IN RE HANEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2010
In the Matter of HANEY, Minors.
No. 297655
Ionia Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 09-000009-NA
09-000010-NA
09-000011-NA
09-000012-NA
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her four children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for clear error both the trial court’s decision that statutory grounds for
termination have been proven by clear and convincing evidence and its best interests
determination. In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90-91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “A decision qualifies as
clearly erroneous when, ‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” In re
Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (citation omitted). Termination of
parental rights is proper if at least one statutory ground for termination is established by clear and
convincing evidence and the trial court finds that termination is in the child’s best interest. MCL
712A.19b(5). Further, a trial court’s finding regarding whether reasonable reunification efforts
were made is a question of fact that we also review for clear error. MCR 3.977(K).
II. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
At the outset, respondent asserts that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunite
her with the children. Specifically, respondent criticizes petitioner’s decision to place the
children with relatives an hour and half drive away from respondent and requiring respondent to
call before visits. She contends the placement and phone call requirement created barriers to
visitation. We disagree. When a child is removed from a parent’s custody and reunification is
the goal, petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts at reunification by adopting a service
plan. MCL 712A.18f(1), (2), (4). A failure to make reasonable efforts at reunification may
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prevent petitioner from establishing the statutory grounds for termination. See In re Newman,
189 Mich App 61, 67-68, 70; 472 NW2d 38 (1991).
Under the circumstances, visitation certainly required respondent to travel. However,
petitioner provided respondent with gas cards and the telephone number of a transportation
service to assist with transportation to these visits. Respondent admitted that she chose not to
use this service, except on one occasion, and failed to tell her Wraparound coordinator that she
needed further assistance. Respondent also did not attempt to obtain her driver’s license, despite
having access to a vehicle and there being nothing from preventing her from obtaining a license.
Moreover, the requirement that respondent call before visits was only mandated after respondent
missed many visits and it became clear that her inconsistency had affected the children. Thus, it
appears that respondent’s own failure to use the services provided led to her missed visits, rather
than a lack of reasonable efforts on petitioner’s part. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court did not clearly err by finding that reasonable efforts at reunification were made.
III. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent next contends that the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence supported the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree. In our view, clear and
convincing evidence warrants termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The conditions leading to adjudication were respondent’s failure to provide
proper nutrition for her children, her failure to benefit from services, and her failure to maintain
suitable housing. Although respondent had obtained clean and appropriate housing at the time of
the termination hearing, other evidence on the record supports the trial court’s finding that she
had not made any meaningful change in the conditions that led to adjudication. Respondent’s
housing remained unstable; respondent moved six times during the pendency of the case and, at
the time of trial, she lived in temporary housing with no lease. And, despite receiving services
since 2004, respondent failed to make any meaningful improvement in her parenting skills; she
remained unable to provide the children with nutritious food and had difficulty providing
attention to all the children during visits. Because clear and convincing evidence supports
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), we need not consider whether clear and convincing
evidence supported termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), (g), and (j). The trial court did
not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL
712A.19b(c)(i).
III. BEST INTERESTS
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. See MCL 712A.19b(5). Again, we disagree.
Respondent received services intermittently from 2004 to January 2009, when the children were
removed, and during the pendency of this case. Respondent failed to benefit from these services.
Moreover, respondent missed half of the allowed parenting time in the eight months preceding
the termination hearing, although she knew visitation was important and that her inconsistency
had a negative impact on the children. Although respondent loves her children, her actions show
that she cannot provide them with the emotional stability, safe housing, and permanency that
they deserve. The trial court did not clearly err in its best interests determination. Termination
of respondent’s parental rights was proper.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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