PEOPLE OF MI V NICHOLAS JOHN HORAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 292422
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 09-057367-FH
NICHOLAS JOHN HORAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and MARKEY and WILDER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of child
sexually abusive material, MCL 750.145c(4), and three counts of using a computer to a commit
crime, MCL 752.797(3)(f). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 23 to 48 months
each for the child sexually abusive material convictions and 56 to 84 months for two of the
computer-related convictions, and a term of 49 to 84 months for the third computer-related
conviction, the latter term to be served consecutively to one of the child sexually abusive
material sentences. He was sentenced to 49 to 84 months in prison for the remaining using a
computer to a commit crime conviction (count VI), which was consecutive to the third
possession conviction (count III). Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the discovery of child pornography on a computer in
defendant’s home. The principal defense theory at trial was that someone other than defendant
downloaded the material onto the computer.
I. VALIDITY OF SEARCH
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
that was discovered during a search of his home computer, which defendant contends was
illegally seized and then illegally searched.
We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate determination on a motion to suppress, but
review the court’s factual determinations regarding the validity and scope of consent for clear
error, giving deference to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting evidence and witness
credibility. People v Dagwan, 269 Mich App 338, 342; 711 NW2d 386 (2005). A finding is
clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made. Id.
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The evidence showed that the police contacted defendant’s wife, Barbie Horan, after
receiving information that a member of her household may have been sexually abused by another
family member. Barbie disclosed to Trooper Chris Prevette that defendant viewed pornography
on the home computer. The police obtained Barbie’s consent to take the computer, following
which it conducted an examination of the computer’s contents. The police discovered more than
3,000 files of pornography, including some files that depicted child pornography. Defendant
does not challenge Barbie’s authority to give consent to the computer’s removal. Rather, he
argues that her consent was not voluntary, and further argues that, even if it were voluntary, she
consented only to the removal of the computer from the home, not a search of the data content
stored inside. We disagree.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a person’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Generally,
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. Dagwan, 269 Mich App at 342. However,
voluntary consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. The consent exception to the
warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is unequivocal and specific, and
freely and intelligently given. People v Beydoun, 283 Mich App 314, 337; 770 NW2d 54 (2009).
The validity of a consent is determined under the totality of the circumstances, which is a
question of fact. Dagwan, 269 Mich App at 342.
A. VOLUNTARINESS
Defendant argues that Barbie was unable to freely and intelligently consent to the seizure
of the home computer because of her physical and emotional condition at the time consent was
given, and because any purported consent was obtained through police coercion and threats from
a Protective Services worker that her children would be taken away if she did not cooperate.
However, the only evidence of Barbie’s severe emotional state and physical manifestations, the
alleged police coercion, and threat to take away her children, was Barbie’s testimony. In contrast
to Barbie’s testimony, Trooper Prevette testified that although Barbie seemed very concerned
about the allegations of sexual abuse against a family member, she was cooperative and, when he
asked her if she was okay, she stated that she was fine. Trooper Prevette also testified that
Barbie never mentioned having a doctor’s appointment and denied that she was ever prevented
from seeing a doctor or picking up medication, as Barbie had claimed.
Trooper Prevette explained that after he informed Barbie of the nature of the allegations,
Barbie mentioned that defendant watched pornography on the home computer, so he asked her if
he could take it for further investigation. She consented. Kim Watson, a Children’s Protective
Services investigator, was with Trooper Prevette at the time and heard Barbie verbally consent to
the computer’s seizure. Later, after Barbie returned to her home, another officer, Trooper John
Forner, took the computer after Barbie signed a written consent form. Conflicting testimony was
presented concerning the events at the home. Trooper Forner denied Barbie’s claims that Barbie
had already left the house before the police arrived, that the police threatened to break inside the
house if Barbie did not return to let them in, and that the police forced Barbie to carry the
computer outside.
As the trial court observed, the determination whether Barbie’s consent was voluntarily
given depended largely on credibility. The trial court expressly found that Barbie’s testimony
was not credible. We disagree with defendant’s argument that the trial court’s credibility
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determination should not be given deference. The trial court was in a superior position to
evaluate credibility. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822
(2000); MCR 2.613(C). Moreover, its credibility determination was based in part on Barbie’s
specific lack of memory. Barbie was able to consistently answer defense counsel’s questions,
but often had memory lapses during questioning by the prosecutor. Further, Barbie’s testimony
lacked independent corroboration. Under the circumstances, we find no reason to disturb the
trial court’s credibility determinations. Given those determinations, the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that Barbie’s consent was freely and intelligently given.
