PHILLIP S BELLROSE V LEANNA E BELLROSE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PHILLIP S. BELLROSE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 292498
Cheboygan Circuit Court
LC No. 08-007256-DO
LEANNA E. BELLROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and FITZGERALD and SAAD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce entered on May 29, 2009. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. FACTS
The parties married on September 2, 1972, and plaintiff filed for divorce on August 12,
2008. In January 2008, plaintiff inherited a lakefront home from his mother worth
approximately $495,000. The trial court ruled that this property is not part of the marital estate,
but is inherited property not subject to division upon divorce. At trial, plaintiff testified that he
also inherited a savings account from his mother with a balance of between $50,000 and
$55,000. The trial court did not include this inheritance in either party’s property award.
Defendant testified that the proceeds of plaintiff’s cash inheritance were deposited in a joint
savings account, and that plaintiff added her name to the account “just after [his mother] passed
away.” Plaintiff testified that he withdrew $45,000 from the account when he decided to leave
the marriage, and left defendant approximately $11,000; defendant testified that plaintiff left her
about $13,000.
Defendant testified that she had various health problems, including diabetes, high blood
pressure, and peripheral artery disease, which require her to take several prescription medications
and to be under the regular care of a doctor. Defendant testified that she was a member of the
Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa Indian tribe, and will receive medical benefits when she becomes an
elder of the tribe upon her sixtieth birthday, in December 2009. However, defendant claimed the
benefits offered by the tribe will not cover all of her medical expenses or medications.
Defendant asked the court to include, as part of the divorce judgment, health insurance
comparable to that provided by plaintiff’s employer. However, the divorce judgment did not
-1-
include such a provision, and stated that “[a]ll insurances, now and in the future, are the sole
responsibility of each party.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. Lakefront Property
Defendant contends that, although the trial court recognized her significant medical
problems and expenses, “instead of providing a means to address this need by invading the lake
front property, [the court] simply ignore[d] the need.” However, defendant has not documented
or described her medical expenses or explained why her property award is insufficient to meet
these expenses. Defendant was awarded the marital home, valued at $123,000, less a $65,000
mortgage, and the court ordered plaintiff to continue making the mortgage payments on the
home as part of the divorce judgment. Defendant also received two of the parties’ real property
lots, valued together at $25,000, and her Individual Retirement Account, worth $5,821. The
court valued defendant’s total property award at $88,821, while plaintiff’s divorce award was
valued at $30,027. However, the court did not include the lakefront property or savings accounts
plaintiff inherited from his mother, nor did it include defendant’s award of alimony, which was
set at $1,000 per month, in its total valuation of the parties’ awards.
Based on the information in the record and provided by the parties, plaintiff has more
assets than defendant following the divorce. However, the law does not mandate that both
parties have equal assets following a divorce, but rather that the division of marital property be
equitable. Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). This Court has also held
that “the marital estate is [to be] divided between the parties, and each party takes away from the
marriage that party’s own separate estate with no invasion by the other party.” Reeves v Reeves,
226 Mich App 490, 494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). The Reeves Court cited two statutory exceptions
to this general rule, which are set forth in MCL 552.23 and 552.401. Id. MCL 552.23(1)
provides:
Upon entry of a judgment of divorce or separate maintenance, if the estate
and effects awarded to either party are insufficient for the suitable support and
maintenance of either party and any children of the marriage who are committed
to the care and custody of either party, the court may also award to either party
the part of the real and personal estate of either party and spousal support out of
the real and personal estate, to be paid to either party in gross or otherwise as the
court considers just and reasonable, after considering the ability of either party to
pay and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances
of the case.
MCL 552.401 provides in pertinent part:
The circuit court of this state may include in any decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance entered in the circuit court appropriate provisions awarding
to a party all or a portion of the property, either real or personal, owned by his or
her spouse, as appears to the court to be equitable under all the circumstances of
the case, if it appears from the evidence in the case that the party contributed to
the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property.
-2-
Defendant claims that both of these exceptions apply here.
According to defendant, the parties used the lakefront property during the marriage and
did not keep it separate from the marital property. However, the record reflects that, during most
of the marriage, plaintiff’s parents owned the property and plaintiff inherited the property only
when his mother died in 2008. Defendant also notes that “both spouses transferred their mutual
homestead tax exemption to the lakefront property and changed their addresses accordingly.”
The court did not make findings of fact on defendant’s arguments. Nevertheless, that defendant
changed her address and state tax homestead exemption to reflect the lakefront property as
opposed to the marital residence is not compelling evidence that the property was a commingled
asset. Defendant asserted at trial and on appeal that she “lived” at the lakefront property only
during the summers and on holidays, and plaintiff testified that until his mother died in 2008, his
mother paid the taxes on the property and maintained it. Based on these facts, the court did not
clearly err when it held that the lakefront property was plaintiff’s sole, inherited property.
Defendant’s years of use of the property occurred before plaintiff was its sole owner and,
therefore, this asset could not have been commingled when it was owned by a third party.
Additionally, defendant acknowledged at trial that she did not make any major improvements to
the property. Because defendant failed to show that she contributed to the acquisition,
improvement, or accumulation of the property, she is not entitled to invasion of the lakefront
property based on the statutory exception set forth in MCL 552.401.
Defendant is also not entitled to the exception in MCL 552.23 that permits the trial court
to invade a party’s separate assets if the property award is “insufficient for the suitable support
and maintenance of either party.” As noted, defendant does not provide documentation or a
description of her monetary needs on appeal, nor does she explain why the trial court’s award of
property and alimony are insufficient for her support. Defendant may not “leave it to this Court
to discover and rationalize the basis for his claim, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments.” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Defendant has failed
to establish a claim under MCL 552.23, and relief is not warranted.
B. Spousal Support
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered that the payment of spousal
support ends upon the death of either party. According to defendant, this was unjust in light of
the fact that she will have a limited income from other sources, and because plaintiff did not
request such a provision.
In the event that plaintiff dies before defendant, she will own the marital home and two
other lots. The combined value of these properties was approximately $148,000 at the time of
trial. Defendant will also presumably continue to receive her disability benefits payment, which
was $719 per month at the time of trial, and a monthly distribution from plaintiff’s pension of
$225. While plaintiff’s pension distribution alone would likely not be sufficient to support
defendant following plaintiff’s death, she would not be without means of supporting herself
based on the value of the assets she was awarded in the divorce judgment. Based on the
evidence, the court’s decision to terminate alimony payments upon the death of either party was
not clear error or inequitable.
C. Attorney Fees
-3-
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it declined to award her attorney fees.
Defendant argues that, without such an award, she will be required to sell the marital home or
use her spousal support to pay her attorney fees, contrary to settled law. Again, however,
defendant does not provide an explanation as to why the assets awarded by the court are not
sufficient to pay her fees without selling the home or using the funds she will receive through
alimony payments. Therefore, this issue lacks merit. Kosch v Kosch, 233 Mich App 346, 354;
592 NW2d 434 (1999); MCR 3.206(C)(2).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Henry William Saad
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
