, 384; 505 NW2d 820 (1993). The
coordination of benefits provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3109a, provides:
An insurer providing personal protection insurance benefits shall offer, at
appropriately reduced premium rates, deductibles and exclusions reasonably
related to other health and accident coverage on the insured. The deductibles and
exclusions required to be offered by this section shall be subject to prior approval
by the commissioner and shall apply only to benefits payable to the person named
in the policy, the spouse of the insured and any relative of either domiciled in the
same household.
B. TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ON REMAND
In our previous decision in this case, we remanded to the trial court for consideration of
plaintiff’s claim “that a question of fact exists as to whether an appropriately reduced premium
was provided in light of his employer’s self-funded long-term disability plan and whether the
reduction was ‘reasonably related’ to his being entitled to such benefits.” Darmer, slip op p 2.
This instruction clearly encompassed only the first sentence of MCL 500.3109a: “An insurer
providing personal protection insurance benefits shall offer, at appropriately reduced premium
rates, deductibles and exclusions reasonably related to other health and accident coverage on the
-4-
insured.” Our remand instructions did not encompass a determination by the trial court
regarding the insurance commissioner’s prior approval of defendant’s reduced premium rates,
which involves the second sentence of MCL 500.3109a. Nevertheless, it is clear from its
comments on the record that the trial court focused on the “prior approval by the commissioner”
language in the second sentence of MCL 500.3109a:
Thank you. And Plaintiff in the Court of Appeals conceded that Jarrad
was controlling for the purpose of determining that no-fault benefits may, in
general, be coordinated with his LTD plan. That’s—I’m quoting from the Court
of Appeals’ decision:
However, Plaintiff—Instead, pointing to the language of MCL
500.3109(a) [sic] above, he argues that a question of fact exists as
to whether an appropriately reduced premium was provided in
light of his employer’s self-funded long-term disability plan and
whether the reduction was reasonably related to his being entitled
to such benefits.
That’s basically the language of 500.3109(a) [sic], which says:
The deductibles and exclusions required to be offered by this
section shall be subject to prior approval by the commissioner and
shall apply only to benefits payable to the person named in the
policy.
The word shall is defined in case law. It means mandatory. It’s not
discretionary. It’s not permissive. It shall be subject to prior approval by the
commissioner. And I realize Defendant and the carrier submitted all of the
documents that appeared to be necessary for requesting coordinated—it looks like
everything was submitted perfectly in order from my review of that submission.
However, I question—I don’t think that constitutes prior approval of the
commissioner. Simply by no action on behalf—on the part of the commissioner
equals approval by the insurance commissioner.
***
So, therefore, the Court finds that although the coordination is permissible and is
allowable by law, I don’t believe that 500.3109(a) [sic] has been complied with
because there is no action. There is no final decision of approval by the insurance
commissioner. So the Court is—so the Court is granting summary disposition in
favor of Plaintiff that the subject insurance policy at this point is a noncoordinated
insurance policy.
Curiously, the trial court correctly articulated our instructions on remand, but then only quoted
the second sentence of MCL 500.3109a, which is the portion of the statute requiring the prior
approval of the insurance commissioner. The trial court’s statements on the record indicate that
it focused exclusively on the question of prior approval.
-5-
The trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition and denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition also demonstrates its failure to adhere to our
instructions on remand. According to the order, this Court remanded “for consideration of
whether or not there has been proper compliance with MCL 500.3109a[.]” As noted above, our
instructions on remand were not as broad or general as this. We did not instruct the trial court to
determine general compliance with MCL 500.3109a; to the contrary, our remand instructions
specifically limited the trial court’s determination on remand to a determination regarding the
first sentence of MCL 500.3109a.
“[W]hen an appellate court gives clear instructions in its remand order, it is improper for
a lower court to exceed the scope of the order.” K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t of Environmental
Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 544; 705 NW2d 365 (2005). “‘It is the duty of the lower court or
tribunal, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the appellate court.’” Id. at 544-545,
quoting Rodriguez v Gen Motors Corp (On Remand), 204 Mich App 509, 514; 516 NW2d 105
(1994). In this case, our clear instructions to the trial court limited the scope of remand to a
determination regarding the first sentence in MCL 500.3109a and did not implicate the second
sentence in the statute relating to prior approval by the insurance commissioner. Therefore, the
trial court failed to strictly comply with our instructions in granting summary disposition in favor
of plaintiff based on the lack of prior approval of the reduced premium rates by the insurance
commissioner. Such a determination was outside of our clearly articulated instructions on
remand and was improper.
Finally, even if we had not concluded that the trial court’s ruling in this case exceeded the
scope of our remand instructions, we would question the trial court’s remedy in this case. The
trial court’s ruling effectively reformed the insurance contract by transforming it from
coordinated coverage to a policy that was not coordinated. Courts will reform a contract to
reflect the parties’ actual intent where there is a mutual mistake, fraud, or the instrument does not
express the true intent of the parties.4 Olsen v Porter, 213 Mich App 25, 29; 539 NW2d 523
(1995). In this case, however, there was no mutual mistake or fraud, and the policy expressed
the parties’ true intent.
In Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 465-470; 703 NW2d 23 (2005), our
Supreme Court held that a court may not modify or refuse to enforce a provision in an insurance
contract based on a judicial determination of reasonableness because to do so undermines the
parties’ freedom to contract. As the Supreme Court explained:
A fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence is that unambiguous contracts
are not open to judicial construction and must be enforced as written. Courts
enforce contracts according to their unambiguous terms because doing so respects
the freedom of individuals freely to arrange their affairs via contract. This Court
has previously noted that “‘[t]he general rule [of contracts] is that competent
4
Although Olsen did not involve an insurance contract, “insurance policies are subject to the
same contract construction principles that apply to any other species of contract.” Rory v
Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005) (emphasis in original).
-6-
persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their agreements
voluntarily and fairly made shall be held valid and enforced in the courts.’”
[Rory, 473 Mich at 468 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).]
Although the trial court’s reformation of the insurance policy in this case was not based
on a judicial determination of reasonableness, it nonetheless undermines plaintiff’s freedom to
contract for the purchase of a coordinated insurance policy. The judiciary should not rewrite an
insurance contract that was freely entered into if the contract does not violate the law or public
policy. Id. at 469.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxation of costs pursuant to
MCR 7.219, a public question being involved.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.