B. SCOPE
Defendant also challenges the scope of Barbie’s consent. He contends that Barbie only
consented to the seizure of the computer, not a search of its contents. We disagree.
The scope of a person’s consent to search is determined under an objective standard.
Dagwan, 269 Mich App at 343. It is what the typical reasonable person would have understood
it to be under the circumstances. Id. The scope of a search is generally defined by its express
object. Id.
Here, the object of the search was a computer. Although Barbie testified that she was not
told that the police wanted to examine the computer’s contents, Trooper Prevette expressed an
interest in the computer only after Barbie told him that defendant had watched a lot of
pornography on it. Further, Trooper Prevette testified that he told Barbie that he wanted to take
the computer for further investigation. Moreover, a reasonable person would know that a
computer could be used to commit crimes and contain child sexually abusive material in the
form of electronic images. Id. at 344. Under the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for
the police to believe that Barbie’s consent included consent to examine the contents of the
computer.
Defendant is correct that the terms “search” and “seizure” have different meanings under
the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 16; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)
(defining terms “search” and seizure”). However, the analysis of the scope of Barbie’s verbal
consent is not limited to only the words that were used. It is only one factor to consider in
determining what a typical reasonable person would have understood the scope to be based on
the exchange between the officer and the person giving consent. See Dagwan, 269 Mich App at
343-345.
Defendant also focuses on the fact that only the first section of the written consent form
that Barbie signed was checked. The first section authorized the police “[t]o conduct a complete
search of the premises and property including all buildings and vehicles, both inside and outside
the property located at: [Barbie and defendant’s residence].” The second section, which was not
checked, authorized the police “[t]o conduct a complete search of the motor vehicle . . . including
the interior, trunk, engine compartment, and all containers therein.” Defendant asserts that
because the word “containers” is not included in the first section, and because the second section
was not checked, Barbie’s consent to search did not extend to a search of the computer’s
contents. We disagree.
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By its express terms, the second section applies only to searches of motor vehicles. In
this case, the computer was located inside Barbie and defendant’s house, not an automobile.
Thus, the second section was not applicable. Accordingly, it is immaterial that the second
section was not checked. The language of the first section is sufficiently broad to include
containers. As in the second section, the first section authorizes the police to conduct a
“complete” search of the “premises and property,” thereby authorizing a total, unqualified, or
thorough search. Dagwan, 269 Mich App at 344-345. The language is broad enough to lead a
reasonable person to understand that the scope of consent that was given in this case included a
search of the computer’s data content. Id. at 345. Under the totality of the circumstances, the
trial court did not clearly err in determining that the scope of Barbie’s consent, whether verbal or
written, included a search of the computer’s content.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the computer.
II. OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE
The charges in this case arose from a police investigation that began after a child in
defendant’s household made allegations of sexual misconduct against defendant. The trial court
granted the prosecutor’s motion to admit evidence of defendant’s alleged misconduct under
MRE 404(b)(1). Defendant challenges that decision. We review for an abuse of discretion a
trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b). People v
Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 670; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). A trial court abuses its discretion
when it chooses an outcome that is outside the principled range of outcomes. People v
Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 460; 751 NW2d 408 (2008).
A. ADMISSIBILITY
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
To be admissible under MRE 404(b)(1), evidence of other bad acts (1) must be offered
for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant, and (3) its probative value may not be substantially
outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d
366 (2004). A proper purpose is one other than establishing the defendant’s character to show
his propensity to commit the offense. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), mod 445 Mich 1205 (1994). The prosecutor bears the burden of establishing relevance.
Knox, 469 Mich at 509. Evidence is relevant if it could make a material fact in issue more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id.
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Proffered evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it presents a danger that marginally probative
evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury, People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184,
198; 783 NW2d 67 (2010), or it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence, Waclawski,
286 Mich App at 672. The determination whether the probative value of evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect is best left to a contemporaneous assessment of
the presentation, credibility, and effect of the testimony. Id. at 670.
