PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD LEE PEARSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291776
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 08-000922-FH
RICHARD LEE PEARSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.84,
and the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one year in jail, to be followed by 24 months
of probation. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant’s conviction arises out of an altercation between him and Scott McCarthy on
the evening of July 15, 2008, at Tammy Gilyan’s residence. Defendant does not dispute that the
evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction. He also does not dispute that his
actions may not have been justified as legal self-defense. Rather, he argues that a finding that he
acted with the intent to cause great bodily harm is against the great weight of the evidence.
“The elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder are (1) an
assault, i.e. ‘an attempt or offer with force and violence to do corporal hurt to another’ coupled
with (2) a specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v Bailey, 451 Mich
657, 668-669; 549 NW2d 325 (1996) (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that McCarthy’s testimony that defendant attacked him without
provocation is “utterly unbelievable by any objective measure” when considered with the other
evidence. He asserts that McCarthy’s testimony in this regard is so “inherently implausible” and
so thoroughly contradicted by other evidence that it should be entirely discounted. He concedes
that the evidence by witnesses Holly and Maranda might be sufficient, even without McCarthy’s
testimony, to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant went beyond what was
necessary to defend himself. He contends, however, that, apart from McCarthy’s unbelievable
testimony, there was no evidence to support a finding that defendant had the specific intent to
cause great bodily harm.
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Even if evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a new trial may be granted
where the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, but “only where the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1988) (citation omitted).
“[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury, and the trial
court may not substitute its view of the credibility ‘for the constitutionally guaranteed jury
determination thereof.’” Id. at 642 (citation omitted). Where the question is one of credibility,
the verdict may not be overturned unless the directly contradictory testimony has been so far
impeached that it was “deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it.” Id.
at 643, 645-646. The court must also find that “there [is] ‘a real concern that an innocent person
may have been convicted’ or that ‘it would be a manifest injustice’ to allow the guilty verdict to
stand.” Id. at 644. Otherwise, questions of weight and credibility are for the jury. Id. at 644,
646-647.
Here, there is no dispute that an assault occurred and that McCarthy suffered great bodily
harm. The issue is whether defendant intended to cause that harm. Intent can be inferred from
any facts in evidence, People v Unger, 278 Mich App at 210, 223, 231; 749 NW2d 272 (2008),
including the defendant's acts, the means employed to commit the assault, and the extent of the
victim's injuries, although actual physical injury is not a necessary element of the crime. People
v Harrington, 194 Mich App 424, 430; 487 NW2d 479 (1992); People v Cunningham, 21 Mich
App 381, 384; 175 NW2d 781 (1970). Use of a weapon is also not a necessary element of the
crime; a defendant can use his bare hands. People v Van Diver, 80 Mich App 352, 356; 263
NW2d 370 (1977).
McCarthy did not deny that he was jealous and upset when he went to Gilyan’s residence
after calling her several times, but he denied yelling while at the front door, denied asking
defendant to come outside and fight, denied threatening to slash defendant’s tires, and denied
calling him any names. He indicated that he was preparing to leave the residence after a few
minutes on the porch because Gilyan would not open the door. He testified that defendant was
enraged and shouting at McCarthy in a threatening manner when he came charging out of the
house shouting “leave this woman alone.” He testified that defendant was the aggressor and
assaulted McCarthy first. McCarthy further testified that defendant knocked him down, that he
was unable to get up or defend himself, and that he suffered serious injuries. He denied having
any injuries to his hands. Deputy Hoeksema confirmed that McCarthy was severely beaten and
that he did not have any marks on his hands, did not have any defensive wounds on his arms or
hands, and did not have any knuckle wounds.
Maranda testified that McCarthy was upset and yelling to defendant to “come out and
fight.” She did not hear McCarthy call defendant any names, but heard McCarthy threaten to
slash defendant’s tires if he did not come outside and fight. She testified that defendant “flew
open the door and ran out” yelling, “I’ll come there and make you leave.” Hall indicated that
McCarthy attempted to punch defendant, but missed, and defendant punched McCarthy instead.
Hall noted that defendant hit McCarthy in the head and face a couple of times, and that
McCarthy tried but failed to get up a couple times. She testified that defendant pushed
McCarthy back to the ground and hit him a couple more times on the head.
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Gilyan testified that she went outside and asked McCarthy to leave. After she went back
inside, McCarthy threatened to slash the tires on defendant’s truck if he did not come outside.
Defendant went outside and calmly talked to McCarthy. She testified that McCarthy “came at
defendant” and pushed him. When defendant pushed back, McCarthy fell into some bushes and
hit his head on a rock. McCarthy got up and went at defendant again. McCarthy’s punch missed
defendant, but defendant punched McCarthy in the face. Gilyan denied that McCarthy was on
the ground when defendant was hitting him. Gilyan admitted that she told defendant to leave
McCarthy alone and to let him go home before the police arrived. She also admitted that
McCarthy did not threaten or assault her that night.
Holly testified that McCarthy was on the front porch and “being loud and obnoxious.”
She testified that she tried to keep defendant from going outside because he was angry.
Defendant went outside and told McCarthy to go away. McCarthy responded, “Come on, hit
me.” McCarthy then punched defendant, defendant then punched McCarthy, and McCarthy fell
down, hitting his head. McCarthy got up and went after defendant, saying he was going to “beat
his ass.” Holly testified that defendant punched McCarthy in the face when McCarthy was on
the ground, and that it looked like defendant wanted to fight when he was punching McCarthy.
Both men went to their trucks, and defendant started to back up toward McCarthy’s truck. Holly
had to scream at defendant to keep him from backing into McCarthy’s truck. In her statement to
police, Holly indicated that she was “too scared to talk to them, mostly Ricky [defendant].”
