VERNA SPAYTH V CITY OF ANN ARBOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
VERNA SPAYTH,
UNPUBLISHED
December 7, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292460
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 08-001000-NO
CITY OF ANN ARBOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and ZAHRA and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary
disposition based on governmental immunity. We reverse and remand. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This case concerns the notice provision of the highway exception to governmental
immunity. MCL 691.1404. The facts are not in dispute. The only issue is whether the written
notice plaintiff provided was adequate.
Plaintiff, a wheelchair user, was allegedly injured while navigating defendant’s ramped
sidewalk at the curb cut leading to a crosswalk on August 25, 2008. On September 22, 2008,
plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to defendant, giving notice of plaintiff’s intent to file suit. The
letter identified “a theory of general negligence for failing to maintain/construct/design
sidewalks . . . located near street address 700 Packard, Ann Arbor, Michigan.” The letter further
stated that plaintiff “suffered injury.” On October 2, 2008, plaintiff filed suit alleging, in
relevant part, that the incident occurred on a public sidewalk “located near the cross section of
Packard and State Streets” and that as plaintiff “was attempting to navigate her power chair
down a curb and into the street, she was thrown from her chair due to uneven portions of
concrete, steep incline and slope.” The complaint identified plaintiff’s injuries with specificity.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff failed to comply with
the notice requirements of MCL 691.1404 and that as a result, defendant was unable to identify
the exact location of the alleged defect. Defendant did not argue that the information in the
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complaint could not be combined with that of the letter, but instead asserted that the information
was insufficient even when both documents were considered together. In her response brief,
plaintiff included two photographs of the site that clarified the location.1
The trial court disagreed with defendant’s argument. Under Burise v Pontiac, 282 Mich
App 646; 766 NW2d 311 (2009), the plaintiff did not have to include all the information in her
first notice as long as all the required information was given within the 120-day time limit. The
Burise Court found the location of the defect sufficiently identified where it was said to be
between two addresses. The trial court found the location given in this case—a steep and uneven
ramp near 700 Packard—similarly sufficient.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that is also considered de novo on appeal. Detroit v
Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221 (2008).
The governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., provides that a governmental
agency is immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function unless a specific
exception applies. MCL 691.1407(1). The highway exception to governmental immunity, MCL
691.1402(1), requires a governmental agency to maintain a highway under its jurisdiction in
reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The definition of
“highway” includes sidewalks. MCL 691.1401(e).
To bring a claim under the highway exception, a plaintiff must first provide notice in
accordance with MCL 691.1404(1), which provides in relevant part:
As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any
defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury
occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on
the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The
notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury
sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.
[Emphasis added.]
In Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 200; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), our
Supreme Court stated that, at least as regards the highway exception to governmental immunity,
there must be strict compliance with the conditions and restrictions of the statute. Substantial
compliance is not sufficient. Id.
As noted above, the complaint identified the location of the defect as a public sidewalk
“near 700 Packard” and “near the cross section of Packard and State Streets,” and that plaintiff
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These photographs were not supplied within 120 days of the accident, and thus cannot be
considered part of plaintiff’s original notice. See MCL 691.1404(1).
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was going “down a curb and into the street.” The nature of the defect is identified as “uneven
portions of concrete, steep incline and slope.”
In Smith v City of Warren, 11 Mich App 449, 451; 161 NW2d 412 (1968), this Court held
the location was insufficiently identified by “Thirteen Mile Road and Hoover, near the address of
11480 Thirteen Mile Road” because it failed to specify which of the four corners of the named
intersection was involved. In Burise, which the trial court here found analogous, photographs
were included with the written description, and the defect was identified as “an extremely deep,
wide and long pothole that had been in disrepair.” The trial court here erred in comparing the
single-address description provided in the present case with the description and photographs
provided in Burise; rather, we find Smith is analogous. It would have been simple enough for
plaintiff to include a photo with her letter, or a diagram with an “x” on it. Plaintiff’s counsel’s
motion argument that this description was “the best that we can do” is unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s
later efforts to show and explain where the defect was demonstrates that much more could have
been done. The map defendant provides shows that “near 700 Packard” describes a large portion
of sidewalk. And plaintiff never stated in her letter or complaint that she was going down the
curb-cut ramp. From her description, she could as well have been going over the curb itself.
Finally, the nature of the defect is also inadequate. Uneven concrete is ubiquitous and
that allegation by itself does establish the existence of a defective condition making the sidewalk
unreasonably dangerous. The steepness of the slope is, as defendant points out, a design issue
and not actionable. Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, 478 Mich 492; 638 NW2d 396 (2002).
The trial court erred in holding that plaintiff’s notice was sufficient.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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