PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN COTTER LAMPING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2010
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 293538
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-001740-FH
JOHN COTTER LAMPING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MURPHY, C.J., and METER and SHAPIRO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
MCL 750.84, felonious assault, MCL 750.82, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident,
MCL 257.617. He was sentenced to two to ten years’ imprisonment for his assault with intent to
do great bodily harm conviction, two to four years’ imprisonment for his felonious assault
conviction, and two to five years’ imprisonment for his failure to stop at the scene of an accident
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first issue on appeal is that the prosecution engaged in misconduct when it
brought additional charges—assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and
failure to stop at the scene of an accident—against defendant when defendant refused to plead
guilty to felonious assault. We disagree. Preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
reviewed de novo to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. People v Wilson,
265 Mich App 386, 393; 695 NW2d 351 (2005).
A prosecutor violates a defendant’s right to due process when he or she punishes the
defendant “for asserting a protected statutory or constitutional right.” People v Ryan, 451 Mich
30, 35; 545 NW2d 612 (1996). Actual prosecutorial vindictiveness will be found only when
there is objective evidence in the form of an “expressed hostility or threat” indicating that the
defendant was deliberately penalized for exercising a procedural, statutory, or constitutional
right. People v Jones, 252 Mich App 1, 7; 650 NW2d 717 (2002). The defendant has the burden
to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 8.
“The mere threat of additional charges during plea negotiations does not amount to actual
vindictiveness where bringing the additional charges is within the prosecutor’s charging
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discretion.” Ryan, 451 Mich at 36. The United States Supreme Court explained the reason for
allowing prosecutors to bring additional charges in the following way:
While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly
may have a “discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the
imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable”-and permissible-“attribute
of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.”
. . . It follows that, by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this
Court has necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality
that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to
forgo his right to plead not guilty. [Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 364; 98
S Ct 663; 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978) (citations omitted).]
Therefore, the reasoning follows that since plea bargaining is constitutionally permissible, a
prosecutor may add permissible charges after a defendant fails to plead guilty.
“[T]he decision whether to bring a charge and what charge to bring lies in the discretion
of the prosecutor.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 100; 586 NW2d 732 (1998). A
prosecutor may “bring any charges supported by the evidence.” People v Nichols, 262 Mich
App 408, 415; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). To support a bindover, a prosecutor must only establish
probable cause that the crime was committed. Venticinque, 459 Mich at 101. Probable cause
requires a lower quantum of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt and exists when there is
evidence sufficient to cause “a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously
entertain a reasonable belief of the [defendant’s] guilt” even if he or she has some reservations.
People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 277; 615 NW2d 784 (2000).
“The elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder are: (1) an
attempt or threat with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703
NW2d 230 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted; emphasis in original). To convict a
defendant of the failure to stop at the scene of an accident, the prosecution must show that the
defendant was the driver of a vehicle and knew or had reason to know that the accident in which
he was involved on a public road or any property open to the public resulted in serious injury to
or the death of another person and the driver failed to immediately stop. MCL 257.617; People v
Lang, 250 Mich App 565, 572; 649 NW2d 102 (2002).
We conclude that defendant has failed to show that the prosecution acted with
vindictiveness when it brought additional charges against defendant after defendant failed to
plead guilty. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an integral part of plea
bargaining is allowing the prosecution to bargain with a defendant by threatening to charge him
with additional crimes. Bordenkircher, 434 US at 364. The record indicates that defendant and
prosecution engaged in plea bargaining. The deal that seemed to have been struck was that
defendant would plead guilty in exchange for only receiving the lesser charge of felonious
assault. When defendant refused to plead guilty, the prosecution acted within its discretion to
add charges supported by the evidence. What the prosecution did in the case is part of the usual
bargaining process. Defendant has failed to show that the prosecution acted with vindictiveness.