Defendant testified that he answered Gilyan’s telephone and told McCarthy he was a
police officer and that he needed to stop calling Gilyan or he would be arrested. He testified that
McCarthy arrived at Gilyan’s residence and, when Gilyan asked McCarthy to leave, McCarthy
asked, “Where is the cop in the house?” McCarthy was screaming for defendant to come outside
and fight or else he would “pop” defendant’s tires. Defendant testified that he went outside as
McCarthy was walking toward his truck and asked McCarthy to go home. McCarthy
approached him in a threatening manner and pushed him while stating he was going to “kick his
ass.” Defendant pushed McCarthy back and McCarthy fell into the bushes. McCarthy then got
back up and said he was “gonna kill ya.” Defendant swung and hit McCarthy in the jaw and
shoulders. He denied hitting McCarthy when he was down. He denied intending to hurt
McCarthy.
The evidence presented a credibility contest regarding defendant’s intent. Absent
exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury. Lemmon, 456 Mich at
642. Both Maranda and Holly testified that defendant was angry when he went out the door.
Evidence was presented that McCarthy suffered serious injuries, but had no defensive wounds or
injuries to his hands, arms, or knuckles. Although Gilyan and defendant both denied that
defendant continued to punch McCarthy while he was on the ground, Maranda testified that
McCarthy was unable to get back up after being knocked down, and that defendant continued to
punch McCarthy while he was on the ground. Holly testified that defendant punched McCarthy
in the face when McCarthy was on the ground, and that it looked like defendant wanted to fight
when he was punching McCarthy. McCarthy suffered severe injuries, including two broken
orbitals and a broken nose, as well as a bruised and a swollen eye and lips. The trial court
correctly realized that there was testimony that the jury could have found that was circumstantial
evidence that the defendant intended to cause great bodily harm as opposed to just believing that
he was acting in self-defense when he was not acting in self-defense. The evidence did not
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preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the
verdict to stand. Lemmon, 456 Mich at 644.
II
Defendant’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial is
essentially predicated on defense counsel rejecting the prosecution’s offer during the course of
trial to have the jury instructed on the offense of assault and battery. Defendant supports his
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with an affidavit in which he asserts that, prior to trial,
he discussed with defense counsel “the possibility of an alternate charge of misdemeanor assault
and battery” and that he deferred to trial counsel’s experience in recommending not to seek such
an alternative charge. Defendant states that he believed at the time of that discussion that he
“could get up to a year for a misdemeanor” and that trial counsel did not make him aware that
the maximum sentence for assault and battery was only 93 days, so that a conviction of
misdemeanor assault and battery would have entitled defendant “to a sentence of no more than
time served.” Defendant asserts that, if he had known that a misdemeanor assault conviction
would not have resulted in additional time, he “would have wanted a jury instruction regarding
the lesser offense.” Further, defendant states that, on the third day of trial, trial counsel told him
that the prosecutor had offered an instruction on an alternative charge of assault and battery but
that trial counsel rejected such an instruction. Defendant states that, after going through the trial,
he “no longer felt as confident” as he did when he first discussed a potential lesser offense with
trial counsel and that, if he had been made aware of the offer, he would have accepted it
(presumably meaning if he had been made aware before trial counsel rejected the prosecutor’s
offer). Finally, defendant states that trial counsel never informed him that he had a right to ask
for an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple assault and could still have requested
that instruction despite trial counsel rejecting the prosecutor’s offer of an assault and battery
instruction.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel's
assistance fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness, and (2) that but for
counsel’s ineffective assistance, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-88, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden to prove
otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The defendant “must
overcome a strong presumption that counsel's performance constituted sound trial strategy.”
People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).
At trial, defendant presented the theory that he had acted in self-defense. Trial counsel
testified at the motion hearing on remand that defendant had fired his former attorney, George
Betts, because Betts wanted defendant to accept a plea bargain and defendant believed he was
innocent and did not want a conviction. Trial counsel testified that defendant indicated that he
wanted to present his side of the story and wanted to pursue a self-defense theory because that
would have entirely exonerated defendant of culpability for his assault of McCarthy. Trial
counsel also testified that on the third day of trial he informed defendant that the prosecutor had
no objection to an instruction on a lesser included offense, but that he would be opposing it.
Defense counsel indicated that he “[f]elt that Mr. Pearson gave me every indication that he was
on board with that.” Indeed, defendant testified at the motion hearing that “he was okay with
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that.” Defendant asserted, however, that if he had been advised that a conviction on a lesser
included offense would result in a misdemeanor conviction with a maximum penalty of 93 days,
that he would have wanted the jury to be instructed on a lesser included offense. Trial counsel
testified, however, that he had at one point advised defendant of this fact, but that the discussions
were brief because defendant had indicated he wanted to pursue a self-defense theory and avoid
a conviction. In light of defendant’s refusal to accept a plea bargain, and his firing of Betts for
encouraging defendant to plead guilty, as well as his desire to avoid a conviction, it appears that
defendant is using the benefit of hindsight to argue that he would have accepted an instruction on
lesser included offenses had he been advised of the nature of such a conviction and the penalty.
Given the facts of this case, the trial court properly found that “It was a sound strategy for
Mr. Carter to go for all or nothing because his client had indicated he wanted no conviction.
There were facts to support self-defense. It was a valid and sound strategy to pursue an all or
nothing approach and to avoid any conviction whatsoever by not requesting or arguing for an
assault and battery instruction.” See People v Armstrong, 124 Mich App 766, 769; 335 NW2d
687 (1983) (emphasizing that “defense counsel's decision not to request lesser included offense
instructions ... [is] a matter of trial strategy”). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s
performance was deficient.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Henry William Saad
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