IN RE J L MORING MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
October 14, 2010
In the Matter of J. L. MORING, Minor.
No. 296851
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-457530-NA
Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and WHITBECK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-mother1 appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i), and (j). We affirm.
Before a court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights, the petitioner must establish
at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re JK, 468
Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). In this case, the trial court did not err when it found
sufficient evidence that respondent-mother had not rectified the conditions leading to
adjudication and was not likely to do so within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The conditions that led to adjudication were medical neglect, untreated
mental health issues, poor parenting skills, and alcohol abuse, which led to the termination of
respondent-mother’s rights to other children a few months before the minor child at issue in this
case was born. Although respondent-mother participated in parenting classes and therapy, she
did not benefit from the services she received. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676-677;
692 NW2d 708 (2005). She demonstrated that she was still unwilling or unable to meet any of
her children’s medical and emotional needs when she failed to visit or attend medical
appointments. Her unwillingness to learn to use public transportation was not a sufficient
excuse. Further, because she missed screens, she could not demonstrate that she had stopped
abusing alcohol.
The same evidence supported the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother had failed
to provide proper care and custody for the child and was not reasonably likely to do so in a
reasonable time. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Moreover, the risks posed by respondent-mother’s
serious neglect of the child’s medical and therapeutic needs made it reasonably likely that the
1
The child’s father is not involved in the present appeal.
-1-
child would be harmed if returned to respondent-mother’s home. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Lastly,
the trial court did not err by finding that respondent-mother’s rights to another child had been
terminated because of serious neglect or abuse and that prior rehabilitation efforts had failed.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). We conclude that the statutory grounds for termination were proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
Respondent-mother also challenges the trial court’s finding under MCL 712A.19b(5) that
termination was in the child’s best interests. Respondent-mother claims that she and the child
shared an obvious bond. But the only testimony on this subject suggested that they did not have
a bond. The child was removed as a newborn, and respondent-mother reportedly attended only
five of about fifty offered visits. Further, the child had medical and developmental challenges
that required a stable and attentive environment, which respondent-mother could not provide.
We cannot conclude that the trial court erred by finding that termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.