IN RE TERRENCE HARRIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TERRENCE HARRIS Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 26, 2010
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
Nos. 292455; 293890
Wayne Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 03-415110
TERRENCE HARRIS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and TALBOT and METER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent challenges (1) the trial court’s April 2009
supplemental order of disposition extending the court’s jurisdiction over respondent until the age
of 21, and (2) the trial court’s August 2009 dispositional order and judgment of conviction
revoking respondent’s juvenile probation and sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of 20
months to 10 years each for three counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84, and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, with credit for 894 days served. The
court also ordered that respondent’s sentences be served consecutive to a felony-firearm sentence
that he was serving in LC No. 08-008555-01. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Respondent was charged with three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83, and felony-firearm for offenses committed on June 7, 2005, when he was a 16-year-old
juvenile. The prosecutor designated the case as one where respondent would be tried as an adult.
MCL 712A.2d. Following a jury trial, respondent was found guilty of three counts of assault
with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and felony-firearm. The trial court imposed
a blended sentence pursuant to MCL 712A.18(1)(m), in which respondent was committed to a
juvenile treatment facility, subject to the court’s authority to impose an adult sentence if
respondent failed to comply with the terms of his juvenile sentence.
Respondent was AWOL from December 2007 until he was apprehended on a writ in June
2008. He tested positive for marijuana and was placed in a juvenile facility. By July 2008,
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respondent was in the county jail awaiting trial on charges of first-degree murder and felonyfirearm stemming from his involvement in criminal activity in January 2008. Following a
required commitment review hearing in March 2009, the trial court determined that respondent
had not been rehabilitated and, therefore, it would extend its jurisdiction over him until the age of
21.1 In connection with the new charges, respondent was convicted by a jury of felony-firearm;
he also pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed weapon. Respondent subsequently admitted the
allegations in a supplemental petition that his new convictions violated his juvenile probation
and the terms of his delayed sentence. The trial court thereafter revoked respondent’s juvenile
probation and imposed the sentences that form the basis of this appeal.
II. TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION
Respondent first argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose an adult sentence
when it did, because the court’s jurisdiction should have expired when he turned 19. Respondent
contends that he “aged out” of the juvenile system at the age of 19, was no longer in need of a
parent surrogate, and that the extension of jurisdiction is nothing more than a waste of
resources.2 We disagree.
This Court reviews questions involving the interpretation or application of a statute de
novo as questions of law. Mason v City of Menominee, 282 Mich App 525, 527-528; 766 NW2d
888 (2009). Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the Legislature. Id. at 528. To that end, this Court begins by examining the plain language of
the statute and, “where that language is unambiguous, [this Court] presume[s] that the
Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed and enforce[s] that statute as written.”
People v Holder, 483 Mich 168, 172; 767 NW2d 423 (2009).
The family division of circuit court has “[e]xclusive original jurisdiction superior to and
regardless of the jurisdiction of another court in proceedings concerning a juvenile under 17
years of age who is found within the county if 1 or more of the following applies”:
Except as otherwise provided in this sub-subdivision, the juvenile has
violated any municipal ordinance or law of the state or of the United States. . . .
The court has jurisdiction over a juvenile 14 years of age or older who is charged
with a specified juvenile violation only if the prosecuting attorney files a petition
in the court instead of authorizing a complaint and warrant. . . . [MCL
712A.2(a)(1).]
A “specified juvenile violation” includes assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83.
MCL 712A.2(a)(1)(A).
1
Respondent was AWOL when he turned 19 in May 2008. The requirement commitment
review hearing was adjourned several times because of respondent’s status.
2
Although there are statutory provisions that address the trial court’s jurisdiction in this
situation, respondent does not address those statutes or provide any legal support for his
argument that the trial court’s jurisdiction expired when he turned 19.
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As previously noted, the prosecutor designated this case as one where respondent would
be tried as an adult. MCL 712A.2d. Under MCL 712A.2a(1), a trial court’s jurisdiction over a
respondent in a juvenile case generally terminates on the respondent’s 19th birthday. See In re
Reiswitz, 236 Mich App 158, 164; 600 NW2d 135 (1999). But MCL 712A.2a(2) authorizes a
court to retain jurisdiction “until the juvenile is 21 years of age” for designated offenses, i.e.,
offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute violations or attempted violations of
certain enumerated statutory sections. Accordingly, respondent’s assertion that the trial court’s
jurisdiction expired on his 19th birthday is contrary to MCL 712A.2a(2).