The prosecutor sought to admit evidence of defendant’s sexual contact with a family
member to show that he had a sexual interest in children, making it more likely that he was the
person who downloaded the child pornography onto his computer. MRE 404(b)(1) expressly
allows other acts evidence to be introduced for the purpose of proving identity. Moreover,
identity was the principal issue at trial in light of the defense theory that other people had access
to the computer and could have downloaded the illegal pornography.
To be admissible, however, the evidence must be logically relevant to the purpose for
which it is offered. In People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388-389; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), the
Court explained:
Pursuant to MRE 401, evidence is relevant if two components are present,
materiality and probative value. Materiality is the requirement that the proffered
evidence be related to “any fact that is of consequence” to the action. “In other
words, is the fact to be proven truly in issue?” A fact that is “of consequence” to
the action is a material fact. “Materiality looks to the relation between the
propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the
evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue, the
evidence is immaterial.”
It is well established in Michigan that all elements of a criminal offense
are “in issue” when a defendant enters a plea of not guilty. Because the
prosecution must carry the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable
doubt, regardless of whether the defendant specifically disputes or offers to
stipulate any of the elements, the elements of the offense are always “in issue”
and, thus, material. [Citations omitted.]
Here, the evidence was offered for its relevance in establishing defendant’s identity as the
person who downloaded the child pornography onto the computer and thus possessed it.
Defendant’s identity as the person who committed the charged offenses was an essential element
that the prosecutor needed to prove. Therefore, the evidence was material.
For evidence to be relevant, it must also have probative value. In Crawford, id. at 389390, the Supreme Court stated:
The probative force inquiry asks whether the proffered evidence tends “to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
The threshold is minimal: “any” tendency is sufficient probative force. In the
context of prior acts evidence, however, MRE 404(b) stands as a sentinel at the
gate: the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something other than the
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defendant’s propensity to commit the crime. If the prosecutor fails to weave a
logical thread linking the prior act to the ultimate inference, the evidence must be
excluded, notwithstanding its logical relevance to character. [Citations omitted;
emphasis in original.]
In this case, the charged offenses were based on three videos on defendant’s computer,
each of which depicted a young female child engaged in sexual conduct. The evidence of
defendant’s uncharged sexual misconduct toward a female child in his household and the
evidence that defendant frequently watched pornography on his computer permitted the jury to
infer that defendant was sexually attracted to young girls, and that he used his computer to view
child pornography, making it more likely that he was the person who downloaded the child
pornography that was found on his computer. Accordingly, the evidence was relevant to a
proper purpose under MRE 404(b)(1).
Lastly, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Although the evidence had a tendency to complicate the issues at
trial, and defendant asserted that the family member had recanted her allegations, the probative
value of the evidence was great, given that it was relevant to the principal issue at trial. The fact
that the “sleeping girl” video and the uncharged acts were substantially similar increased the
evidence’s probative value, as did defendant’s admission that the similar acts occurred on one
occasion, albeit accidentally. Also, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that was designed to
minimize any prejudicial effect. Further, the limited form of the evidence that was presented, as
opposed to calling the child family member to testify concerning the alleged abuse, reduced the
potential prejudicial effect of the evidence. Under the circumstances, the trial court’s
determination that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes and, accordingly,
the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
Defendant also argues that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated because the
trial court allowed the prosecutor to use this trial to test the evidentiary strength of the other acts
evidence for a potential prosecution for second-degree criminal sexual conduct based on the
family member’s allegations. Because defendant did not object to the evidence on this basis at
trial, this issue is not preserved. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004) (an
objection on one ground is insufficient to preserve an appellate attack on a different ground).
