IRA GORDON V JIM LIPPENS CONSTRUCTION INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
IRA GORDON and YOLANDA GORDON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2010
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
JIM LIPPENS CONSTRUCTION, INC. and JIM
LIPPENS,
No. 293084
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-003082-CK
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHIKAMING TOWNSHIP,
Defendant,
and
HOWARD GAUL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and SERVITTO and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Howard Gaul, appeals as of right the trial court order denying his motion for
summary disposition that was based, in part, on governmental immunity. Because Gaul’s
conduct was not “the” proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, he was entitled to governmental
immunity. We therefore reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition
in Gaul’s favor.
Plaintiffs contracted with defendants, Jim Lippens Construction, Inc., and Jim Lippens,
for the construction of a single-family residence in Chikaming Township. The house was to be
constructed according to architectural plans, and was subject to periodic inspections by the
township building inspector.
Defendant, Howard Gaul is, and was at the time plaintiffs’ house was built, the
Chikaming Township building official, plan reviewer, and building inspector. Gaul inspected
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the framing of plaintiffs’ home as it was being built, and approved the framing in early 2004.
Gaul issued a certificate of occupancy for the home in January 2005.
In early 2006, plaintiffs noticed a deflection in the slope of their roof. They retained
consultants, who advised that the home, particularly the framing and structure of the roof, had
not been built in accordance with the architectural plans or the applicable building code, and was
not constructed in a workmanlike manner. Plaintiffs thereafter initiated the instant lawsuit,
setting forth various claims against Jim Lippens Construction, Inc., and Jim Lippens, and
asserting that Chikaming Township and Gaul were grossly negligent in performing their
proprietary functions.
Both Chikaming Township and Gaul moved for summary disposition claiming, among
other things, governmental immunity. The trial court granted the Township’s motion, but denied
Gaul’s motion, opining that Gaul owed a common law duty to plaintiffs and that a reasonable
juror could find that Gaul was both grossly negligent in the execution of his duties, and was the
one most immediate and direct cause of the roof system failure. Gaul (hereafter “defendant”)
now appeals the trial court’s decision.
This Court reviews summary disposition rulings de novo. Thorn v Mercy Mem Hosp
Corp, 281 Mich App 644, 647; 761 NW2d 414, 417 (2008). Summary disposition under MCL
2.116(C)(7) is proper when a claim is barred by immunity granted by law to a defendant. Fane v
Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68, 74; 631 NW2d 678 (2001). In reviewing a motion under
subrule (C)(7), we accept the plaintiffs' well-pleaded allegations as true and consider any
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
Hanley v Mazda Motor Corp, 239 Mich App 596, 600; 609 NW2d 203 (2000). The plaintiff has
the burden to allege facts that justify applying an exception to governmental immunity. Tarlea v
Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 87-88; 687 NW2d 333 (2004). “[W]hen no reasonable person could
find that a governmental employee's conduct was grossly negligent,” summary disposition is
properly granted. Id. at 88. Because the claims in this case involve the governmental immunity
act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., we are presented with issues of statutory construction which, being
questions of law, we also review de novo. Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit, 478
Mich 412, 417; 733 NW2d 755 (2007).
Defendant first contends that he is entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to MCL
691.1407(2) because he was not “the” proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. We agree.
MCL 691.1407(2) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and
employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a
governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or
statutorily created task force of a governmental agency is immune from tort
liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer,
employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or caused by
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the
following are met:
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(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably
believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.
(c) The officer's, employee's, member's, or volunteer's conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.
The Legislature's reference to “the proximate cause”-as opposed to “a proximate cause”- is
significant and means that the employee’s gross negligence must be more than just a proximate
cause (such as when there are several tortfeasers) of the injury in order to meet the requirements
of the exception to the governmental employee’s immunity. See, Lameau v City of Royal Oak,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No.’s 290059 and 292006, issued July 13, 2010).
The “Legislature's use of the definite article ‘the’ [in the statute] clearly evinces an intent to
focus on one cause.” Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 458-459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).1
Thus, to be “the” proximate cause of an injury, gross negligence of a government employee
must be “the one most immediate, efficient and direct cause of the injury or damage.” Id. at 462
(emphasis added).
In Rakowski v Sarb, 269 Mich App 619, 636; 713 NW2d 787 (2006), an individual was
injured when a railing on a ramp of a friend’s home gave way. The injured party brought suit
against various persons and entities, including the building inspector who had approved the
allegedly defectively built structure. This Court, citing Robinson, held that even if the building
inspector’s approval of that structure constituted gross negligence, the inspector’s gross
negligence still could not be deemed the proximate cause of the injury because the inspector’s
alleged misconduct was not “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the injury.
The Rakowski court explained:
. . . it is beyond dispute that the loose handrail caused Ms. Rakowski to fall and
sustain injuries. Regardless of whether, six months before her injury, Mr. Sarb
correctly approved the ramp during his inspection, his conduct could not be “the
one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of Ms. Rakowski's injury.
Therefore, the trial court should have granted summary disposition to Mr. Sarb.
Id. at 636.
Here, in similar fashion, plaintiffs’ claim of injury is the faulty construction of their
home--which arose directly and most substantially from the work done by the construction
company. The risk of harm was created by the construction company. The allegation against
defendant is essentially that he failed to find the defects and deficiencies after they already
existed. The damages are the result of the poor construction, not the result of the failure to
1
In 1986, the Legislature amended MCL 691.1407(2)(c) to require that a government employee's
actions be “the” proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, rather than “a” proximate cause of the
injury. 1986 PA 175; Miller v. Lord, 262 Mich App 640, 644; 686 NW2d 800 (2004).
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discover the poor construction. Had defendant discovered the alleged roof defects upon
inspection, the defects would have needed to be corrected upon discovery rather than at a later
point in time. In any event, the roof would have needed additional work performed regardless of
the defendant’s findings. At most, defendant’s actions may have contributed to an increased cost
of repair. Further, if the faulty workmanship had not been in existence, due to the actions of the
construction company, there would have been no tort to which defendant could have contributed.
Thus, “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the damages was the poor
workmanship of the construction company. Because defendant’s conduct may have been a
proximate cause, but was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, he is entitled to
immunity under MCL 691.1407(2) and his motion for summary disposition should have been
granted.
As plaintiffs point out, this case does differ from Rakowski, in that the inspector in
Rakowski had no direct or indirect relationship with the injured party, the injured party was an
invitee of the homeowner, and the inspector’s role in conducting the inspection was to visually
assess the completed ramp for code violations. Here, in contrast, defendant had at least one
conversation with the homeowners (the subject of which is disputed), the homeowners are the
injured parties, and defendant inspected the construction during the framing of the home.
However, the relationship between the parties is more determinative of whether defendant owed
a common law duty to plaintiffs, not whether his inspection was the one most direct proximate
cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. And, the fact that defendant inspected the home during its
construction and issued an approval is not of significance. Again, absent the allegedly shoddy
workmanship and code violations by the construction company in existence before defendant
conducted his inspections, there would have been no alleged injuries or the instant cause of
action.
Given our findings concerning “the” proximate cause issue, we need not consider
whether defendant owed a common law duty to plaintiffs or whether defendant was grossly
negligent. Even assuming a duty existed, or that defendant engaged in grossly negligent
conduct, the proximate cause element is lacking. Because defendant’s actions were not the
proximate cause of plaintiffs’ alleged injuries, defendant is entitled to immunity under MCL
691.1407(2).
Reversed and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in defendant’s
favor. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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