JEANNINE COOPER-JAMES V TEXAS ROAD HOUSE OF ROSEVILLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JEANNINE COOPER-JAMES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 293797
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-003592-NO
TEXAS ROADHOUSE OF ROSEVILLE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and MARKEY and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
In 2006, plaintiff was a customer in defendant’s restaurant. She was sitting in the waiting
area, waiting for a table, when a neon and metal sign hanging in the window behind her fell,
hitting her shoulder and injuring her. The sign had been hanging since 2004 by a chain hooked
on a screw attached to the wall above the window. Plaintiff sued, alleging that the sign “was not
secure or was overloaded or was in a precarious or unstable position and placed there in an
unreasonable manner.” Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff had no
proof of negligence. Defendant maintained that there was no proof a defect existed and no proof
that defendant had notice of a defect. Plaintiff responded that the doctrine of res ispa loquitur
applied because what happened—the sign falling without anyone bumping or pulling on it—
normally does not happen in the absence of negligence. Plaintiff noted that the screw holding
the sign was well above the reach of any customers, so it was in defendant’s exclusive control.
Plaintiff also noted that defendant took the sign out of the public area after the incident and so
the evidence of the reason it fell was not available to plaintiff.
The trial court agreed with defendant, finding that ordinary negligence was not
established because there was no evidence that defendant had notice of a defect. The court
noted, “[P]laintiff’s theory that the screw came loose due to repeated pulling on the string to turn
it off and off [sic] or from vibrations from the operation of the doors is mere supposition.
Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest the screw came loose.”
The court also rejected
plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur theory, finding that although the sign would not be expected to fall in
the absence of negligence, the sign’s location in the public area meant that numerous people
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outside of defendant’s control had access to it and that plaintiff, who stayed and dined after the
incident, could have examined the sign, chain, and screw but did not.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although
substantively admissible evidence submitted at the time of the motion must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the non-moving party must come forward
with at least some evidentiary proof, some statement of specific fact upon which to base his case.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Skinner v Square D Co, 445
Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
The trial court did not err in dismissing this case. First, there is no evidence that
defendant acted negligently in any way. To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff
must prove four elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that
duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701 NW2d
684 (2005). Breach of the duty requires determination of a general standard of care and a
specific standard of care; causation requires both cause in fact and proximate cause. Case v
Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6 n 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). Cause in fact requires that the
harmful result would not have come about but for the negligent conduct. Martin v Ledingham,
282 Mich App 158, 161; 774 NW2d 328 (2009). Cause in fact may be established by
circumstantial evidence, but such proof must be subject to reasonable inferences and not mere
speculation. Skinner, 445 Mich at 163-164. An explanation that is consistent with known facts
but not deducible from them is impermissible conjecture. Id. at 164.
In this case, while defendant owes plaintiff a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably
safe condition, there is no evidence that it failed to do so, other than the mere fact that the sign
fell. Deciding whether this was due to a defective screw, a defective wood frame, a negligent
hanging job, someone bumping or pulling on the sign, or just something that happened due to the
passing of time requires speculation. Plaintiff prefers the explanation that vibrational forces
caused it to fall, but she provides no evidence that the sign actually was subject to such forces,
that they would be sufficient to cause it to fall, or that defendant had any notice of them.
Although the trial court agreed with plaintiff that the sign would not have fallen in the absence of
negligence, there is no evidence that this is so. That is, it is pure speculation to say that a person
acting without negligence would have secured the sign in a different manner, e.g., with a bigger
or stronger screw or with more than one attachment point. Nor is there any evidence that
periodic inspection would have revealed the condition or that the condition should have been
inspected sooner than the two years it hung there unobserved.
Nor does res ipsa loquitur save plaintiff’s case. Proof of negligent conduct can be
established by a permissible inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence. To invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the event was of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) that it was caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) that it was not due to any
voluntary action of the plaintiff; and (4) that evidence of the true explanation of the event was
more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff. Woodard v Custer, 473 Mich 1, 67; 702 NW2d 522 (2005).
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Although the trial court accepted plaintiff’s assertion that this event was of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, plaintiff must produce some evidence of
wrongdoing beyond the mere happening of the event, Fuller v Wurzburg Dry Goods Co, 192
Mich 447, 448; 158 NW 1026 (1916), and plaintiff failed to do so. Moreover, the hanging
screw may have been outside normal reach of defendant’s customers, but the photographs clearly
show that anyone could have tugged on or bumped the sign at any time. Even though no one did
so while plaintiff waited, there is no reason why earlier contact, combined with plaintiff’s
“vibrational forces” could not be the cause. Finally, plaintiff’s argument, that evidence of the
true explanation of the event was more readily accessible to defendant than to plaintiff, fails
because plaintiff apparently made no attempt to inspect the evidence until the notice to produce,
filed October 16, 2008, over two years after the incident. There is no evidence that defendant
attempted to prevent plaintiff from inspecting the evidence, and plaintiff’s failure to ask does not
amount to the evidence being unavailable.
Finally, plaintiff’s argument for an inference that the missing screw establishes proof of
defendant’s negligence is unfounded. The rule plaintiff cites, as explained in Trupiano, is “‘the
intentional spoliation or destruction of evidence raises the presumption against the spoliator
where the evidence was relevant to the case or where it was his duty to preserve it, since his
conduct may properly be attributed to his supposed knowledge that the truth would operate
against him.’” 349 Mich at 570, quoting 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § 185, p 191. However, the
Court noted that there was more to the rule than this:
The full section continues, however:
“Such a presumption can be applied only where there was intentional conduct
indicating fraud and a desire to destroy and thereby suppress the truth. Moreover,
while the spoliation of evidence raises a presumption against the person guilty of
such act, yet such presumption does not relieve the other party from introducing
evidence tending affirmatively to prove his case, insofar as he has the burden of
proof. The spoliation or suppression of evidence is a circumstance open to
explanation.” [Id.]
There is no evidence in this case that defendant acted with intent. Indeed, the manager indicated
that the screw in the photographs taken after the event may or may not be the same one.
Moreover, even if a presumption arises that the screw would have been detrimental to
defendant’s case, there is no proof if this was because it had broken, had come out of the wall,
was defectively manufactured, was too small, was not angled correctly, or whether defendant had
been negligent at all in using the screw.
Affirmed.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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