Accordingly, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Knox,
469 Mich at 508. Essentially, defendant contends that evidence of uncharged misconduct should
not be admitted when it is possible that the alleged misconduct could be the subject of criminal
charges in the future. Defendant cites no authority for this proposition and does not explain how
the authority he does cite supports his position. Accordingly, he may be deemed to have
abandoned this argument. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Regardless, we find no merit to this issue. “MRE 404(b) specifically addresses the admissibility
of uncharged conduct.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 499; 577 NW2d 673 (1998) (emphasis in
original). The rule contains no limitation on uncharged conduct that otherwise satisfies the rule’s
requirements for admissibility. Further, our Supreme Court has stated that proper employment
of the evidentiary safeguards in MRE 404(b) sufficiently protects a defendant’s right to a fair
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trial. Crawford, 458 Mich at 385-388; Starr, 457 Mich at 496. Accordingly, there was no plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
III. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
Defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence for one
of his convictions for using a computer to commit a crime. We review for an abuse of discretion
a trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentencing. People v St John, 230 Mich App 644,
646; 585 NW2d 849 (1998).
In Michigan, concurrent sentencing is the norm, and a court may impose consecutive
sentences only if authorized by statute. People v Brown, 220 Mich App 680, 682; 560 NW2d 80
(1996). The Legislature has authorized consecutive sentencing for a conviction involving the use
of a computer to commit a crime. MCL 752.797(4).1 “The purpose of consecutive sentencing is
to ‘enhance the punishment imposed upon those who have been found guilty of more serious
crimes and who repeatedly engage in criminal acts.’” People v Chambers, 430 Mich 217, 229;
421 NW2d 903 (1988) (citation and emphasis omitted). “The ‘[i]mposition of a consecutive
sentence is strong medicine. It may well be warranted in some cases. But it should be used only
after awareness of a sentence already imposed so that the punitive effect of the consecutive
sentence is carefully considered at the time of its imposition.’” Id. at 231 (citation omitted).
In this case, the trial court imposed a consecutive sentence for the use of a computer
conviction that related to defendant’s possession of the “Vicky” file. The court stated, “That
Vicky tape was appalling. All the tapes were disturbing, but that Vicky tape involving a girl that
couldn’t be more than eight or nine, doing what she was coaxed to do, with a grown man, and the
degradation that culminated at the end is just terrible.” The court also commented that people
who download child pornography contribute to its demand.2 Defendant does not dispute the trial
court’s description of the images, but rather argues that consecutive sentencing is more
appropriate in cases where a defendant is the purchaser, producer, distributor, or collector of
large quantities of child sexually abusive material. Although we agree that these factors may be
appropriate considerations in deciding whether to impose a consecutive sentence, we disagree
with defendant’s argument that the content of child sexually abusive material cannot also provide
a basis for imposing a consecutive sentence. Although defendant contends, and we agree, that all
child pornography is offensive, it is not inappropriate for a trial court to take into consideration
1
Subsection (4) provides:
The court may order that a term of imprisonment imposed under
subsection (3) be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for
conviction of the underlying offense.
2
Defendant not only demonstrated an interest in child pornography through the files categorized
as such on his computer, but also by the multitude of other files that contained names suggestive
of child images.
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the increasing degree of indecency or vulgarity when deciding whether to impose a consecutive
sentence.
Defendant also argues that the longer maximum prison term for using a computer to
commit an underlying offense, when compared to the maximum term for the underlying
offense,3 is itself sufficient additional punishment. However, because the Legislature both
established the maximum penalty for using a computer to commit a crime and authorized a
consecutive sentence for a conviction of that offense, this argument is not a persuasive basis for
finding that the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence was improper. Ultimately, this
Court’s task is to determine whether the outcome selected by the trial court is a reasonable and
principled one. The trial court recognized its discretion to impose either concurrent or
consecutive sentences for defendant’s three convictions for illegal use of a computer, and opted
to impose a consecutive sentence for just one of those convictions. That decision was based on
the trial court’s observation that, while all of the child pornography videos were offensive, the
“Vicky video” was materially more offensive than the others. The trial court’s decision was also
designed to deter defendant from using a computer to download child sexually abusive materials
in the future and to decrease demand for such material by removing a user of the material. The
trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence for one of the three computer-related
convictions was a reasonable and principled decision and, therefore, was not an abuse of
discretion.
IV. SCORING OF OFFENSE VARIABLES
Defendant lastly argues that the trial court erred in scoring offense variables (OV) 12 and
19 of the sentencing guidelines. When scoring the sentencing guidelines, a sentencing court has
discretion in determining the number of points to be scored provided there is evidence in the
record that adequately supports a particular score. Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 680. The trial
court’s scoring of offense variables is determined by reference to the record, using the
preponderance of the evidence standard. People v Osantowski, 481 Mich 103, 111; 748 NW2d
799 (2008).