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Moreover, the additional charges brought by the prosecution against defendant were
supported by probable cause. Three eyewitnesses testified at the preliminary examination that
defendant drove his black car at Timothy Moore, the victim, intending to hit him. They further
testified that defendant drove away after hitting Moore. In particular, Moore’s girlfriend,
Stephanie Turskey, testified that she witnessed defendant yelling at Moore, driving his car at
Moore and hitting him. She further testified that defendant then drove his car away from the
scene of the crime. Moore corroborated that defendant drove his car at him. Moore testified, at
the last minute, that he tried to get out of the way of defendant’s car, but defendant’s vehicle hit
Moore’s right leg. Moore then watched defendant drive away. Finally, another witness, Joel
Thompson, testified that he heard defendant tell Moore that he was going to hit him. Thompson
then witnessed defendant hit Moore with his car and drive off. Thompson got in his car and
drove after defendant. Thompson obtained defendant’s license plate number. Both Thompson
and Turskey identified defendant as the driver of the black car from a photograph shown to them
at the scene of the crime and they identified him again in court. Moore also identified defendant
in court as the driver who hit him. Taken together, this evidence was sufficient for a person of
ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of defendant’s
guilt of assault with intent to do great bodily harm and failure to stop at the scene of an accident.
The evidence demonstrates that defendant acted with force by hitting Moore with a car and that
he manifested an intent to do great bodily harm by telling Moore he was going to hit him.
Moreover, the evidence further shows that defendant was involved in an accident, had reason to
know that someone was seriously injured in the accident and fled the scene.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the on-the-scene
and in-court identifications of defendant because of an unduly suggestive photographic
identification procedure. We disagree. A trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error and the trial court’s ultimate ruling is reviewed de
novo. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). A finding is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 127; 755 NW2d 664 (2008).
To sustain a due process challenge to a photographic lineup, “a defendant must show that
the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances
that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289,
302; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). In examining the totality of the circumstances, relevant factors
include:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness’s degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [Id. at 306, citing
Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188, 199-200; 93 S Ct 375; 34 L Ed 2d 401 (1972).]
An improper suggestion often arises when the witness is told or believes that the police have
apprehended the right person or the witness is shown only one person or a group in which one
person is singled out in some way. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998).
The exhibition of a single photograph is very suggestive. Id.
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In this case, the trial court made the following ruling, after holding an evidentiary
hearing, regarding whether showing the single photograph was unduly suggestive:
I have examined the preliminary examination, and there were actually three
witnesses [Thompson, Turskey and Moore.] at the preliminary examination[.]
I didn’t see any equivocations among these witnesses as to who they saw and the
method of the on-scene identification, calling up a picture of the person. This is
what ties it up in the Court’s mind as far as the identification issues is that we
have a license plate number that matches a black Talon and is registered to a
person that looks remarkably like the picture in the, that was called up from the
department of state.
So all these things add up. A unique set of circumstances that you don’t often see
this when a citizen witness actually pursue [sic] an alleged defendant . . ., and get
[sic] the license plate number and all these circumstances add up to an, I think, a
proper impounding of the vehicle and a proper evidentiary procedure used by the
police.
We agree with the trial court that the unique circumstances of the case made it permissible for
the police to show Turskey and Thompson a single photograph of defendant at the scene of the
crime. These circumstances made it unlikely that defendant would be misidentified when the
police showed the single photograph. As noted above, three eyewitnesses testified at the
preliminary examination that they witnessed defendant hit Moore with his car. Moore, Turskey
and Thompson indicated that they could clearly see defendant during the incident and were
paying attention, and that there was nothing blocking their view. Moreover, Thompson followed
defendant as he drove his vehicle out of the parking lot and obtained defendant’s license plate
number. The photograph shown was obtained by running the license plate number through the
state system. This was not a situation where the photograph was only tangentially related to the
facts of case. Finally, the police showed the single photograph of defendant to Turskey and
Thompson soon after the crime occurred. There is no indication that the police told Turskey and
Thompson that the picture was of the driver of the black car. They merely asked Turskey and
Thompson if the picture of defendant represented the driver. Moreover, there was no evidence
that either Turskey or Thompson equivocated at identifying defendant as the driver. It is true
that neither Turskey nor Thompson gave a detailed description of the driver before seeing the
photograph, but that alone is not enough to render the single photograph unduly suggestive.
Because we conclude that the photographic identification was not unduly suggestive, we need
not address defendant’s arguments that showing the photograph tainted Turskey’s, Thompson’s
and even Moore’s in-court identifications of defendant.
Defendant’s third issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s
motion to suppress any evidence from the illegal seizure of his car. We disagree. A trial court's
findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error and the trial
court's ultimate ruling is reviewed de novo. Williams, 472 Mich at 313. A finding is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. Brown, 279 Mich App at 127.