Further, following a judgment of conviction in a designated case for a specified juvenile
violation, the trial court shall enter a dispositional order or impose a sentence authorized under
MCL 712A.18(1)(m). MCL 712A.2d(8). As previously indicated, the trial court imposed a
delayed sentence under MCL 712A.18(1)(m), which provides, in relevant part:
The court may delay imposing a sentence of imprisonment under this
subdivision for a period not longer than the period during which the court has
jurisdiction over the juvenile under this chapter by entering an order of disposition
delaying imposition of sentence and placing the juvenile on probation upon the
terms and conditions it considers appropriate, including any disposition under this
section. If the court delays imposing sentence under this section, section 18i of
this chapter applies.
MCL 712A.18i, which is referenced in MCL 712A.18(1)(m), provides in relevant part:
(1)
A delay in sentencing does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
sentence the juvenile under section 18(1)(n) of this chapter [] any time during the
delay.
***
(3)
If the court entered an order of disposition under section
18(1)[(m)] of this chapter delaying imposition of sentence, the court shall conduct
a review hearing to determine whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated and
whether the juvenile presents a serious risk to public safety. If the court
determines that the juvenile has not been rehabilitated or that the juvenile presents
a serious risk to public safety, jurisdiction over the juvenile shall be continued or
the court may impose sentence.
In making this determination, the trial court is directed to consider many factors,
including the juvenile’s behavior in placement, prior record and character, potential for violent
conduct as demonstrated by prior behavior, the recommendations of any agency charged with the
juvenile’s care for the juvenile’s release or continued custody, and other information submitted.
See MCL 712A.18i(3)(c) – (g). Here, the record contains ample support for the trial court’s
continued jurisdiction as a result of respondent’s lack of rehabilitation. As the trial court noted,
respondent went AWOL from his juvenile placement, was involved in serious criminal activity
while AWOL and before he turned 19, was charged with first-degree murder and felony-firearm
as a result of that criminal activity, was convicted of felony-firearm, tested positive for drug use
when he was apprehended on a writ, and made admissions on the record that demonstrated that
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he had not been rehabilitated. Accordingly, we find no merit to respondent’s argument that there
was no basis for the trial court to continue to exercise its jurisdiction beyond the age of 19. The
trial court did not lose its jurisdiction over respondent and appropriately imposed sentence upon
him under the delayed sentence.
II. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred when it ordered his sentences to be
served consecutive to the felony-firearm sentence that he was serving in LC No. 08-008555-01.
We disagree. A consecutive sentence may be imposed only when specifically authorized by
statute. People v Brown, 220 Mich App 680, 682; 560 NW2d 80 (1996). Whether consecutive
sentencing is authorized is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v Lee, 233 Mich
App 403, 405; 592 NW2d 779 (1999).
Petitioner argues that consecutive sentencing is authorized by MCL 768.7a(1), because
respondent committed the subsequent crimes while AWOL from his juvenile placement, which
petitioner claims qualifies as a “reformatory institution” within the meaning of the statute. MCL
768.7a(1) provides:
A person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution in this
state, or who escapes from such an institution, and who commits a crime during
that incarceration or escape which is punishable by imprisonment in a penal or
reformatory institution in this state shall, upon conviction of that crime, be
sentenced as provided by law. The term of imprisonment imposed for the crime
shall begin to run at the expiration of the term or terms of imprisonment which the
person is serving or has become liable to serve in a penal or reformatory
institution in this state.
MCL 768.7a(1) is expressly applicable to a “person who is incarcerated in a penal or
reformatory institution.” Although not defined, the phrase “penal or reformatory institution” has
been given a broad meaning to include a county jail People v Sheridan, 141 Mich App 770, 367
NW2d 450 (1985), a halfway house, People v Jennings, 121 Mich App 318, 319; 329 NW2d 25
(1982); People v Mayes, 95 Mich App 188; 290 NW2d 119 (1980), and a community corrections
program, People v Shirley Johnson, 96 Mich App 84, 292 NW2d 489 (1980). Further, a
reformatory commonly refers to “a penal institution for reforming young offenders, esp. minors.”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, (1997); See also Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.
(“A penal institution for youthful offenders where the emphasis is on the reformation for the
juvenile’s behavior.”). We conclude that that a juvenile detention center is a facility within the
common and broad meaning of the term reformatory institution.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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