A. OV 12
OV 12 provides that 25 points are to be scored where “[t]hree or more contemporaneous
felonious criminal acts involving crimes against a person were committed.” MCL 777.42(1)(a).
A felonious criminal act is contemporaneous if “[t]he act occurred within 24 hours of the
sentencing offense” and “[t]he act has not and will not result in a separate conviction.” MCL
777.42(2)(a). Defendant contends that he did not possess three or more uncharged files
contemporaneously with a sentencing offense file because only one uncharged file and one
sentencing offense file were downloaded within 24 hours of each other. Defendant relies on
People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120; 771 NW2d 655 (2009), to argue that possession of child
sexually abusive material is complete when the material is acquired, e.g., by being downloaded
3
The maximum penalty for using a computer to commit a crime is only longer where the
underlying felony has a one-, two-, or four-year maximum term. MCL 752.797(3)(b)-(d).
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from the internet. He asserts that continued retention of the files is irrelevant because the Court
in McGraw rejected the concept of a continuing crime for scoring purposes. We disagree.
In McGraw, the Court held that “a defendant’s conduct after an offense is completed does
not relate back to the sentencing offense for purposes of scoring offense variables unless a
variable specifically instructs otherwise.” Id. at 122. However, McGraw did not address when a
given offense is complete. The Court specifically noted that under the facts of the case, it did not
need to resolve that question. Id. at 135 n 45. Possession offenses are, by nature, continuing
offenses. The offense is not complete until the perpetrator is dispossessed of the object of the
offense. People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 532 n 4; 521 NW2d 275 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting)
(criminal acts of possession are continuous in nature); People v Beverly, 247 Mich 353, 355-356;
225 NW 481 (1929) (possession of intoxicating liquor is a continuous offense for as long as the
possession exists). Because possession is a continuing crime, the offenses of possession of child
sexually abusive material, charged and uncharged, were continuing crimes as long as defendant
possessed the computer files. Therefore, the trial court properly could consider defendant’s
contemporaneous possession of the uncharged files containing child pornography for purposes of
scoring OV 12, regardless of when the files were downloaded.
On appeal, defendant also asserts that the record does not support a finding that the five
other files in the SYSXL folder, where the charged files were located, contained child sexually
abusive material. Because defendant did not object to the scoring of OV 12 on this basis below,
this issue is unpreserved. Accordingly, defendant has the burden of demonstrating a plain error
affecting his substantial rights. Kimble, 470 Mich at 312. At trial, no one testified regarding
whether the five uncharged files actually contained child sexually abusive material. However,
the prosecutor introduced an exhibit that contained thumbnail photographs of the eight files in
the SYSXL folder, which the trial court was able to view. Also, the presentence report, the
accuracy of which defendant did not challenge at sentencing, indicates that the additional files
were clearly child sexually abusive material based on the apparent ages of the victims depicted.
Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s determination that at least three of the uncharged
files contained child sexually abusive material. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that defendant committed at least three contemporaneous felonious acts, and it did not
abuse its discretion in scoring 25 points for OV 12.
B. OV 19
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in scoring ten points for OV 19 on the
basis that defendant “interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice,”
MCL 777.49(c). It is unnecessary to resolve this issue in light of our conclusion that 25 points
were properly scored for OV 12. Any error in scoring ten points for OV 19 would not affect the
appropriate guidelines range and would be harmless. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8;
711 NW2d 44 (2006); People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 290; 508 NW2d 509 (1993). Even
if we were to consider this argument, however, defendant’s contradictory trial testimony and
prior statements to police regarding separate allegations could be characterized as perjury, and
therefore an interference with law enforcement officers and their investigation of a crime, for
scoring purposes. Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on McGraw, 484 Mich at 133, for the
proposition that “[o]ffense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing
offense alone, unless otherwise provided in the particular variable,” is misplaced because he
failed to preserve the argument. See People v Mushatt, 486 Mich 934; 782 NW2d 202 (2010)
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(“that the retroactive effect of McGraw is limited to cases pending on appeal when McGraw was
decided and in which the scoring issue had been raised and preserved.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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