IN RE PATTISON/PATTISON-BENTLEY/BENTLEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
October 19, 2010
In the Matter of PATTISON/PATTISONBENTLEY/BENTLEY, Minors.
No. 297167
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-458979-NA
In the Matter of PATTISON/PATTISONBENTLEY/BENTLEY, Minors.
No. 297168
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-458979-NA
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and K.F. KELLY and DONOFRIO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the order terminating their
parental rights to the minor children1 pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), and (j). We
affirm.
Respondent-father challenges the sufficiency of evidence. This Court reviews for clear
error a trial court’s decision that clear and convincing evidence supported a statutory ground for
termination. MCR 3.977(K); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Ample evidence existed on the record to support the trial court’s decision to terminate
respondent-father’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). It was undisputed that
the oldest boy’s neck was injured by scratches. Although respondent-father claimed those
scratches were made by the cat, other evidence clearly and convincingly established that
respondent-father caused the physical injury. Statements made by the two oldest children were
admitted into evidence pursuant to MCR 3.972(C)(2), and indicated that respondents disciplined
the children by spanking and that respondent-father had grabbed the oldest boy’s neck and dug in
1
Respondent-father was the father of only the three youngest children.
-1-
his nails in an attempt to make him stop screaming. The evidence also clearly and convincingly
established that there was a reasonable likelihood that the oldest boy would suffer from injury in
the foreseeable future if placed in respondent-father’s home. Despite participating in counseling
and parenting classes during a prior protective proceeding, respondent-father continued to
employ inappropriate discipline methods.
In addition, respondent-father’s denial of
responsibility for the scratches showed that he had not accepted responsibility for his behavior
and, as such, was unlikely to change that behavior.
The trial court also properly relied upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) when terminating
respondent-father’s parental rights. The fact that the youngest boy was covered in feces and
there was feces spread throughout the home provided sufficient evidence of a past failure by
respondent-father to provide proper care or custody for the children. In addition, respondentfather failed to properly care for the two boys when he left them in their room for such extended
periods of time that one of them was forced to defecate on the bedroom floor. Next, although
respondent-father admitted on the day of the children’s removal that the substance spread
throughout the house and covering a child was feces, he changed his story by the time of the
initial dispositional hearing where he identified the substance as mud or chocolate pudding. This
denial about the feces showed there was no reasonable expectation that respondent-father would
be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the children’s
young ages.2
We next turn our attention to respondent-mother’s argument that the trial court erred
when it failed to grant her request for a Clinic evaluation prior to the best interests determination,
thereby depriving her of the opportunity to obtain best interests evidence. Respondent-mother
cites In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472-473; 564 NW2d 156 (1997), for the proposition
that she had the burden of going forward with evidence to show that termination of parental
rights was not in the children’s best interests. However, our Supreme Court specifically rejected
that proposition in In re Trejo, where the Court held “that under subsection 19b(5), the court may
consider evidence introduced by any party” when making its best interests determination and,
“even where no best interest evidence is offered,” the court may make its determination based on
“evidence on the whole record.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Furthermore, respondent-mother had the opportunity to present best interests evidence and, in
fact, did present testimony that was sympathetic to herself. She also had the opportunity to
present additional evidence on the issue had she so desired. Therefore, the trial court did not
commit clear error when it failed to grant her request.3
2
Though not necessary to resolve this appeal, we also conclude that termination of respondentfather’s parental rights was properly ordered pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). As discussed
above, there was a reasonable likelihood that the oldest boy would suffer from physical injury in
the foreseeable future if placed in respondent-father’s home. In addition, the children’s health
would be at great risk of harm had they been returned to a home that was reasonably likely to
become unsanitary and unhealthy once again.
3
Though neither respondent has challenged the trial court’s finding that termination of their
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
(…continued)
rights was in the best interests of the children, our review of the record reveals no clear error in
the trial court’s conclusion.
-3-
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