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Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. The Michigan
Constitution in this regard is generally construed to provide the same protection as the federal
constitution. People v Chowdhury, 285 Mich App 509, 516; 775 NW2d 845 (2009). Whether a
search or seizure is reasonable depends upon the circumstances of each case. People v
Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 433; 622 NW2d 528 (2000). Generally, items that are seized
during an unlawful search or that are the indirect result of an unlawful search may not be
admitted as evidence against a defendant. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 232; 663
NW2d 499 (2003).
To constitute a constitutionally reasonable search, a search must have been executed
pursuant to a warrant or based upon a specific exception to the warrant requirement. People v
Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 417; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). One exception to the warrant
requirement allows police officers to “search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be found in it.” People v Perreault, 486
Mich 914, 915; 781 NW2d 796 (2010). Probable cause exists when there is a substantial basis
for inferring a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. People v Hellstrom, 264 Mich App 187, 192; 690 NW2d 293 (2004). Another exception
to the warrant requirement allows police officers to seize items in plain view without first
obtaining a search warrant “if the officer is lawfully in the position to have that view and the
evidence is obviously incriminatory.” People v Galloway, 259 Mich App 634, 639; 675 NW2d
883 (2003).
In this case, the police seizure of defendant’s car was not unlawful both because it was a
car involved in a crime, but also because the car was in plain view and was obviously
incriminating. Thompson testified at the preliminary examination that he followed the car,
which hit Moore, and obtained its license plate number. Thompson gave the license plate
number to the police. Police Officer James Gilcrest used the license plate number to obtain the
make and model of the car, an Eagle Talon, and defendant’s address. As a result, Gilcrest
testified that the police went to defendant’s residence where they found a black Eagle Talon
parked in the driveway “out in the open.” Gilcrest testified that the license plate number
matched the number given to him by Thompson. Seeing the car in plain view and believing it to
be involved in a crime, Gilcrest had the vehicle towed. Based on the actions of Thompson,
Gilcrest had probable cause to believe that defendant’s car was involved in a crime. Moreover,
the car was in plain view. Therefore, we conclude the seizure of defendant’s car was lawful and
the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the car.
Defendant’s final issue on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when it
scored defendant 25 points for offense variable 3, the physical injury suffered by a victim. We
disagree. A trial court’s decision regarding the points to assess in the sentencing guidelines
calculations is reviewed for whether the court properly exercised its discretion and the record
adequately supported the particular score. People v Wilson, 265 Mich App 386, 397; 695 NW2d
351 (2005).
OV 3 concerns the degree of physical injury suffered by a victim. MCL 777.33(1). In
assessing points under the sentencing guidelines, a court must assess the highest applicable
points under OV 3, depending on the physical injury to the victim. People v Morson, 471 Mich
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248, 260; 685 NW2d 203 (2004). A defendant should be scored 25 points if the victim suffered
“a life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury[.]” MCL 777.33(1)(c). A defendant
should be scored only ten points if the victim suffered “a bodily injury requiring medical
treatment[.]” MCL 777.33(1)(d).
Medical evidence is not necessary to prove a life threatening or permanently
incapacitating injury. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 697 n 19; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). The
trial court need only find the existence of the sentencing factor by a preponderance of the
evidence. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 142-143; 715 NW2d 778 (2006).
The record indicates that Moore testified at trial that defendant drove his car into Moore
breaking the tibia and fibula in Moore’s right leg. Turskey testified that she could see the bone
coming out of Moore’s right leg after the incident. When Moore arrived at Mount Clemens
Regional Medical Center, x-rays of his leg were taken and he had emergency surgery. In the
surgery, a rod was put in Moore’s leg. Moore was in the hospital for three and a half days and he
was in a cast for two and a half months and missed work that entire time. Even 15 months after
the incident, Moore was still having problems with his leg.
Although the record evidence is not overwhelming, we conclude that there were
minimally sufficient proofs to allow the trial court to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that Moore had undergone prolonged medical treatment and suffered a permanent incapacitating
injury to his leg as a result of defendant’s actions. Indeed, the fact that Moore continued to have
problems more than 15 months after the incident and had to have the rod in his leg indicates that
he suffered a “permanent incapacitating injury” within the meaning of OV 3. Because there was
some evidence in the record to support the score, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in scoring defendant 25 points of OV 3.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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